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1

Wyrok niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 18 marca 2014 r. Koniec sporu o konstytucyjność reformy strefy euro

100%

Barcz J.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2014

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issue 5(124)

91-108

EN

In the recent years the Federal Constitutional Court has referred to the measures taken on the EU level in order to overcome the financial crisis in the Euro zone and its consequences. The judgment of 18 March 2014 provides the summary of these case-law, confirming its compliance with the German constitution: the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The reasoning of the German Court is consistent with the arguments resulting from the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-370/12, Pringle. In the German legal doctrine, the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 18 March 2014 is also coupled with the hope for reduction of the use of constitutional complaint for purposes of political struggle, which has become widespread particularly in the context of measures taken to reform the euro area. Nevertheless, in the context of mechanisms for interaction between parliament and government in relation to “EU issues”, an important question is the extension and precise establishing of the competences of the Bundestag (and Bundesrat) concerning the creation of internal (national) position to the European Stability Mechanism and the related powers to obtain relevant information from the federal government. It is also important that the mechanisms of cooperation between federal government and the Bundestag (Bundesrat) in the “EU issues” include matters connected with intergovernmental measures undertaken formally by the EU Member States — outside the EU institutional legal framework, but closely related to EU law. This solution may be the of interest to other EU Member States.

2

Powtórna niekonstytucyjność prawa w Polsce — uwagi na tle praktyki i doktryny niemieckiej

80%

Jarosz-Żukowska S.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2013

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issue 1(114)

9-34

EN

The obligation to enforce the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments, derived from Article 190 para. 1 of the Constitution, explained in negative terms, means a prohibition on the legislature to make laws being identical in content with those already found unconstitutional. Infringement of this obligation is contrary to the principle of constitutionalism and means that the legislature has gone beyond the scope of regulatory discretion shaped by the Tribunal’s case law. Under current law, the Tribunal does not have, in fact, any instruments allowing them to assess how the enforcement of judgments. The only possible response by the legislature to the repetition of “constitutional mistake” would be carrying out a repeated review of regulations introduced to the legal system to enforce the judgment. The issue has long been debated in German legal literature and in the Federal Constitutional Court. The discourse is dominated by the view that any possible extension of the effect of the judgment (declaring the unconstitutionality) on a subsequent norm of the identical content, or imposing on the legislature an obligation to repeal it, would not be in conformity with the principle of separation of powers. This would require a departure from the principle of accusatorial procedure and principle of binding limits of application limits of the application or ongoing monitoring by the Tribunal of the condition of legislation which would make it more like to a supervisory authority than a constitutional court.

3

Powierzenie kompetencji na rzecz Unii Europejskiej a Traktat o Europejskim Mechanizmie Stabilności i Traktat o unii fi skalnej. Uwagi w świetle orzecznictwa Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego i wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE w sprawie C-370/12

51%

Barcz J., Kranz J.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2013

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issue 4(117)

23-48

EN

The article contains an analysis of the jurisprudence of German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice judgment in the Pringle case (C-370/12). First of all, they examined consistency with EU law of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact), both adopted beyond the institutional legal framework of the European Union. The analysis of this jurisprudence unequivocally reveals that the said treaties do not violate EU law, nor do they involve a conferral of new competences on the European Union by its member states. Secondly, this analysis shows that the case-law (particularly, the judgment of the European Court of Justice) legitimizes, to an extent, the so-call Schengen method, setting — at the same time — the legal framework for future inter-governmental measures to be taken for consolidation of the Eurozone. From the above-mentioned case-law it follows that the procedure used in Poland for approval of the decision of the European Council (2011/199/EU) and for ratifi cation of the Fiscal Compact was reasonable. That procedure may be applied in the future for ratifi cation of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.

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Wyrok niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 18 marca 2014 r. Koniec sporu o konstytucyjność reformy strefy euro

Powtórna niekonstytucyjność prawa w Polsce — uwagi na tle praktyki i doktryny niemieckiej

Powierzenie kompetencji na rzecz Unii Europejskiej a Traktat o Europejskim Mechanizmie Stabilności i Traktat o unii fi skalnej. Uwagi w świetle orzecznictwa Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego i wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE w sprawie C-370/12