Sovereignty in the European Union is restricted by EU law and policies. The weakest and peripheral states have the least impact on the shape of this law and policies and hence are most constrained thereby. In the case of the largest states sovereignty is reinforced. Countries with the greatest influence on the way the Union functions are able to use its instruments to implement goals that result from their national democratic processes, which means that the sovereignty of the most powerful states is enhanced at the expense of those on the periphery. The key to explain this phenomenon is the asymmetry of power in the EU among the Member States. In a way, the smaller states, which are weaker economically and politically, trade their national sovereignty for economic benefits or for a stronger sense of stability and security. At the same time, the crises that affect Europe show that the said benefits from limiting sovereignty are not durable, as they have resulted in a number of economic, social and political problems, undermining both stability and a sense of security.
The financial crisis has resulted in EU Member States having to pay massive amounts of money to rescue their banks. To protect taxpayers’ money in the future, the EU institutions have made some profound amendments to the legal framework, shifting the financial burden stemming from banks’ failures to some stakeholders, mainly on banks’ shareholders and unsecured creditors. This is a part of the banking union, the supervision on banks by one body is supplemented by the Single Resolution Fund. However, the details of such a system are disappointing because they do not guarantee that taxpayers’ money really will be protected in future crises, as envisaged.
EU decision-making has always been criticised, mostly due to its complexity. Nowadays, especially with regard to several crises Europe is facing, the criticism is overwhelming. However, such criticism is rarely accompanied by an even superficial attempt to explore EU decision-making and its specificity, which can briefly be described as multi-level, multi-faceted, and complex. The purpose of this article is to present and analyse decision-making in the European Union through the prism of three logics of political action often used in international relations, the logic of consequentiality, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of justification. These examine the motives, behaviour and goals of players who influence decisions. The main thesis of this article is that the specifics of the EU decision-making mean that each of the logics is reflected even in terms of single issues. This results in the fact that the European Union, in terms of its decision-making, remains a sui generis structure, with a mode of decision-making incomparable to other international structures. Analysis of EU decision-making through the prism of the three logics also gives a research perspective to help understanding of specific EU decisions in different integration and international contexts.
This article discusses the impact of the crisis on the processes of European integration. From this broad perspective, certain general and detailed problems have been selected for analysis, including the ‘operational code’ of European integration that was developed at the point in time when political decisions were taken to initiate the integration processes. The European Union’s operational code is based on pur¬suing the policy of fait accompli and giving priority to integration in the policies of the member states, regardless of the area of integration and the values concerned. Even the principles of democracy have been subordinated to this priority. In the light of the fact that public voting has been bypassed on issues related to integration, including economic ones, the legitimacy and effectiveness of these decisions have been called into question. The entire discussion is burdened by the lack of any funda¬mental consensus about what the political outcome of the integration should be, nor to what extent the crisis, in its various aspects (economic, political, social and dem¬ocratic), may change the European Union.
The aim of this article is to present the concept of circular migration in the European migration policy. Circular migration has recently been promoted as a triple win solution bringing benefits to destination and origin countries as well as to migrant workers themselves. What is more, circular movements are being advocated as a potential solution to a number of challenges surrounding contemporary migration in the EU (labour shortages in certain sectors, population ageing, etc.). The article focuses on political statements published mainly by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union directly and indirectly concerning circular migration. The EU has already developed certain regulations facilitating circular movements that are also mentioned in the publication. Finally, the paper offers some general thoughts about the implications for the future of the EU migration policy.
The article provides an analysis of the family policy in Sweden in broader Scandinavian and European contexts, with special attention given to the new welfare trends from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. Generous parental leave schemes, including the father’s quota, and public childcare have been for years the trademark of the Nordic countries. The author argues that despite recent changes and challenges, such as the introduction of private for profit childcare providers and a home care allowance, Swedish and Nordic family policies have remained largely social-democratic in their underlying goals, such as gender equality, high employment and female labour force participation, universalism in providing social services, etc. These policies have manager to facilitate a balanced work-family model of dual earners and dual carers. They also contribute to a fertility rate much higher than in other parts of Europe.
