Although finding does not seem to be logically and philosophically so much interesting as (intentional attitude of ) seeking, the present study gives exhaustive survey of logical analyses corresponding to (surprisingly many) kinds of finding (altogether with related issues). There are four basic groups of findings (all of them are expressed in natural languages in homonymous way): (I) finding by accidence; (II) finding after seeking which is typically relation between an agent and an intension; (III) finding after finding an instance of intension to which was an agent related by seeking; (IV) finding pejorativelly reported (agent is not really finding respective thing). Only type (II) can be considered as a notional attitude because it is a relation to an intension (a suitable candidate for ‘notion'); moreover, this relation is unique in the sense that agent is related just and only to one exact intension (thus its concept cannot be substituted by concept expressed by expression which is not coreferential in all possible worlds and time moments with the expression denoting original intension).
In the first part of continuation of our study we classify and analyze passive forms which belong to four kinds of findings. Further we investigate cases of unsuccessful finding; they do not trivially correspond to kinds of succesful finding. We can distinguish: (1) not-finding for the reason of not-seeking, (2) not-finding for the reason of not finished seeking, (3) not-finding for the reason of stopped seeking whereas a) an instance of the respective seeked intension is not existing, b) an agent was not enough skilful and the question of existence of an instance of the respective seeked intension remains open.
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