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Eurosceptyzym polskich partii politycznych – ile w tym przekonania, a ile pragmatyzmu?

100%
Pacześniak A.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
|
2015
|
issue 2(33)
177-200
EN
The aim of the article is to consider the Euroscepticism of Polish political parties in the period before the accession to the EU and after 2004. Empirical material for this article is contained in electoral manifestoes of four Polish political parties defined by author as Eurosceptic (League of Polish Families, Self‑Defence, Law and Justice, Congress of New Right), published between 2001 and 2014. The author is looking for answer to the question, as far the Eurosceptic position of political party is the result of the party’s relationship to the EU and the axiology, expressed in their political manifestoes, and as far there is the tactical response to the expectations of their electorates.
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Rola Unii Europejskiej na arenie międzynarodowej według partii eurosceptycznych — nowy wymiar wspólnoty?

100%
Tereszkiewicz F.
Rocznik Europeistyczny
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2016
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issue 2
101-117
EN
A Eurosceptical attitude towards EU foreign affairs and an EU position in a new international order is presented in the paper. The author concentrates on Eurosceptic parties whose members are sitting in the European Parliament 8th term. Elements which are common for these politicians are described (the attitude toward US, Russia, NATO and immigration). Activities which, in the opinion of the Eurosceptic MEP, could be conducted in the framework of the European cooperation are identified (development assistance, environmental policy). At the end we are presented with a “Eurosceptical European identity”, which could be a basis for the international activity of the more or less integrated Europe.
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European Elections in Croatia

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Cipek T.
Political Preferences
|
2014
|
issue 9
21-37
EN
This text discusses the results of European elections in Croatia. It reaches the conclusion that voters, unhappy with the economic situation, punished the ruling social democratic coalition which suffered a heavy defeat. On the other hand, election results prove the recovery of HDZ, the opposition, centre-right party. It is also obvious that most Croatian citizens do not believe that European elections are important enough to warrant voting. Euroscepticism in Croatia is on the rise because citizens see no obvious benefits from joining the European Union. On the contrary, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in its first year as a member, Croatia will pay more funds into EU budget than it will receive from it. It is evident that direct elections of European Parliament members did not succeed in strengthening EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of Croatian voters, and that European elections are actually of secondary importance.
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The 2014 European Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia: Hardly and Novelty

100%
Krašovec A., Deželan T.
Political Preferences
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2014
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issue 9
77-96
EN
In the article the main characteristics of the European Parliament elections in 2014 in relation to the characteristics of the both previous elections to the Parliament were analysed. First, the legal framework is presented, followed by the presentation of candidate lists. As it is frequently the case, the authors for the analysis employed the analytical framework presented by Reif and Schmitt (1980). Following the framework, it is obvious the elections in Slovenia again demonstrated many elements of the second-order elections framework, for example in terms of the turnout, success of the governmental parties, success of small parties, as well as almost complete absence of party programmes, Euroscepticism and European topics in the campaign. Since several important domestic events happened just before the EP elections (e.g. resignation of the government at the beginning of May and the fact the leader of the biggest opposition party was by the court found guilty of corruption activity and sent to the prison at the end of April) such developments did not come as a big surprise.
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Meandry norweskiej europejskości

100%
Grzela J.
Rocznik Europeistyczny
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2016
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issue 2
149-165
EN
Norway is a part of Europe, not only geographically, but historically, financially and culturally. The European Union is the main trading partner of that country, and EU policies have an impact on many sectors of Norwegian life. Despite this, the Norwegians twice in a referendum rejected membership in the European Union. There are many reasons for this decision. Among them, the most stressed — economic reasons. Norwegians do not want to share profits from fishing, and, what is more, the extraction of natural resources. Norwegian economy is healthy and prospers well without being part of the European Union. Norwegian absence in the EU is therefore nothing other than self-preservation and Norwegians Euroscepticism is based on a commitment to autonomy.
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Polski eurosceptycyzm w kontekście dylematów teoretycznych i porównawczych

100%
Zuba K.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
|
2015
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issue 2(33)
155-176
EN
The aim of this article is an analysis of two of the most inflammatory issues in the debate over Euroscepticism – the typology of anti‑European attitudes and the main conditioning factors of these attitudes. The first aspect constitutes a certain substitute for a definitional debate, since despite the abundance of studies related to Euroscepticism, such studies contain only trace definitional concepts. In the Polish perspective, the two issues above have been presented in the context of the specificity of Poland’s political scene in the 1990s and early 2000s. This confirms that Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that exceeds the scope of simple generalizations, and is characterized by specific and unique processes occurring on the scale of particular countries. It should be acknowledged that, in Poland, we are dealing with a relatively clear scheme in which Euroscepticism relates almost exclusively to right‑wing parties. This does not mean, however, that it is not also conditioned by factors related to a particular party’s political strategy. The Polish example, therefore, fails to confirm the opposition between the two main conceptions of Euroscepticism – either as determined by ideology or as determined by political strategy.
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(Non)Existence of Bulgarian Party-Based Euroscepticism – Why Should We Care?

