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EN
This paper presents two discourses of natural law in Greek and medieval tradition: the Stoic account of lex, the account of ius in the understanding of Francis Suarez, and the concept of natural law in terms of St. Thomas Aquinas. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, it is to describe the history and the development of the concept of natural law from its early, Stoic expressions to its late medieval modification. And secondly, to argue for the thesis, according to which the Aquinas’s proposal, based on his concept of “nature”, avoids the difficulties of the Stoic approach associated with the continuity between the legal and moral justification and the nature.
EN
In the paper I show the reasons for which the Aristotelian principle vivere viventibus est esse is relevant for the understanding of actual existence; there are three sorts of these reasons: (i) some metaphilosophical reasons which I offer in p. 2; (ii) the possibility of illustrating some key metaphysical theses (which I list in p. 3) concerning actual existence on the example of life; (iii) a connection between ignoring actual existence and some way of treating life (that I show on the example of Francis Suarez and John Punch). In the course of the argument I distinguish between three senses of the predicate ‘is alive’ and the concept of life (the accidental, the essential and the actual one) and I focus on some key differences between the ways the concept of life is introduced in Aquinas and in Suarez and Punch.
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