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Problem prawdy u Wilhelma z Owernii

100%

Pawlikowski T.

Seminare. Poszukiwania naukowe

2012

vol. 31

87-102

William of Auvergne (1180–1249) was one of the first wave professors of University in Paris to engage with Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he calls the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic – the problem of truth. Based on a doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth's classical definition. In his view, this definition express the essence of logical truth, which is constituted in any relation between human intellect and things, if intellect is adequate to his object. So the logical truth is a basis and property of true judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and – generally – about all the man can think or about everything possible to thinking. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects contingent. William argues that only actually existing things are real existing as caused by God. So only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn't cause things as existing in the past, in the future, but as existing in the present. What is more, He doesn't cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognizes logical truth as the only justification for true adjudication of all what exists and doesn't exist. In Steven P. Marrone's opinion William's theory of truth is a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William's theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is depended on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional terms, he divorced with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, taken in this article studies seem to show that William's theory of truth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of human being. This is not logic in twentieth-century's sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that the logical truth, which realizes in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of truths that exist in contingent beings, William considered as final and the sole basis of every true judgments and statements, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical truth is not able to truly independent existence.

Assensum in mente prophetae: William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Prophecies

72%

Limonta R., Fedriga R.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2021

vol. 54

57-80

Tema dell'articolo è il rapporto tra Walter Chatton e Guglielmo di Ockham in merito alle teorie sulla natura cognitiva degli enunciati profetici, un argomento centrale nel dibattito teologico della prima metà del XIV secolo. A partire dalle recenti interpretazioni delle teorie cognitive di Chatton e Ockham alla luce della distinzione epistemica tra esternalismo ed internalismo (e a partire da alcune fonti dove il tema della profezia è cruciale, come la Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 28-29 e i Quodibela 26-29 di Chatton e il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de prescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium di Ockham, la nostra analisi applicherà la distinzione internalismo/esternalismo al caso degli enunciati profetici. A partire dalle questioni epistemologiche che riguardano profezie, futuri contingenti e prescienza divina, l'analisi cercherà di mostrare i principi strutturali e le ricadute pragmatiche di questi enunciati nei due modelli analizzati.

The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William of Ockham’s theories about the cognitive nature of prophetic statements, a topic in the theological debate of the early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations of Chatton and Ockham’s cognitive theory in terms of the distinction between externalism and internalism, and from a reading of some sources where the topic of prophecy is crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, the less investigated d. 41 and Quodlibeta, qq. 26-29; for Ockham: Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, q.1 and Quodlibeta, q. 4) we apply the externalism/internalism distinction to the case study of prophetic statements. Starting from epistemological questions about prophecies, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, we’ll show the outcomes as pragmatic rules of this kind of statements in both conceptual frameworks analyzed.

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1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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1 Pawlikowski T.

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Problem prawdy u Wilhelma z Owernii

Assensum in mente prophetae: William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Prophecies