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Orientacja transatlantycka w Niemczech w obliczu nowego otwarcia w stosunkach niemiecko-amerykańskich

100%
Malinowski K.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2021
|
issue 1 (378)
7-28
EN
Belonging to the transatlantic security community is an axiom of German foreign policy. Germany has been able to maintain a stable position in the North Atlantic Alliance thanks to the transatlantic orientation of the main German political parties. The last decade has seen its erosion, exacerbated by the presidency of Donald Trump. Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 presidential election created an opportunity to revive transatlantic and German-Americanrelations. The aim of the article is to diagnose the state of the transatlantic orientation in Germany in the face of US expectations and the Bundestag elections (09'2021), which may bring a change in the governing coalition. It was assumed that the quality of Germany's engagement in the new phase of its co-operation with the US depends on the condition of the transatlantic orientation. The official party positions and politicians' statements concerning the prospects of alliance co-operation were analyzed with regard to such issues as the future of the North Atlantic Alliance, the 'burden sharing' among allies and attitudes towards Russia and China. The thesis was formulated that although the German political parties CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD and the Greens (with the exception of Die Linke and AfD) are generally in favor of NATO, the low degree of convergence of opinions among individual parties as regards strengthening NATO security and the strategy towards Russia points to the modest potential of the transatlantic orientation and may indicate that it is in the process of decomposition.
2
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Germany’s Stance on the Termination of the INF Treaty by the US

86%
Malinowski K.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
|
2019
|
issue 1
61-86
EN
This paper aims to discuss Germany’s stance on the decision taken by US President Donald Trump on 1 February 2019 to withdraw from the INF Treaty, given Russia’s noncompliance with its provisions. It looks at the numerous consequences that may result for the German security policy. Given its geostrategic position at the heart of Europe, the political role of Germany – the cornerstone of the transatlantic system and military potential – makes the country an important player in the dispute with Russia regarding the restoration of the balance in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Merkel government believes that the initiative to overcome the crisis lies with Russia. Germany will undertake diplomatic attempts to restore dialogue with Russia and at the same time persuade the US to seek agreement on the renegotiation of the treaty. The Merkel government intends to include the issue of medium-range missiles in talks on a wider disarmament agreement with the US and Russia, but also China. Approval for deployment of American missiles is limited in the German political class and remains the subject of internal disputes, which may eventually weaken NATO.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie stanowiska Niemiec na decyzję prezydenta Donalda Trumpa z 1 lutego 2019 r. o wycofaniu się przez Stany Zjednoczone z traktatu INF w związku z jego naruszaniem przez Rosję. Chodzi o rozpatrzenie, jakie konsekwencje mogą wyniknąć dla niemieckiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Niemcy ze względu na położenie geostrategiczne w środku Europy, swoją polityczną rolę jako zwornika układu transatlantyckiego oraz potencjał wojskowy są ważnym uczestnikiem sporu z Rosją dotyczącego przywrócenia równowagi w zakresie broni nuklearnej średniego zasięgu w Europie. Rząd Merkel uważa, że inicjatywa na rzecz zażegnania kryzysu leży po stronie Rosji. Niemcy będą podejmować dyplomatyczne próby przywrócenia dialogu z Rosją i jednocześnie przekonywać USA do szukania porozumienia w sprawie renegocjowania traktatu. Rząd Merkel zamierza włączyć sprawę rakiet średniego zasięgu do rozmów na temat szerszego porozumienia rozbrojeniowego z udziałem USA i Rosji, ale także Chin. Akceptacja dla stacjonowania amerykańskich rakiet jest ograniczona w niemieckiej klasie politycznej i pozostaje przedmiotem wewnętrznego sporu, który może osłabić także NATO.
3
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Niemieckie ugrupowania polityczne wobec kryzysu uchodźczego

72%
Nitszke A.
Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych
|
2017
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vol. 12
|
issue 3
EN
The Federal Republic of Germany has developed a model of integration and assimilation of refugees and economic migrants, which for decades was a model for other European countries and the European Union (EU ). This was possible thanks to the consensus between the main political forces in the country, which, despite the natural alternation of power, do not undermine the main objectives of both foreign policy as well as internal, including the approach to immigrants. The situation changed after 2011 and the events in North Africa, known as the Arab Spring, the consequence of which was a massive influx of refugees and immigrants to Germany. This article examines the position of the main political parties in relation to the refugee crisis.
PL
Republika Federalna Niemiec (RFN) wypracowała model integracji i asymilacji uchodźców i imigrantów zarobkowych, który przez dziesięciolecia stanowił wzór dla innych państw europejskich i Unii Europejskiej (UE ). Było to możliwe dzięki konsensusowi pomiędzy głównymi siłami politycznymi w kraju, które, mimo naturalnej alternacji władzy, nie podważały głównych założeń zarówno polityki zagranicznej, jak też wewnętrznej, w tym kwestii podejścia do imigrantów. Sytuacja uległa zmianie po 2011 r. i wydarzeniach w Afryce Północnej, zwanych arabską wiosną, których konsekwencją stał się masowy napływ uchodźców i imigrantów do Niemiec. W artykule przeanalizowane zostaną stanowiska głównych partii politycznych w odniesieniu do kryzysu uchodźczego.
4
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Niemieckie partie polityczne wobec Rosji na tle konfliktu na Ukrainie w latach 2014-2018