The process of European integration has not been finalised by a so-called finalité politique i.e. a supranational entity, probably in form of a federation. This entity, expected to play an independent and crucial role in the global arena, is still not created yet. At the same time, the crisis on global markets in 2008 and its aftermath has created many new and unprecedented challenges. Crisis as such is nothing new in the history of European integration, in fact it has been stated that real progress went ‘from crisis to crisis’ (J.Delors). This means that only new challenges push forward the whole machin¬ery. The situation after 2008 is different however, as at this moment the European Union is challenged by a multilayer crisis. Namely, the EU currently has problems with: 1) Leadership and strategic vision; 2) Economic crisis in the Eurozone, together with overwhelming domestic debts in the so-called PIGS countries, mainly of the Mediter¬ranean region; 3) Institutions (the ‘democratic deficit’), and even 4) Axiology, i.e. a common system of values, which are being frequently and openly challenged in many Member States by various political forces. Thus the EU today, in the middle of the sec¬ond decade of the twenty-first century, is staying just in front of the threshold, or rather a fault-line, and faces a cardinal dilemma: how to deepen integration, including the cru¬cial CFSP, amongst a growing tide of renationalisation? One thing seems to be obvious, however. The longer will be the crisis (multi-layered!), the greater will be the opportu¬nities for anti-integration forces and processes. Only strong leadership with a reformist agenda can bring us out of this Catch-22 situation. Without courage and vision, the EU may be doomed to become an ‘economic giant and political pygmy’ again. Is that the status we wish as we face the challenges from the so-called emerging markets and in an era when a new balance of (economic) power is also emerging after 2008?
This article presents an analysis of the growing role of transnational processes and interaction between political parties, interest groups, non-governmen¬tal organisations, and other civil society institutions. The main aim is to discuss the nature of transnational participatory processes, the reasons for their occurrence, and their forms and manifestations and intensity and effectiveness, as well as their con¬sequences for the functioning of the EU system with respect to its democratic char¬acter. The research problems approached in this article include: 1) the nature of transnational participation, its determinants and the factors affecting its develop¬ment; 2) explication of the interrelations between the laws adopted by the European Union and the transnational participatory processes; 3) the increasing social approval for the actions undertaken and the process of integration as a whole – increasing the output legitimacy of the European Union – as a result of the transna¬tional participatory processes.
Since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty two decades ago, we have wit¬nessed intense debates on the future of democracy in Europe, mostly fuelled by the hope and expectation that we would sooner or later figure out how democratic processes could function in the European multi-level system, and how they should be institutionalised. Under the impact of the financial crisis however, the confidence in such perspectives has been shaken. Rather than institutionalizing ‘more democracy’, Europe’s crisis management system has established authoritarian modes of economic governance, executed by an administrative-governmental compound. Thus it remains all the more important to keep democratic aspirations alive and to search anew for firm constitutional grounds for implementing more democracy. At present, the prospects for such efforts are anything but encouraging.
Presidency in the Council of the European Union creates conditions to shape the image of a state. This regularity is confirmed in the case of Poland as well. Especially if one takes into account the fact that Poland is the first large state of the ‘new EU’, which faced the task to preside the works of the EU Council. The main aim of the article is to discuss the preparatory stage to the process of shaping our state image during Polish presidency in the EU Council. It is therefore justified to illustrate activities which constitute these preparation as well as to discuss the activities undertaken by proper institutions. Especially if one considers their dual orientation. First of all, the absence of proper experience of Poland in the organization of the process of shaping its own image. Secondly, there exist the formal-legal proposals deciding on the character of the Presidency accepted on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Nowadays, when the European Union is weak and faces the dilemma of how to overcome this weakness, it should pay more attention to the area of Sub-Saharan Africa and establish a set of roles that could be played in order to conduct an effective policy in the region. Taking the above into consideration, the main research problem of this study is the question of how the European Union is trying to take advantage of its activity in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa through international roles with regard to the increase of its power in the international arena. The aim of the article is, therefore, to identify the roles that the European Union plays towards the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and assess their effectiveness and potential impact on the growth of its power. Unfortunately, it can be concluded that the actions undertaken by the Euro-pean Union are a drop in the sea of the real needs of African societies and are often ineffective.
