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1

INTERNALISTICKÉ ZNAKY V KONCEPCII INTUITÍVNEHO POZNANIA PODĽA DUNSA SCOTA

100%
Chabada M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 9
721 – 732
EN
The paper deals with internalist features of the conception of intuitive cognition according to Duns Scotus. Its first part is concerned with strong and weak internalism, the latter being compatible with externalism. In its second part attention is paid to Duns Scotus’ theory of intuitive cognition including internal states of the soul, acts of recollection and contingent truth propositions. The goal of the third part is to show the manner in which the internalist features are present in Scotus’ theory of intuition. In conclusion the author suggests that Scotus’ theory of intuition resembles the access internalism in its weak form and as such doesn´t contradict externalism.
2

SPORY O CHARAKTER ZDÔVODNENIA V SÚČASNEJ ANALYTICKEJ EPISTEMOLÓGII

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Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
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issue 6
517 – 522
EN
The controversy between internalists and externalists concerning the approach to justification is among central issues in contemporary analytic epistemology. In its first part, the paper briefly surveys the main points of controversy. In its second part, the author defends the view that internalist and externalist approaches are components of two different epistemological projects. If the presented view is true, then the controversy between internalism and externalism is in fact meaningless, because it does not concern the same subject.
3

PREČO EXTERIALISTICKÉ KRITÉRIÁ ZDÔVODNENIA PRINCIPIÁLNE ZLYHÁVAJÚ?

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Nuhlíček M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 1
37 – 49
EN
The article concerns two basic approaches to the problem of epistemic belief-justification: internalism and externalism. The article aims to showing that internalism as well as externalism, when confronted with the problem of philosophical scepticism, face various kinds of problems, which lead to implausibility of their respective accounts of justification. The author provides a special focus on the externalist approach which was invented as a direct response to the threat of scepticism. The central part of the article contains a brief analysis of main attributes of externalism, and subsequently its criticism which aims to showing that the criteria of justification proposed by externalists do not accomplish the basic function of distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs. The author argues that the discussed deficiencies of externalism result from its elementary rationale, which implies that they are incurable, and therefore the externalist criteria of justification inevitably fail.
4

PROBLÉM VNÚTORNÝCH A VONKAJŠÍCH FAKTOROV V HRUŠOVSKÉHO KONCEPCII VÝVINU VEDECKÉHO POZNANIA

100%
Viceník J., Zigo M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 10
939-952
EN
In the first part of the paper the authors describe Hrusovsky's model of the development of scientific knowledge, which, due to the influence of logical empiricism, he saw as cumulative, hypothetical-confirmational and internal, i.e. taking into account only scientific factors. In the second part it is showed, that Hrusovsky acknowledged the influence of the external factors, emphasizing at the same time the fundamental independence of scientific knowledge. He dismissed the vulgar economism as well as the extreme internalism (immanentism).
5

MEMORIES OF THE FOURTH CONDITION AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM A SUSPICIOUS EXTERNALISM

86%
Bac M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
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vol. 16
|
issue 2
127-145
EN
A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier's original article. The author's aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old epistemological issue. He argues that Pollock's paradigmatic treatment of the matter gives rise to a critical problem with regard to the exact role of the fourth condition and its relation with the onto-semantic or alethic condition of propositional knowledge, to wit, truth. In the light of this discussion, the author draws certain conclusions about epistemic externalism and point out some of its theoretical shortcomings.
6

PERFECT THINKERS, PERFECT SPEAKERS AND INTERNALISM ABOUT THOUGHT CONTENT

86%
Angelova-Elchinova M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
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vol. 30
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issue 3
281 – 309
EN
In the following paper I propose an argument against internalism about thought content. After a brief preview of the recent debate between Sarah Sawyer and Åsa Wikforss, the paper outlines the central issue in their discussion. I show that, even if Wikforss’ objections against Sawyer are granted, externalism about thought content can still prevail. For my argument, I use Wikforss` own objection against externalism and show how, if accepted, it binds one to the mythical figure of the perfect speaker – an infallible creature that possesses complete understanding of all of her concepts.
7

CAUSALITY, TRUTH AND REALITY

72%
Taliga M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2010
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vol. 17
|
issue 4
488-507
EN
The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.
8

(UN)HOLY GRAIL OF EPISTEMOLOGY

72%
Ziȩba P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
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vol. 22
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issue 1
21 - 33
EN
As formulated by Duncan Pritchard and John McDowell, epistemological disjunctivism is the claim that perceptual experience can provide the subject with epistemic justification that is reflectively accessible and externally grounded at the same time. Pritchard calls this thesis ‘the holy grail of epistemology’, since it reconciles two traditionally rival theories of justification, namely epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. The main objection against epistemological disjunctivism thus understood is that it does not do justice to the well-known internalist intuitions expressed in The New Evil Demon and Brain-in-a-Vat scenarios. The author defends epistemological disjunctivism from this objection by indicating that those who apply to such scenarios commit themselves to implausible views in the philosophy of mind. He concludes that epistemological disjunctivism accurately expresses the epistemological attitude of a non-reductive materialist regarding the body-mind problem.
9
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THE PROBLEM OF ACTION INDIVIDUATION AND INTERNALIZATION (Problem indywiduacji i internalizacji dzialan)

72%
Paprzycka K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 11
291-315
EN
One of the striking features of Davidson's account of action individuation is the internalization of actions to the domain of bodily movements. I reconstruct Davidson's arguments for that claim as applying mainly against naive externalism (according to which actions are simple events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body) but also against externalist moderationism (according to which actions are complex events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body). I show that the debate between Davidson's internalist minimalism and externalist moderationism is at a standstill. Externalist moderationism is better at explaining some of the claims we are prepared to make about actions (the temporal problem) while internalist minimalism is better at capturing some deeper intuitions about actions. I argue that one can use the old distinction between process and product as applied to agency to help get out of the impasse and restore healthy externalist intuitions.
10

K PREDPOKLADOM A SÚVISLOSTIAM FAKTU V SOCIÁLNOM POZNANÍ

72%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 7
613-624
EN
The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The applied approach is historical (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiation between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Intentionality and the structure of social facts in terms of Searle's construction of the social are underlined as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, which contents are conceived - contrary to Searle's internalism - in terms of externalism.
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