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The concept of narrow content is still under discussion in the debate over mental representation. In the paper, one-factor dimensional accounts of representation are analyzed, particularly the case of Fodor's methodological solipsism. In methodological solipsism, semantic properties of content are arguably eliminated in favor of syntactic ones. If “narrow content” means content properties independent of external factors to a system (as in Segal's view), the concept of content becomes elusive. Moreover, important conceptual problems with one-factor dimensional account are pointed out as a result of analysis arguments presented by J. Searle, S. Harnad and T. Burge. Furthermore, these problems are illustrated with psychological and ethological examples. Although understanding content as partially independent from contextual factors allows theorists to preserve content properties, it seems that understanding content in total abstraction from external factors of these properties is implausible. As a result, internalism is rejected in favor of externalism.
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PL
W 1975 roku Fodor opublikował książkę Język myśli. W 2011 ukazała się jej kontynuacja. Celem artykułu jest krytyczne zbadanie, czym nowa koncepcja języka myśli różni się od poprzedniej. Artykuł przedstawia dotychczasowe założenia Reprezentacyjnej Teorii Umysłu i jej konsekwencje dla atomizmu pojęciowego i natywizmu. Założenia te zostały porównane treściami zawartymi w LOT2, gdzie Fodor nie tylko wzmacnia swoje poprzednie tezy, ale też ostro krytykuje pragmatyzm i dodaje ważny element do RTM w postaci reprezentacji niepojęciowych.
EN
In 1975 Jerry Fodor published The Language of Thought. In 2011 its continuation appeared. The purpose of this article is to examine whether the new conception of the language of thought differs from the previous one. The article presents the current assumptions of the Representational Theory of Mind and their implications for conceptual atomism and nativism. These are compared with the material contained in LOT2 where Fodor not only reinforces his previous claims, but also sharply criticizes pragmatism and adds an important element to the RTM, nonconceptual representation.
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