100%
Styczyńska N.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2015
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issue 2(33)
201-214
EN
Euroscepticism is often linked to the disappointment with the outcomes of transition as well as overgrown expectations that accompanied the accession to the European Union. The main aim of the paper is to investigate if and how party‑based Euroscepticism has been active in Bulgaria, a post‑ communist country in CEE and a member of the European Union since 2007. The paper will present the rhetoric and characteristics of main Eurosceptic political parties in Bulgaria. Bulgarian public opinion used to be perceived as one of the most pro‑European among the member states, but current events show that the European issue is not so salient for the Bulgarian society and political elite. The difficult social and political situation marginalises discussions about the functioning of the EU and the future of Europe. Not only the absence of Euroscepticism, but also the lack of any European issues in party manifestos is puzzling. This paper aims to answer the question if Bulgarian politicians are so pro‑European or rather if Europe doesn’t really matter to the elites.
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Proponents of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom from 1950 to 2017

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Tarnavskyi O.
Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne
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2017
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issue 4
39-58
PL
Autor niniejszego artykułu bada kwestię obecności zwolenników eurosceptycyzmu w Wielkiej Brytanii w latach 1950–2017. Autor twierdzi, że pierwszym eurosceptycznym szefem rządu był Winston Churchill i utrzymuje, że eurosceptycyzm nie jest zjawiskiem powiązanym z jakąkolwiek partią polityczną, lecz zjawiskiem o charakterze ponadpartyjnym, nieposiadającym ścisłego związku z konkretną ideologią. Jednocześnie zauważa, że największy odsetek eurosceptyków w Wielkiej Brytanii występuje wśród konserwatystów. W toku rozważań zawartych w artykule, autor identyfikuje głównego teoretyka współczesnego brytyjskiego eurosceptycyzmu, a także wyodrębnia umiarkowany i radykalny wariant eurosceptycyzmu.
EN
The author of this article explores the issues of the Proponents of Euroscepticism in the UK from 1950 to 2017. The researcher claims that Winston Churchill was the first Eurosceptic Prime Minister. The author believes that Euroscepticism is not related to any political party, but is a non-party phenomenon, not linked to a particular ideology. However, the researcher concludes that the biggest number of Eurosceptics in the UK can be found among the Conservatives. In addition, in his study, the author identifies the main theorist of contemporary British Euroscepticism as well as the moderate and radical types of Euroscepticism.
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Euroscepticism in the Visegrád Group

88%
Szewczyk J.
Catallaxy
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2021
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vol. 6
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issue 2
49-63
EN
Motivation: Euroscepticism is an phenomenon which is becoming increasingly important. EU countries ought to enhance cooperation in the face of major challenges. Despite challenges facing the European Union too little attention has been devote exploration Euroscepticism with particular reference to the V4 countries. Aim: The main objective of this study was to examine citizen?s Euroscepticism in the countries of the Visegrád Group. Accordingly, in the theoretical section were introduced definition of Euroscepticism, its classification and present differences in delineating of the phenomenon. Instigate an attempt to indicate the sources of Euroscepticism in the V4 countries and its characterize. The theoretical part was the basis for the empirical part in which was performed analysis results of Eurobarometer Public Opinion Researches. Materials and methods: Quantitative (basic statistical analysis and ALSCAL algorithm) methods were used in this investigation. The research data was drawn from Eurobarometer opinion polls commissioned by the European Commission. Results: The study indicated a varied level of Euroscepticism among the citizens of the Visegrad Group countries and the source of the whole phenomenon is strongly rooted in the sphere of migration. The Czechs are the most anti-European society from the V4 group. Reasearch on Euroscepticism must also be carried out at the level of the societies of individual states, and not only of political parties.
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Euroscepticism in Hungary and in Poland: A comparative analysis of Jobbik and the Law and Justice parties