One of the main promises of the Treaty of Lisbon was to increase the democratic legitimacy of the European Union through strengthening the role of national parliament’s in EU policy-making under so-called "Early Warning System" (EWS) for subsidiarity control. However, introduction of the EWS has met with some criticism in the academic literature. Scholars claim that the mechanism not only fails to alleviate the democratic deficit, but it also obfuscates the existing channels of delegation and accountability in the EU. Moreover, it has been predicted that the EWS will remain a mere "window dressing", largely unexploited by national assemblies, let alone the subnational parliaments. This article addresses the above-mentioned criticisms four years after the entry into force of the Lisbon provisions. On the basis of an empirically grounded analysis, this article identifies and evaluates positive effects of the EWS with respect to both the input and output legitimacy of the EU. The article posits that the unintended (spill-over) effects of the EWS allow for its broader conceptualisation as (1) a disciplining tool for a better regulatory environment; (2) a representation and accountability enhancing mechanism; (3) an opportunity structure for increasing parliamentary control of the executive an (4) a Europeanization mechanism.
The article presents an analysis of rail freight and passenger transport in the EU and coordination of European transport corridors. The analysis was based on an assessment of the passengers’ traffic, density of railway lines in the EU countries, the dynamics of freight and passenger transport dynamics.
The current text of the European Security Strategy is 12 years old. Its record relates to a world, even if not completely non-existent, then certainly one that is described selectively. As such it urgently requires a fresh look. Avoiding the strategic debate per se does not remove the need for the EU to act strategically. Its aim is not mere participation in international relations based on the existing potential to effectively protect Community interests. The lack of an upto-date security strategy blurs the clarity of purpose, weakens domestic consensus, and does not facilitate communication with other international actors. Pursuing strategies by collective actors (with multiple centres of decision-making), which is the case with the European Union, by its very nature cannot be easy. Democracy as a common denominator for the EU and the Member States’ status as sovereign decision-makers on strategic matters do not provide for a single dominant model of a security strategy. Thus, inevitably, both short-term decisions and the common strategic culture are the result of a laborious and rather slow process. The main purpose of the EU strategy, however, is to be simply an instrument of good policy and an effective reference point in planning specific, collective actions, conscious of the clearly stated interests of the entire Community. It is not replaceable by ad hoc measures or sectoral approaches (resulting solely from external circumstances, opportunities as they arise, or simply viewed as ersatz strategy). Having a strategy promotes the strong members in the implementation of their plans and in the case of the weaker—brings hope that their security situation will improve. Thus, it is also an attribute of global leadership, to which the EU aspires.
The aim of this article is presentation the problem of protection of multiculturalism in the European Union after its enlargement. There are two aspects of the issue: protection of cultural diversity within one community and within the space of the EU. The first part refers to the Polish and foreign regulations connected with the problem of protection of cultural pluralism. Special attention is paid to the rules of the Polish Constitution from 2nd April 1997 concerning to the liberty of conscience and religion. In addition, Austrian, German and French constitutional solutions referring to the liberty of religion are shortly presented. The second part of this article is presentation the EU programmes Culture 2000, MEDIA Plus and eContent. Analysis of these programmes shows that they promote the cultural diversity in Europe, which results from the cultural policy of the UE. In this context, it must be emphasized that article 151 part 4 of the consolidate version of the Treaty establishing the European Community states that the Community shall respect the diversity of its cultures. The EU programmes give the great opportunity to participate in the formation of the cultural policy of the EuropeanUnion. It is particularly important for Poland which should actively participate in these programmes. In conclusion, the author ascertains that the liberty of settling down in the EU inserts new norms and values into national cultures. Therefore, national minorities must have lawfully guaranteed the right to preserve their own religion, mother tongue and tradition. It must be stressed that this right is very well protected by Polish constitutional regulations. At the same time, the cultural policy of the European Union intends to encourage development of national cultures and promotion of inter-cultural dialogue. Consequently, one cannot agree with the statement that the process of integration of Europe will annihilate the cultural diversity in Europe. In particular, the entry of Poland to the European Union will not destroy Polish cultural identity. The EU s money will afford possibilities for quicker than ever development of Polish culture.
