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1

Empedocles’ Sphairos and its Interpretations in Antiquity, I: Aristotle and the Neoplatonists

100%
Hladký V.
Eirene. Studia Graeca et Latina
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2014
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vol. 50
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issue 1-2
149-164
EN
This article attempts to shed more light on a problem addressed in a previous work by the same authors, namely the nature of Empedocles’ Sphairos, which is taken for a structured whole and not – according to the usual interpretation – as an amorphous mixture. This article does not concentrate on the fragments of Empedocles himself, but focuses on the further reception of the Sphairos by ancient Greek writers. First, the paper attempts to show that the interpretation prevalent today is actually due to Aristotle’s equation of the Sphairos with his concept of ‘underlying matter’ conceived as an indeterminate substratum. The only ancient author who seems to hold the interpretation of the Sphere as an amorphous mixture is, however, John Philoponus, and, moreover, only in some of his commentaries on Aristotle. Philoponus’ notion of the Sphairos was then adopted by Friedrich Wilhelm Sturz, author of the first substantial modern study on Empedocles, published in 1805. The current article then examines the Neoplatonic explanation of the Sphairos, in which it is regularly equated with the intelligible word of the Forms. Although its transcendence is clearly at odds with the Empedocles’ original intentions, this interpretative approach assumes that the Sphairos is as clearly structured as the Forms are.
2

Empedocles’ Sphairos and Its Interpretations in Antiquity, II: Plato’s Timaeus and Statesman

100%
Hladký V.
Eirene. Studia Graeca et Latina
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2015
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vol. 51
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issue 1-2
71-98
EN
This article presents further discussion of a problem addressed in a previous study, namely the nature of Empedocles’ Sphairos, which is taken to be a structured whole and not – as it is usually interpreted – an amorphous mixture. Instead of concentrating on the fragments of Empedocles himself, a previous article launched a thorough study of the further reception of the Sphairos by later ancient Greek writers (Aristotle and the Neoplatonists). This time we turn our attention to Plato, where we can find Empedoclean echoes in the Timaeus and Politicus. In both cases, the Sphairos is equated with the sensible world, which is, again, a structured whole. Common motifs include the world conceived as a kind of superorganism (living being), the idea of a cosmic cycle, and the concept of the blessed life of humankind in the Golden Age.
3

Empedocles’ Sphairos and Its Interpretations in Antiquity, III: Zoogony and Plato’s Symposium

100%
Hladký V.
Eirene. Studia Graeca et Latina
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2016
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vol. 52
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issue 1-2
359–383
EN
This article presents further discussion of a problem addressed in a previous work, namely the nature of Empedocles’ Sphairos, which is taken by us to be a structured whole and not – as it seems to be usually interpreted – an amorphous mixture. In the previous two articles we did not concentrate on the fragments of Empedocles himself, but initiated a thorough study of the further reception of the Sphairos by later ancient Greek writers (Aristotle and the Neoplatonists). Then we turned our attention to Plato, where we can fi nd Empedoclean echoes in the Timaeus and Statesman. This time we are investigating Empedocles’zoogony, that is, his account of the origin of life. There are strong parallels between Empedocles’ fragments and Plato’s Symposium. We have proposed a new reconstruction of the transformations of living beings to fi t better with our interpretation of Sphairos and Empedocles’ cosmic cycle. The article offers a metapoetic reading of Herondas’ second Mimiamb, in which Battaros should be identifi ed with Callimachus, Thales with Apollonius of Rhodes and Myrtale with the poetic production of Callimachus himself. According to this approach, the real aim of the mimiamb could be the ironic description of Callimachus (portrayed as a greedy brothel-keeper) accusing Apollonius of stealing his poems: the Koan jury (probably the poets around Philetas) will have to judge, in fact, a case of plagiarism.
4
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The Meaning of Genus in Ancient Greek Philosophy up to Aristotle and in Thomas Aquinas

51%
D’Antuono M.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 3
515-545
EN
The term “genus” has evolved over time. This paper traces development of the word from the common usage of Ancient Greece, through the pre-Socratic philosophers and Plato, and up to the more technical use in Aristotle. It began in common use to mean a class or race of people, most specifically referring to people with a common parentage. The pre-Socratics applied the term to refer to things that were generated. Plato used the term to refer to groups of people generated by a common interest or aim. Aristotle employed it in different ways based on his predecessors. This paper makes comparisons between these usages and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that understanding the development of “genus” facilitates understanding how Thomas Aquinas used it.
5
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Aristotelova první filosofie a první filosofové