88%
Lázár N.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
|
2015
|
issue 2(33)
215-233
EN
Euroscepticism is one of the most contested concepts within political science discourse; its definitions, classifications and criteria are widespread. Using Szczerbiak & Taggart, Kopecký & Mudde as well as Chris Flood, this essay intends to describe the attitudes of citizens towards the European Union in Hungary and Poland ten years after accession to the EU. Two dominant parties from Central Eastern Europe, which are classified as Eurosceptic according to scientists and experts, represent dissatisfied and even hostile constituencies towards EU engagement within Hungary and Poland. A comparative analysis of the two parties shows their similarities at the national level, yet reveals important differences in terms of ideology as well as their classification of Euroscepticism.
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European Union and European Integration Aspirations of Ukraine: Lost Possibilities and Sceptic Moods

88%
Hissa O.
Historia i Polityka
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2014
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issue 12(19)
57-65
EN
The article deals with the problems of European integration. The Eurosceptic moods of the EU concerning the European integration of Ukraine are researched. The polls on European citizens’ opinion concerning enlargement are investigated. The interviews of European leaders concerning the enlargement are analyzed.
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Anti-EU and Anti-LGBT Attitudes in Poland: Considering Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence

88%
Chojnicka J.
Baltic Journal of European Studies
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2015
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vol. 5
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issue 2
30-55
EN
The purpose of this study is to investigate anti-EU and anti- LGBT attitudes in Poland on the basis of quantitative evidence (statistical data) and qualitative evidence (discourse analysis of statements expressed on the Internet). As Euroscepticism seems to frequently appear in conjunction with prejudice against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual or transgender) persons, the task of this article is to find out whether they may have a common foundation and what it may be. A possible answer, as the article argues, is that both attitudes could be considered symptoms of a deeper, more wide-ranging and fundamental problem-a fear, tension, or anxiety caused by social change, especially the fragmentation of dominant collective (national) identity. The case for such an interpretation of the situation is first made on the basis of existing academic literature and statistical data provided by Eurobarometer and the Polish Public Opinion Research Centre (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS). However, as the text further argues, such quantitative methods have their limitations and should be supported and illustrated with qualitative studies. The article thus proposes an alternative discourse-oriented approach, namely critical discourse analysis (CDA). This approach is used to conduct an introductory, presentational analysis of some examples of anti-EU and anti-LGBT discourse found on the Internet. This analysis shows that sexual minorities represent values so strange and foreign to Polish conservatives that they can only be conceptualized as something imposed by the power which is both new and distant-by Brussels. And the other way round, the European Union’s liberalism and espousal of human rights, including women’s and LGBT rights, makes it impossible for the conservative parts of the Polish society to accept a “European identity”. This means that Euroscepticism and LGBT prejudice are not just occasionally, coincidentally connected expressions of an underlying resistance to change, but that a closer relationship exists between them. Namely, the conservative reluctance or hostility towards both the EU and LGBT is caused by their incompatibility with the patriotic and religious national identity construction.
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A Critical Assessment of a Eurosceptic Party Group on European Integration: A Case Study of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group

88%
Akbaba S.
Baltic Journal of European Studies
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2014
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vol. 4
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issue 1
97-118
EN
The article explores Euroscepticism and the way it is utilized within the politics of Europe, analyzed upon evidence from a Eurosceptic Euro-party located in the European Parliament, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). The aim of this article is to clarify that the selected party> disproves the argument of EU- criticism being an unfavourable condition, and, more importantly, its contribution to the political contestation in the EU. For such an assessment, a survey of the party> manifesto, party working documents, as well as the discourses of the Member of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be analyzed, and the concept of Euroscepticism will be once again in the centre of this analysis. This argument is evaluated based on the transnational-level analysis of the aforementioned party, focusing primarily on three specific issues-the democratic deficit, the issue of sovereignty! and anti-immigration rhetoric.
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Szwajcarski eurosceptycyzm – pomiędzy ekonomią a polityką

