Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  EXPLANATORY POWER
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

O DVOCH POHĽADOCH NA NARATÍVNU EXPLANÁCIU

100%
Zeleňák E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 8
762-769
EN
The paper deals with one of the central topics of the philosophy of history - the narrative. Two different views of narrative and consequently of narrative explanation are distinguished. According to the first position (defended, for instance, by Hayden White), reality itself does not have a narrative structure, but since we are familiar with the narrative form, we can explain events if we present them as a story of a particular kind. According to the second position (maintained, for instance, by David Carr), in order to explain, we need to capture real connections (narrative or other) between events. That is, our narratives should depict structures already present in reality. The paper outlines these two general views and points out to the fact that they are based on different ontological presuppositions and different views of the nature of the explanatory power of narrative.
2

THE ROLE OF PRIORS IN A PROBABILISTIC ACCOUNT OF “BEST EXPLANATION”

100%
Donchev A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2017
|
vol. 24
|
issue 4
511 - 525
EN
In this paper, the author argues that the notion of “best explanation”, as it appears in the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), can be defined in terms of explanatory power (EP) (i.e. the best explanation among a set of possible explanations is the one having the highest EP), if we employ a probabilistic measure of EP, which takes into account both the likelihoods and the prior probabilities of the compared explanatory hypotheses. Although the association between the EP of a hypothesis and its likelihood is largely uncontroversial, most of those working on EP do not see an association between EP and the prior probability of an explanatory hypothesis. He provides three examples (two toy examples and one from real scientific practice), in order to show that the role of priors in decisions about the best explanatory hypothesis deserves a serious consideration. The author also shows that such an explication of “best explanation” allows us to compare IBE and Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) in terms of the probabilities they assign to two competing hypotheses, and thus to elicit the conditions under which both IBE and BCT lead to the same conclusion and are in this sense compatible.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.