45%
Boháček K.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 6
837-860
EN
The author addresses the issue of the origin of the discipline that we call metaphysics. First he briefly describes the difficulties associated with Aristotle’s extant metaphysical concept: problems with the character of his treatise Metaphysics, problems with the arrangement of the individual books, and even problems with the title – all related to the problematic lack of clarity in the discipline itself. He then presents an overview of the common solutions to these difficulties in the conclusion to the first part of the article. In the second part, the author provides a detailed analysis of one of the possible interpretative hypotheses: that Aristotle’s metaphysics is a continuation of the pre-Socratic tradition and, in fact, only explicitly articulates a general, foundational theme of philosophy. This interpretation is closely related to Jan Patočka’s universal concept of metaphysics. By analyzing the textual evidence of the doctrines of the archetypal pre-Socratic candidates for a first metaphysics, the author concludes that, in agreement with recent research, these thinkers do not share Aristotle’s metaphysical approach. Differently from Patočka, the author thereby concludes that we can meaningfully talk about a pre-metaphysical philosophy.
CS
Autor se zabývá problémem původu disciplíny zvané metafyzika. Nejprve nastiňuje obtíže spojené s rekonstrukcí Aristotelovy metafyzické koncepce: problémy s charakterem spisu Metafyzika, problémy s řazením jednotlivých knih, ba dokonce problémy s názvem – to vše souvisí s problematickou nevyjasněností disciplíny samé. V závěru první části prezentuje přehled obvyklých řešení těchto obtíží.
6
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Normativity and Ontology of Law in Early Greek Philosophy

45%
Goździalski K.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica
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2022
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vol. 100
107-125
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest przybliżeniu problematyki powstania europejskiej nauki i filozofii, które zostały ufundowane przez antycznych Greków. W okresie nazywanym Pierwszym Oświeceniem doszło, z jednej strony do stopniowego odejścia od mitologicznych wyjaśnień rzeczywistości, z drugiej – do zbudowania nowego sposobu patrzenia na świat, zwanego badaniem przyrody. Dociekania antycznych Greków miały wymiar ontologiczny – polegały na poszukiwaniu arche świata – poszukiwali oni bowiem ostatecznej struktury rzeczywistości, a co ważne, człowiek usytuowany był w tych badaniach jako integralna ale nie najważniejsza część kosmosu, poddana jego prawom. Presokratycy nie stawiali człowieka ponad naturą, nie odróżniali bowiem ściśle praw przyrody od praw wspólnoty. Był to jeden z powodów, dla których nie powstała wówczas nauka prawa. Poza tym, Grecy nigdy nie redukowali swojego prawa do systemu, ponieważ zbyt często bogowie lub demos „wtrącali się” do praw polis. Było ono typowym przykładem „prawa bez prawoznawstwa”, ponieważ było elastyczne a także posiadało niejasno sformułowane reguły i instytucje. Istotny był tutaj również brak wyszkolonej grupy zawodowych prawników. Okres ten zakończył się wraz z pojawieniem się filozofii Sokratesa. Do jego czasów filozofia badała liczby i ruchy, a także zajmowała się zagadnieniem, skąd wszystkie rzeczy biorą swój początek i dokąd znikają; obserwowała też gwiazdy, odległości między nimi, ich obiegi oraz badała zjawiska pojawiające się na niebie. Pierwsi mędrcy uważali, że zdobywają wiedzę przez prowadzenie badań dotyczących samych zjawisk naturalnych. Sokrates odrzucił ontologię i badanie natury zapoczątkowane przez Milezyjczyków i myślicieli z obszaru Wielkiej Grecji, na rzecz poszukiwania znaczenia słów i pojęć występujących w języku ateńskiego polis. Sądził bowiem, że znalezienie znaczenia słów oznacza odsłonięcie rzeczywistości, do której inaczej dotrzeć nie można.
EN
The paper is devoted to the issues of the emergence of European science and philosophy, founded by the ancient Greeks. In the period known as the First Enlightenment, there was, on the one hand, a gradual departure from the mythological explanations of the reality, and, on the other, the construction of a new way of looking at the world, known as the study of nature. The inquiries of the ancient Greeks had an ontological dimension; they consisted in searching for the arche of the world and they were looking for the ultimate structure of reality, and, what is important, the human being was situated in these studies as an integral, but not the most important part of the Cosmos, subject to its laws. Presocratics did not put the human being above nature, because they did not strictly distinguish between the laws of nature and the laws of community. This was one of the reasons why the science of law did not arise at that time. Besides, the Greeks never reduced their right to the system, because too often gods or demos ‘interfered’ with the laws of the polis. It was a typical example of “law without jurisprudence”, because it was flexible and had vaguely formulated rules and institutions. Another significant factor here was the lack of the trained group of professional lawyers. This period ended with the advent of Socrates’ philosophy. Up to his time, philosophy had studied numbers and movements, and had dealt with the question of where all things have their origin and where they disappear; it also had observed the stars, the distances between them, their circuits, as well as had studied phenomena which appear in the sky. The early sages believed that they could gain knowledge by conducting research into natural phenomena themselves. Socrates rejected the ontology and study of nature initiated by the Milesians and other early Greek thinkers in favour of searching for the meaning of words and concepts found in the Athenian polis language. He believed that finding the meaning of words translated into revealing the reality which could not be reached otherwise.
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