75%
Riedel R.
Studia Ekonomiczne
|
2016
|
vol. 269
39-49
PL
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest charakterystyka szwajcarskiego eurosceptycyzmu – zespołu negatywnych opinii, zachowań i postaw wobec procesu integracji europejskiej jako takiej, w tym w szczególności w postaci Unii Europejskiej. Tekst rekonstruuje główne argumenty (natury ekonomicznej i politycznej) podnoszone w szwajcarskiej debacie publicznej na temat uczestnictwa Helwetów w głównym nurcie procesu integracyjnego w Europie, jak również postawy głównych sił politycznych Konfederacji Szwajcarskiej oraz opinię samych Helwetów ujawnianą w postaci sondaży opinii publicznej. Artykuł wyjaśnia prawno-ustrojowe, jak również ekonomiczne i polityczne uwarunkowania szwajcarskiego eurosceptycyzmu.
EN
The objective of the article is the analysis of Swiss Euroscepticism – a set of negative opinions and attitudes towards the European integration process, the European Union in particular. Author reconstructs the main arguments (political and economic) risen in the Swiss public debate, that is by the political parties, their leaders and electorates as well as in the opinion polls. This article explains the legal (constitutional), economic as well as political determinants of the Swiss Euroscepticism.
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Partia Niepodległości Zjednoczonego Królestwa (UKIP) – studium partii eurosceptycznej

75%
Czapiewski T.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2020
|
issue 1 (374)
291-311
EN
The aim of the study is to analyse the programme of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which created the Eurosceptic discourse in the UK in the 21st century. The main hypothesis of the study is that the party’s programme was based on three key foundations, not just Euroscepticism. The essential timeframe for the research was set for the period 2006-2016, although references to the earlier and later period of the party’s activity are occasionally included. The basis for the research was the examination of manifestos and other party documents, but also broadly understood activities of politicians, including statements of party leaders, taking into account their functions in gaining voters’ support. It was concluded that the party’s programme appeal was based on Euroscepticism, hostility to immigration and populist antielitism. The analysis was complemented by an indication of the special role of the European Parliament, avoidance of accusations of racism and a populist approach to security issues. It also presents an assessment of the position of UKIP in 2016-2019 as a return to the status of a marginal party whose further existence is unsure.
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Polish Eurosceptic Parties in the Light of EP Elections. Analysis of the Eurosceptic “Opportunity Structure”

75%
Moroska-Bonkiewicz A., Kozierska J.
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
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2015
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vol. 48
279-299
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie zróżnicowanego poparcia, jakie partie eurosceptyczne uzyskały w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce w 2004, 2009 i 2014 roku. Biorąc pod uwagę specyfikę wyborów do PE, które w teorii przypisują większe znacznie kwestiom europejskim, w przeprowadzonej analizie skupiono się głównie na problematyce europejskiej analizowanej za pomocą tak zwanej eurosceptycznej struktury sposobności, na którą składają się: przestrzeń polityczna, społeczne postawy wobec integracji oraz czynnik zewnętrzny (dynamika procesu integracji europejskiej). Ponadto analizie poddane zostały postawy partii eurosceptycznych biorących udział w wyborach. Analiza wykazała, że strona popytu i podaży stwarzała podobną strukturę sposobności dla partii eurosceptycznych we wszystkich trzech elekcjach, natomiast czynnik zewnętrzny dawał potencjalnie większe możliwości badanym partiom w 2004 i 2014 roku. Analiza postaw partii eurosceptycznych wskazała natomiast, że partie eurosceptyczne miały większe szanse przyciągnąć wyborców za pomocą kwestii europejskiej w 2004 oraz 2014 roku. Zestawienie powyższych wniosków wraz z poparciem, jakie uzyskali eurosceptycy w poszczególnych wyborach, potwierdza zasadność oraz funkcję wyjaśniającą przyjętych założeń, podkreśla jednak zasadniczą rolę samych partii w badanym aspekcie. Niemniej aby potwierdzić te wstępne wyniki badań i z większym prawdopodobieństwem stwierdzić wpływ kwestii europejskiej na zachowania wyborcze, niezbędne są dalsze pogłębione analizy.
EN
The objective of this article is to explain the differing levels of support achieved by Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections in Poland for the years 2004, 2009, and 2014. Taking into account the specificity of EP elections, which in theory assign greater importance to European issues, the analysis is conducted using the “Eurosceptic opportunity structure”, which is composed of: political space, social attitudes towards integration, and the external factor (the dynamics of the European integration process). Additionally, there is analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties standing for election. The analysis demonstrates that the supply and demand sides created a similar opportunity structure for Eurosceptic parties in all three elections, while the external factor provided those parties with greater possibilities in 2004 and 2014. Analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties, however, indicated that they had greater chances to attract voters by invoking the European question in 2004 and 2014. The combination of these conclusions along with the support received by Eurosceptics in particular elections confirms the validity and the explanatory function of the adopted assumptions, while emphasizing the fundamental role played by the parties themselves in the examined aspect. Nonetheless, to confirm the primary assumption and state with more certainty the impact of the European issue on electoral behaviours, more in-depth analysis is necessary.
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Clustering of Polish Citizens on the Bases of Their Support for Leaving and Remaining the European Union

