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EN
The article presents the classical understanding of the good in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in the excellent and original interpretation of the contemporary German philosopher Josef Pieper. It also presents his discussion with modern ethics (Kant, Sartre, Camus). The importance of the issue is emphasized and then the ontological issue of the good is presented under the following five aspects: 1) The meaning of the thesis that every being is good mean; 2) The meaning of the term "good"; 3) The final interpretation of the thesis that every being is good; 4) The issue of the good from the perspective of empiricism, natural science, and the theory of Kant; and 5) The negation of the thesis that "every being is good", its consequences (nihilism), and the problem of suicide. The article also considers the existence of a direct relationship between the ontological and the moral good. Finally, the relationship between the two types of good is shown in the context of happiness.
EN
This article goes beyond simply presenting the philosophy of D. Ross. It is rather a discussion, not only with his views, but also with those of his commentators. This discussion is quite focused, as it refers to those issues which show the dependence between theory and practice, and between the general moral law and specific laws. The analyses are also aimed at investigating the legitimacy of attempts to supplement the two best-known ethical theories (teleologism and deontologism), made both by Ross and by his commentators, to introduce the concept of prima facie obligations to Kant's theory of perfect and imperfect obligations. Ross tries to review critically both the concepts of Aristotle and the theory of I. Kant. It is not possible, however, to introduce either Ross' prima facie obligations or Stratton-Lake's propositions to Kant's conception, if only because the philosopher from Königsberg understood obligations in a different way than Ross or his followers. For Ross, obligations are not specific instances of general duties, but reasons showing the proper features of human acts. They are not the principles of obligations, but only conditions on which specific demands may be made.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2018
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vol. 46
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issue 4
179-191
EN
The initial thesis of the article is that axiological thinking is possible on condition that it is preceded by a constituent experience or a metaphysical settlement. After the rejection of thinking in values by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, only a strong metaphysical base can legitimize an axiological vision. Such are the philosophies of the good of Emmanuel Levinas and Józef Tischner, which assume the source experience of the absolute Good. I therefore define them with a common term "vertical agatology". According to Levinas, this happens through the encounter with the face of Another. According to Tischner, the experience of the good which takes the negative form of a preferential revolt is decisive: "There is something that shouldn't be." Acorrding to Barbara Skarga, on the other hand, the good appears unexpectedly in human relationships. It comes from man as something surprising and accidental: “It is something that did not have to be”. This type of understanding I call a “horizontal or small agatology”. The distinctive feature here is the affirmative astonishment. Another perspective on the traditional understanding of values is the axiological universality of Władysław Stróżewski. In his view, value as Logos is the keystone of the whole preference order. The Logos is understood here as the highest value, or (in analogy to Plato’s concept of idea) as the value of values. At the same time, value means to him the triad of the transcendentals – goodness, truth, and beauty. In this way, value is located in the middle of metaphysics. The pre-axiological dimension also sets out two basic experiences: love and hope. Although they are not the values themselves, they shape a certain starting topos in which we move and which determines our preferences. Love as an experienced fulfillment allows us to desire other fulfillments and to keep a hope for the unexpectable future.
EN
The author polemizes with some authors' thinking the source of evil is or in God omnipotence and in God omniscience, or that evil is feature of cosmic order. To his mind man is the only creator of values, i.e. only man is able to estimate which human behaviour is good and which is bad one.
EN
Issues related to ethics and morality are constantly the subject of reflection and discussion at many levels of life of contemporary man. In the era of rapid technological development, which is far ahead of the development of ethics, it is extremely important to define its modern version. The issue is which tools to use and models to draw from. The theory of moral action itself is nothing new. On the contrary, it has a centuries-old tradition, dating back to ancient times. Today this tradition has become forgotten, considered inadequate for modern times. Meanwhile, by delving into ancient texts, one can find again in them a wealth of thoughts that are timeless and can serve for contemporary ethical considerations. It is, therefore, useful to refer to the sources of reflection on morality provided by ancient ethics, especially Aristotle’s texts. One of the key categories of Aristotelian ethics is virtue, i.e. excellence. Aristotle studies the good, how to live a happy life, how to achieve one’s ends, and how to be just. He formulates his ethics by analysing various virtues that a man can work on and develop and presents the conditions they must meet in order to be judged morally. It seems that a return to the classical concept of ethics and a new look at Aristotle’s virtue ethics may prove to be an inspiring proposal for contemporary ethical research.
EN
This analysis of the concept of conscience proposed by the outstanding contemporary German thinker Robert Spaemann focuses on several selected aspects: first, a look at this complex phenomenon from two sides, namely its negative aspect (what conscience is not) and positive (what conscience appears to be), then a juxtaposition with other contemporary theories, and finally an analysis in terms of its origin. This shows that Spaemann understands conscience in the classical spirit of Thomas Aquinas. It is not the source of moral law, nor does it appear to be an authority deciding what is morally good or bad, but rather it constitutes a binding moral judgement which takes the form of a call or an appeal. It is emphasised that conscience, seen in the perspective of its origins, is defined by Robert Spaemann, similarly to Viktor Frankl, as an innate ability, a tool for knowing good from bad. No researcher dealing with the philosophy of this eminent thinker has ever pointed out this similarity. The article emphasises and discusses the most original dimension of Spaemann's theory, i.e. presenting it as the most distinctive personal sign. The final considerations attempt to show why, in what sense, and under what conditions the question of conscience is connected with the question of mystery. This analytical aspect has not been directly addressed by Spaemann in his considerations, therefore the article attempts to complement his theory in this respect. Also, the author explains the originality of the German thinker's approach, and offers a concrete indication of where Spaemann's thinking coincides with that of Thomas Aquinas.
7
63%
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 2-3(13-14)
643-662
EN
The article consists of explanatory and critical remarks to Tatarkiewicz’s „O bezwzględności dobra” (“On Absoluteness of Good”). Firstly the author considers the Tatarkiewicz’s concept of good. Acceptance with no proof for theses of undefinability and unconcludability from facts is criticized. Tatarkiewicz’s concepts like “relativism” and “subjectivism” are analyzed. It is pointed out that the thesis on absoluteness of good is doubtful because Tatarkiewicz’s examples are highly connected with human beings. Moreover good is not separable from emotions, so its emotionlessness and unutilitarianity is questioned. Finally the author analyzes Tatarkiewicz’s thesis that establishing rules of rightful action in concrete cases does not belong to science. He claims that Tatarkiewicz did not considered the idea of rightful actions engineering that would not be giving solution for every particular case but the rules of Obtaining solutions in given conditions.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 9
845-859
EN
The essay compares Ricour's and Levinas's conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricour's basic distinction between 'identity-idem' and 'identity-ipse' it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricour conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience - the other in the same - is an initiatory category, which is described in terms of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricour´s critique of Levinas' category of 'the Other' is examined on the background of Levinas' conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good.
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