72%
Kosman M. M.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2019
|
issue 1(370)
105-122
EN
Germany has shown in its history great interest in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach did not change after the reunification in 1990. The Eastern policy of Germany focused on such activities as strengthening political and economic cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and supporting their aspirations for membership in the European Union and NATO; wide-ranging cooperation with Russia; supporting Russia’s involvement in cooperation with organizations from the Western world; financial support for economic transformation in Russia. From the perspective of Germany, Russia was perceived as one of the most important partners in the process of strengthening international security. In turn, the Orange Revolution of 2004 drew Germany’s greater attention to Ukraine. The conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, initiated in 2014, became the cause of deep concern in Germany. The article aims to discuss Germany’s attitude to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2018 - the position of the German government and the main political parties. The author mainly refers to official documents as well as statements of politicians, mostly taken from the press and websites of German political parties. The research problem raised in the article is the attitude of German political parties to Russia following the annexation of Crimea and support of separatist activities in the East of Ukraine. The author verified two research hypotheses: – Traditional political parties, rooted for several decades in the party system of West Germany, show a high degree of principled attitude to the observance of international law. The consequence of such an approach is a critical position at the official level on Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This does not interfere with the phenomenon of pluralism of views on this issue within particular parties. – The political circles of the Eastern federal states, irrespective of the party colors, due to the economic interest tend to lean towards a more flexible approach to Russia’s policy, including limiting or abolishing the sanctions regime. In implementing the goals of the article, the author used appropriate research methods. He decided to resort primarily to elements of institutional and legal analysis, which was used in the examination of documents. In addition, he applied the comparative method, indispensable for comparing the attitude of German political parties to the title problem.
5
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Relacje dwustronne Niemiec z ChRL z perspektywy programów wyborczych niemieckich relewantnych partii politycznych w kampanii parlamentarnej 2021 r.

72%
Kamińska-Korolczuk K.
Przegląd Geopolityczny
|
2022
|
vol. 42
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wniosków wynikających z analizy programów wyborczych opracowanych przez relewantne partie niemieckie na potrzeby kampanii wyborczej do Bundestagu w 2021 r. W pracy przyjęto następujące pytania badawcze: 1. Czy w 2021 r. w programach wyborczych do Bundestag relewantne niemieckie partie polityczne zawarły informacje o ChRL?, 2. Jeśli tak, to jakich określeń w stosunku do ChRL użyto?, 3. Czy w omawianych programach wyborczych pojawiła się kwestia dotycząca Inicjatywy Pasa i Szlaku (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI)? 4. Czy w omawianych programach wyborczych pojawiły się newralgiczne kwestie dotyczące ChRL takie łamanie praw człowieka? Realizację badania umożliwiła zastosowana metoda polegająca na systematycznym przeglądzie literatury i analizie zastanych dokumentów czyli programów wyborczych omawianych partii w 2021 r. Z analizy wynika, że każda z niemieckich partii politycznych mających obecnie (2022 r.) swoją reprezentację w Bundestagu zawarła w programie wyborczym w 2021 r. informacje odnoszące się do ChRL. Nie ma więc rozbieżności, Chiny stanowią ważki temat dla każdej strony sceny politycznej. Odmienne jest jednak postrzeganie działań tego państwa, co wykazano w przeprowadzonej analizie.
EN
The article aims to present conclusions resulting from the analysis of the election programs developed by the relevant German parties in the election campaign to the Bundestag in 2021. In the study, the following research questions were adopted: 1. Did the relevant German political parties include the information about the PRC in the Bundestag election programs in 2021? 2. If so, what terms concerning the PRC were used? 3. Does the discussed election programs refer to the Belt and Road Initiative? 4. Do sensitive issues concerning the PRC such as human rights violations appear in the election programs discussed? The research was made possible by the method used, consisting of a systematic review of the literature and analysis of existing documents, i.e. election programs of the parties in question in 2021. The analysis shows that each of the German political parties currently (2022) represented in the Bundestag included information related to the PRC. So there is no discrepancy, China is an important topic for every side of the political scene. However, the perception of the actions of this country is different, which was in the conducted analysis shown.
6

Rozważania nad populistyczną naturą Alternatywy dla Niemiec

58%
Cymbaluk Ł., Ziółek D.
Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne
|
2019
|
vol. 27
120-137
EN
Alternative for Germany has recently become a phenomenon on the German political scene, especially after the 2017 Bundestag elections. The article contains an analysis and an attempt to explain the populist nature of the party, pointing to what elements may confirm or deny its populistic character. There are some indicators that show Alternative for Germany can be described as an example of populism, especially including the use of left-and right-wing postulates, an anti-system and anti-establishment attitude, temporalization of constructing political communication and usage of social sentiments. On the other hand, there are some visible determinants that go beyond the model of the populist party, for instance the technocratic nature of the party, the lack of a significant unit of a charismatic leader. Also, many issues that raise doubts can be underlined, for example the ideological sphere of the party. Furthermore, the article also contains considerations about the possible effects of functioning of the political group in the German party system.
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