75%
Kozłowski A. R., Krzykowski G., Fallon G.
Polish Political Science Yearbook
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2023
|
issue 2(52)
49-70
EN
The article presents the clustering of Polish citizens based on the empirical dimension of support for European integration. The structure of the work is based on three key elements constituting the basis of the presented text. The first refers to the development of a scale to measure the extent of support for the integration of Poland with the EU. The second element covers an area of support scale modelling. After the substantial and statistical analysis of the adequacy of the probability distribution for the support scale, it was decided that a model in which the scale underwent mixing non-standard Beta distributions would be adopted. Applying the Maximal Likelihood Method (ML), the components for its fitted probability densities and estimators of prior (or mixing) probabilities were indicated. The procedure allowed us to define the clusters of which the population of voters was composed. The paper’s final section presents many practical and theoretical conclusions for political parties and scientists interested in the discussed area. The novelty of applying the ML method goes hand in hand with the findings that previously appeared in political science literature, although under different economic and geopolitical conditions.
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Twenty Years of Poland's Euro-Atlantic Foreign Policy

75%
Zięba R.
International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal
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2011
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vol. 13
27-39
EN
During the years 1989-1991, after a deep transformation of the internal system and the international order in Europe, Poland pursued a sovereign foreign policy. The new policy had the following general goals: 1) to develop a new international security system which would guarantee Poland's national security; 2) to gain diplomatic support for the reforms conducted in Poland, including primarily the transformation of the economy and its adaption to free market mechanisms, which were designed to result in economic growth; and 3) to maintain and increase the international prestige of Poland and the Poles, who had been the first to commence the struggle to create a democratic civil society in the Eastern bloc. Implementing this new concept of foreign policy, Poland entered the Council of Europe in November 1991. The following year, Warsaw started to strive for membership of NATO, which was achieved in March 1999. A few years later, Polish leaders pursued policies in which Poland played the role of a "Trojan horse" for the USA. This was manifested most clearly during the Iraqi crisis of 2003, and in the following years, particularly in 2005-2007. From spring 1990 Poland aspired to integration with the European Community; in December of the following year it signed an association agreement, which fully entered into force in February 1994. In the period 1998-2002 Poland negotiated successfully with the European Union and finally entered this Union in May 2004. In subsequent years Poland adopted an Eurosceptic and sometimes anti-EU position. The new Polish government, established after the parliamentary election of autumn 2007, moved away from an Eurosceptic policy and pursued a policy of engagement with European integration.
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THE FOREIGN NEWS AND MEDIA IMAGE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CURRENT TELEVISION NEWS PRODUCTION

75%
GREGUŠ Ľ., KAČINCOVÁ P. A.
Communication Today
|
2020
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vol. 11
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issue 2
84 - 102
EN
The aim of the presented theoretical-empirical study is to find quantifiable data reflecting information about foreign societies in foreign news through a case study, in which we use quantitative content analysis, focusing on the occurrence of information about events in the European Union and their thematic context. We point out the thematic connection and the position of the European Union in broadcasting in comparison with information about individual states of the world and mainly European countries. Due to the broad spectrum of the topic, we opted for a case study on the Slovak news television TA3, while the research material represented all news content focused on foreign events broadcast during a period of two months (1,621 news items). The theoretical part of the study is focused on a brief definition of key terms, in this case news, agenda setting, pro-Europeanism and Euroscepticism. The results of the research point to the dominant position of the European Union in the broadcasting of the chosen television news, while this international grouping of states is presented as a unified political entity appearing in international political events as an entity equivalent to other countries.
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Państwo narodowe czy zjednoczona Europa w dyskursie parlamentarzystów Ligi Polskich Rodzin

75%
Płoski M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2018
|
issue 1(144)
89–111
XX
This article is an attempt to present national and European thought in the discourse of parliamentarians of the League of Polish Families in relation to two important processes of contemporary times, namely the Poland’s transformation and its integration with European structures. The data for the research are divided into the several spheres of social reality: politics, economy, culture, technology (production) and consumption. In particular spheres antinomies could be noticed, becoming the subject of the research study, because of the political controversy. Analytical material is cognitively interesting because of the contrary views in relation to other political opponents. The League of Polish Families used, in its rhetoric, Eurosceptic views as a weapon to fi ght its political adversaries.
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