Search results

1

Udział Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w dniach Grunwaldu w 2012 roku

100%

Grabowski J.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2013

|

issue 20

283-285

PL

komunikat

2

Udział Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w Dniach Grunwaldu w 2012 roku

100%

Grabowski J.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2013

|

issue 20

283-285

3

Einstellung der Bevölkerung Preußens zur Herrschaft der Ordensritter

85%

Ekdahl S.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2016

|

issue 23

109-114

PL

Ważnym zagadnieniem w kontekście wojny zakonu krzyżackiego z Polską i Litwą w latach 1409–1411 jest postawa ludności Prus wobec panowania Zakonu po przegranej bitwie pod Grunwaldem. Historia związku jaszczurczego dowodzi, iż już przed klęską pod Grunwaldem funkcjonowała tam silna opozycja przeciwko władzy Zakonu. Wrogie wobec niego nastawienie znalazło szczególny wyraz 15 VII 1410 r., gdy szereg chorągwi ziemi chełmińskiej w pośpiechu opuściło pole bitwy. Ponadto jeden z rycerzy zajął miasto i zamek w Ostródzie, a następnie przekazał je królowi polskiemu, aby ułatwić mu marsz na Malbork. Inni rycerze, wśród nich Mikołaj z Ryńska, mieli planować zajęcie Malborka w podobny sposób. W przedstawionym kontekście należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, iż szlachta ziemi chełmińskiej, zgodnie z przywilejem chełmińskim z 1233 r. nie była zobowiązana walczyć po stronie Zakonu poza granicami własnego państwa. Wszelki udział w wyprawach na drugą stronę Wisły i jej dopływów, Drwęcy i Osy, był dobrowolny, a Zakon wynagradzał ten udział zwrotem kosztów i pokryciem wszelkich szkód z nim związanych. Przykładami mogą być wyprawy na Żmudź (1402), Gotlandię (1404) i do Dobrzynia (1409). Z końcem 1410 r. na zlecenie wielkiego mistrza nastąpiła wypłata kwoty 4 tys. marek na rzecz ziemi chełmińskiej. Kwota ta, odpowiadająca wartości około 300 koni bojowych, nie została jednak wykorzystana w całości, ku niezadowoleniu zainteresowanych, którzy wyceniali swoje straty wyżej. Otwarte pozostaje pytanie, na ile szczególne uregulowanie sytuacji ziemi chełmińskiej mogło mieć wpływ na zachowanie części rycerstwa tej ziemi w trakcie bitwy pod Grunwaldem? Analogiczne ustalenia dotyczą rycerstwa z Warmii i Nowej Marchii. Także ono jedynie dobrowolnie brało udział w działaniach zbrojnych poza granicami swych państw. Sytuacja ta stanowiła problem dla Zakonu, prowadząc często do irytacji kierowanej zwłaszcza wobec szlachty z Nowej Marchii. Czterej biskupi (pomezański, warmiński, sambijski i chełmiński) po bitwie pod Grunwaldem złożyli hołd królowi polskiemu, podobnie jak przeorysza klasztoru brygidek w Gdańsku. Skierowała ona do króla Władysława Jagiełły pisemną prośbę o wsparcie – i to już kilka dni po wygranej wojsk polsko-litewskich. Prośba ta spotkała się z akceptacją wyrażoną 6 sierpnia. Interesujący jest przypadek biskupa warmińskiego Henryka IV Vogelsanga, który pod koniec września lub na początku października 1410 r. wyjechał do Polski, co sprawiło że Zakon uważał go za zdrajcę. Dlatego wielki mistrz Henryk von Plauen nieskutecznie próbował zastąpić go przez osobę nastawioną przyjaźnie do Zakonu. Również wielkie miasta Prus zajmowały ambiwalentną postawę wobec klęski Zakonu. Zgodnie z informacjami, które dotarły do biskupa poznańskiego 29 czerwca lub w dniach kolejnych, mieszkańcy Torunia ścięli tamtejszego komtura oraz zabili lub uwięzili 50 żołnierzy Zakonu. W połowie sierpnia podobny los spotkał żołnierzy Zakonu w Gdańsku. Miasto Elbląg usprawiedliwiało później złożenie hołdu królowi Polski faktem, iż Zakon ustawicznie zabraniał miastu naprawy uszkodzonego muru miejskiego. W tym kontekście warto odpowiedzieć na następujące pytania: jak różne były reakcje mieszkańców Prus na zmieniającą się sytuację wojskową i polityczną po Grunwaldzie; czy można rozpoznać różne formy zachowań w zależności od klas społecznych oraz czy licznie składane hołdy były efektem desperacji i oceny sytuacji jako „bez wyjścia”, czy też raczej wyrazem długo skrywanej niechęci do władzy Zakonu?