As a result of Russian intervention on the Crimean Peninsula in February and March 2014, this area has been brought into the Russian Federation. The EU in response, at an extraordinary summit on the sixth of March, decided to suspend the decade-long visa dialogue with Russia. An amendment to the agreement on visa facilitation was frozen, as well as talks suspended on the abolition of visas. Within a few days, the matter in Crimea shattered the hard-fought prospects for a compromise between Russia and the EU for facilitating border crossing rules, including the target of the abolition of visas. The Polish experience with local border traffic (LBT) may serve as an example for other EU countries interested in signing a similar agreement with neighbouring Russian areas. It is worth now supporting practical solutions that would facilitate contacts between the inhabitants of Kaliningrad and EU countries, including Poland.
This article discusses the language policies of the European Union and the United Nations. The author has raised two main research questions, which are reflected in the aims of the article. The two principal aims are to demonstrate that the language policies of the EU and the UN are multilingualism policies as well as to present their corresponding and divergent elements based on their assumptions and objectives. At the beginning, the author presents the concepts of language policy and multilingualism, and then analyses all aspects of multilingualism in the EU and UN contexts. The author extensively presents the legal framework of multilingualism, its policies and the role of Member States in the promotion of multilingualism in both organisations. The final part of the article is devoted to a comparison of the two presented systems.
A new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law, presented by the European Commission in March 2014, seeks to ensure effective and coherent protection of one of the values on which the European Union is founded. The new framework is to precede and complement the Article 7 TEU procedure and infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU. Nevertheless, this initiative is just a prelude to future treaty changes that could lead to more systematic and autonomous monitoring of fundamental rights within the EU, depolitisation of the mechanisms ensuring respect of EU common values and strengthening the role of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union in this area.
The political and strategic dimensions of the relations between the EU and the Republic of Korea fall within the category of a more complex interaction namely economic and cultural. In this perspective, economic relations seem to prevail. However, the political and strategic dimension is growing very quickly, paradoxically also due to the fast-advancing economic cooperation, especially since the 2010 Free Trade Agreement (FTA). From that point forward, both parties have considered each other strategic partners.In the current situation in the East Asia: the growing military power of China, the possible changes in political alliances and security issues on the Korean Peninsula and Japan’s departure from a pacifist stance, the political and strategic dimension of the relations between the EU and the Republic of Korea are likely to gain in significance. Although the interaction between Europe and Korea boasts a long history, strict EU-Korea relations have been varied. Bilateral relations between Korea and some EU member states are at a different level of advancement than overall EU-Korea interactions. Despite the cultural differences and often competing interests and threats, relations between the EU and Korea are still important for both sides.
The application of European company law by domestic courts entails prior interpretation of EU legislation. Firstly, the manner of interpretation of European company law is affected by both the specific nature of European company law and l’acquis communautaire. Secondly, interpretation methods are subject to the principle of uniform interpretation, which aims to safeguard uniform understanding and application of l’acquis EUwide. Thirdly, when undertaking pro-European interpretation one must (i) have regard to all domestic methods of interpretation, (ii) in line with the blanket ban on contra legem interpretation, and (iii) bear in mind the purpose and wording of a directive serving as a point of reference for pro-European interpretation, as far as possible.
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