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Pojetí společenské smlouvy u Františka Suáreze

100%
Koblížek J.
Studia theologica
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2014
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vol. 1
67-87
EN
This work is aimed at determining whether we can regard Francisco Suárez as representative of the social-contracting theories developing in the period from the 16th up until the 18th century. Suárez, who is in all probability better known for his metaphysical disputations, provides a truly sophisticated formulation concerning the origin of civil society and political power, where the concept of social consent holds a key role. Suarez’s concept of social consent is situated in the ontological framework and is closely associated with the term nature. Suárez consequently understands the state as a natural and moral organization.
2
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The  Internal Sense(s) in Early Jesuit Scholasticism

75%
Heider D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue Special Issue 2
133-148
EN
Against the background of the medieval theory of internal senses of Avicenna and Aquinas the author presents a survey of the theories of internal senses as advocated by the early Jesuits, namely by Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596), Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), one of the so-called Conimbricenses, and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Although all these Jesuits consider Aquinas’s tenet of the four really distinct interior senses to be the probable view, each of them takes a more or less reductionist stance against it. In Suárez this eliminativist approach even results in the theory of the single interior sense called phantasy. In conclusion, this Jesuit reductionism is compared to the Zeitgeist of the classical early modern philosophy exemplified by the names of Descartes and Locke.
3
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Anima forma corporis: problém interpretace

51%
Novák L.
Studia theologica
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2015
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vol. 1
70-94
EN
The article raises the question about the content of the Catholic dogma defined at the Council of Vienne stating that the rational human soul is the form of the human body and arrives at the conclusion that there is no single generally accepted meaning in the theological tradition, but rather two radically differing lines of interpretation: a “thomistic” one tending to a more “monistic” interpretation of human nature, and a “reistic” one, resulting in a strongly pronounced dualism. Both of the interpretations are found to be laden with serious difficulties; the author contrasts various aspects of these interpretations, exposing their problems, and finally suggests that further philosophical and theological work is needed to provide an acceptable interpretation of the dogma of Vienne.
4
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Esencjalizacja przedmiotu metafizyki w ujęciu Franciszka Suáreza SJ

51%
Goczał R.
Racjonalia. Z punktu widzenia humanistyki
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2015
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vol. 5
PL
Disputationes metaphysicae by Francis Suárez in its assumptions returns to the classical division into real being (ens reale) and mind­‑dependent being (ens rationis). To put it in the theoretical structure, Suárez’ theory of being is directly linked to the noetic concept of “objective being” (ens objectivum). Suárez definitely broke with a classical approach to the object of metaphysics and headed an existential reflection on being toward the essentialization. So his metaphysics is not focused on the concept of being in the aspect of existence, but is the study of abstract being as the “essence”. It is an interesting theory in historical terms, but it also suggests that it can provide in­‑depth study of previous scholastic theories. Suárez’ approach meets with the theory that clearly influenced the modern epistemology and post­‑Cartesian philosophy as a cognitive shift towards a new subjective prospect (e.g. in se conversa), in which reflection on real being was shifted toward the subject­‑consciousness representation, that is, toward the noetic reflection and mentalism).
5
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Přirozená subjektivní práva mezi středověkem a novověkem

32%
Šejvl M.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2017
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vol. 156
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issue 5
416-452
EN
This article focuses on different conceptions of natural rights in scholars of the high Middle Ages (Henry of Ghent,Duns Scotus, Ockham,Marsilius of Padua,Gerson, Summenhart) and of early Modernity (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius). First the opinions of these scholars’ on natural law are presented, then their „definitions“ of ius as right, their use of permissive natural law and finally their conceptions of natural rights are analysed (natural right to private property is used to demonstrate the last point). Instead of the „dividing line“ between medieval and modern ideas on natural rights the paper argues for the continuity that lies in the fact that the same or similar concepts are reinterpreted and used to build new theoretical constructions. It tries to show that various natural „rights“ (in Henry of Ghent, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham) are in fact Hohfeldian liberties and not Hohfeldian claims and in this sense they are not rights. It criticizes the thesis which is still common (at least in the Czech and Slovak literature) that natural rights theories were triggered by the development of metaphysical nominalism and voluntarism in the high Middle Ages. Instead it tries to find reasons for the development of particular natural rights theories in various ways the scholars reacted on the particular problems of their times.
CS
Tento článek se pokouší zmapovat různé názory na přirozená práva myslitelů vrcholného středověku (Jindřich z Gentu, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Marsilius z Padovy, Gerson, Summenhart) a raného novověku (Vitoria, Suárez,Grotius) tak, že nejdříve představí jejich názory na přirozené objektivní právo, jejich vymezení ius jakožto subjektivního práva, operace s permisivním přirozeným objektivním právem a konečně jejich koncepce přirozených práv (k jejichž demonstraci používá především právo na soukromé vlastnictví). Místo někdy postulovaného předělu mezi středověkem a novověkem ukazuje naopak kontinuitu v názorech, která podle autora spočívá v tom, že často stejné či podobné koncepty jsou různými autory reinterpretovány a použity v nových kontextech. Ukazuje, že přirozená „práva“ u některých myslitelů (Jindřich z Gentu,Marsilius, Ockham) nejsou hohfeldovskými nároky (claims), a tedy subjektivními právy, ale hohfeldovskými volnostmi (liberties). Kritizuje také (minimálně v tuzemské literatuře převládající) tradiční přístup hledající spojitost mezi koncepcemi přirozených práv a nástupem metafyzického nominalismu či voluntarismu. Naopak hledá důvody pro partikulární rozvinutí koncepce přirozených práv v tom, jak zde představení myslitelé reagují na problémy, které před ně postavila doba, v níž žili.
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