EN

The history of the Lizard Union proves existance of strong opposition against the rule of the Teutonic Knights even before its defeat at the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). That hostile attitude was clearly expressed when several banners of Chełmno Lands (banner – unit of the cavalry) left the battlefield on July 15, 1410 by the end of the battle. Moreover, a country knights took over the town and castle of Ostróda for the Polish king to help him to march to Marienburg. Other knights, among them Nicolaus of Renis (Mikołaj z Ryńska), planned to take the Marienburg in a similar manner. In this context it has to be pointed out that the country's nobility of Chełmno Lands was not required to fight outside its borders for the Order after the privilege for Chełmno of 1233. Participation in military campaigns beyond the Vistula River and its tributaries Drewenz and Ossa was performed voluntarily and those who were taking part received from the Order payment and compensation for all incurred losses. The following campaigns can be set as an examples: Samaiten 1402, Gotland 1404 and Dobrzyń 1409. At the end of 1410 a cash payment of 4,000 marks was made on the orders of the Grand Master for Chełmno Lands. The sum, which was the equivalent of about 300 war horses, was not completely used what deeply disappointed the knights who valued higher their losses. An open question remains concerning to what extent that special arrangement for the Chełmno Lands had impact on the behavior of parts of their chivalry in the battle of Grunwald. Similar agreements were also held with the knights in Warmia and in the New March (Neumark); they could also be used for military service outside their borders only voluntary under the above enumerated conditions. This became a problem for the Teutonic Order and often led to annoyance particularly with the nobles in the New March. The four bishops of Pomesania, Warmia, Chełmno Lands and Kulm paid homage to the Polish king after the battle of Grunwald, as did the abbess of St. Bridget in Gdańsk who wrote a request for assistance to Władysław Jagiello slightly after the Polish-Lithuanian victory. Her wishes were promptly answered in the affirmative manner on 6th August. The case of Bishop Heinrich Vogelsang of Warmia is of particular interest because he set out for Poland in late September or early October and was therefore considered by the Teutonic Order as a traitor. Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen sought long in vain to replace him with a supporter of the Teutonic Order. The major cities in Prussia seemed to have an ambivalent attitude towards the heavy defeat of the Knights. According to the messages that reached the Bishop of Poznan on July 29 and briefly after, the inhabitants of Thorn beheaded their komtur and killed 50 Order soldiers. A similar fate suffered other Order soldiers in Gdansk mid-August. The city Elblag apologized later for paying the homage to the Polish king using as an excuse the fact that the German Order prohibited repeatedly to repair the damaged city walls. In the general analysis of this issue the following questions are worth answering: How different were the reactions of the inhabitants of Prussia to the changing military and political situation after the battle of Grunwald? Can the different forms of behavior be recognized depending on social class? And were the numerous tributes the result of desperation and seeing the situation as "hopeless" or rather an expression of long-suppressed resentment of Teutonic Order’s authority?

