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1

TICHÝ AND FICTIONAL NAMES

100%
Glavaničová D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
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issue 3
384 - 404
EN
The paper examines two possible analyses of fictional names within Pavel Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The first of them is the analysis actually proposed by Tichý in his (1988) book The Foundations of Frege’s Logic. He analysed fictional names in terms of free variables. The author will introduce, explain, and assess this analysis. Subsequently, he will explain Tichý’s notion of individual role (office, thing-to-be). On the basis of this notion, he will outline and defend the second analysis of fictional names. This analysis is close to the approach known in the literature as role realism (the most prominent advocates of this position are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Gregory Currie, and Peter Lamarque).
2

A REVISIONARY VIEW OF TEXTS, TEXTUAL MEANING, AND FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

75%
Pettersson A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
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issue 3
366 - 383
EN
Using ideas from John Searle, Roy Harris, Michael Reddy, and Nelson Goodman, the author argues that texts, such as they are commonly conceived, lack brute existence. The common idea of texts is a conceptual construction which is useful in practical everyday contexts but not in serious theorizing, where it creates illusions and contradictions. One of these illusions is the idea of an objective textual meaning, a meaning which is “in the text”: what we actually have in the way of textual meaning are the ideas of various persons – authors, readers, and commentators - about the meaning of the text. When applied to fictional characters, this way of viewing things explains why it makes sense to regard fictional characters as being created and as lacking brute existence.
3

AN ARGUMENT FOR AUTHORIAL CREATION

75%
Zvolenszky Z.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 4
461 – 487
EN
Artefactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artefact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favour of artefactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, he author will be exploring Kripke’s fleeting remarks in the Addenda to his “Naming and Necessity” lectures about expressions like ‘unicorn’ and ‘Harry Potter’. Elsewhere, Kripke motivates artefactualism by suggesting that incorporating authorial creation (as artefactualism does) is a move that is intuitive and natural; but beyond this, he doesn’t provide any arguments in favour of such a move. The author ś purpose in this paper is to construct such an argument based on considerations about Kripke’s general view about proper names, in particular, his seminal causal-historical chain account of reference determination, and its consequences for fictional names as well as nonfictional names without bearers such as ‘Vulcan’.
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