4

Einstellung der bevölkerung Preussens zur herrschaft der Ordensritter

85%

Ekdahl S.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2016

|

issue 23

109-114

EN

The history of the Lizard Union proves existance of strong opposition against the rule of the Teutonic Knights even before its defeat at the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). That hostile attitude was clearly expressed when several banners of Chełmno Lands (banner – unit of the cavalry) left the battlefield on July 15, 1410 by the end of the battle. Moreover, a country knights took over the town and castle of Ostróda for the Polish king to help him to march to Marienburg. Other knights, among them Nicolaus of Renis (Mikołaj z Ryńska), planned to take the Marienburg in a similar manner. In this context it has to be pointed out that the country's nobility of Chełmno Lands was not required to fight outside its borders for the Order after the privilege for Chełmno of 1233. Participation in military campaigns beyond the Vistula River and its tributaries Drewenz and Ossa was performed voluntarily and those who were taking part received from the Order payment and compensation for all incurred losses. The following campaigns can be set as an examples: Samaiten 1402, Gotland 1404 and Dobrzyń 1409. At the end of 1410 a cash payment of 4,000 marks was made on the orders of the Grand Master for Chełmno Lands. The sum, which was the equivalent of about 300 war horses, was not completely used what deeply disappointed the knights who valued higher their losses. An open question remains concerning to what extent that special arrangement for the Chełmno Lands had impact on the behavior of parts of their chivalry in the battle of Grunwald. Similar agreements were also held with the knights in Warmia and in the New March (Neumark); they could also be used for military service outside their borders only voluntary under the above enumerated conditions. This became a problem for the Teutonic Order and often led to annoyance particularly with the nobles in the New March. The four bishops of Pomesania, Warmia, Chełmno Lands and Kulm paid homage to the Polish king after the battle of Grunwald, as did the abbess of St. Bridget in Gdańsk who wrote a request for assistance to Władysław Jagiello slightly after the Polish-Lithuanian victory. Her wishes were promptly answered in the affirmative manner on 6th August. The case of Bishop Heinrich Vogelsang of Warmia is of particular interest because he set out for Poland in late September or early October and was therefore considered by the Teutonic Order as a traitor. Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen sought long in vain to replace him with a supporter of the Teutonic Order. The major cities in Prussia seemed to have an ambivalent attitude towards the heavy defeat of the Knights. According to the messages that reached the Bishop of Poznan on July 29 and briefly after, the inhabitants of Thorn beheaded their komtur and killed 50 Order soldiers. A similar fate suffered other Order soldiers in Gdansk mid-August. The city Elblag apologized later for paying the homage to the Polish king using as an excuse the fact that the German Order prohibited repeatedly to repair the damaged city walls. In the general analysis of this issue the following questions are worth answering: How different were the reactions of the inhabitants of Prussia to the changing military and political situation after the battle of Grunwald? Can the different forms of behavior be recognized depending on social class? And were the numerous tributes the result of desperation and seeing the situation as "hopeless" or rather an expression of long-suppressed resentment of Teutonic Order’s authority?

5

Beneficjenci Wielkiej wojny wśród rycerstwa polskiego

80%

Sperka J.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

92-112

PL

In the article I tried to present those of Polish knights whom the “Great War” brought measurable benefits, whose political and clerical careers were boosted and fortunes increased. They achieved that thanks to King Wladyslaw Jagiello who knew how to appreciate people serving him faithfully as well as those who proved courageous in that great campaign. In the per iod from the middle of July 1410 to the middle of March 1411, the king rewarded 23 knights bestowing them with 10 villages and charging the crown land with the sum of 2310 grzywnas which meant that the goods were actually transferred into a private property. Adding the bestowals from the autumn of 1411, which can be associated with the Great War, we will have 26 rewarded and the amount of grzywnas will increase to 3310. Among thebestowed included were indigent knights as well as magnates who came from all over the Kingdom of Poland, although the majority was from Małopolska. A dozen of people who weregranted offices or were promoted should be also included into the circle of the beneficiaries. In both cases this certainly was not everyone. Analysing the later careers of the knights, theheroes of the war enumerated in Jan Długosz’s chronicle, one thing can be noticed i.e. the king felt a sentimental attachment to those knights who fought in the battle of Grunwald, especially those who were exceptionally courageous and did not spare their own blood in the battle. Those of whose reward we do not know could later on count on the king’s clemency. The majority of the knights who courageously fought in the first ranks during the battle of Grunwald and Koronowo took land offices, starosties or were taken in the court by clemency of the king in the later years. The battlefields of “the Great War” turned out to be a kind of “purgatory” for those knights who had formerly fallen into disgrace (e.g. Jakub from Kobylany, Mikołaj Chrząstowski). Finally, it is necessary to mention the largest group of “the Great War” beneficiaries, unfortunately almost entirely anonymous, namely hundreds of knights who enriched themselves with trophies obtained during the campaign.

6

Armia króla Władysława Jagiełły w drodze pod Grunwald

80%

Grabarczyk T.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

7-25

PL

For years, the route followed by the Polish-Lithuanian army on its way to Grunwald in 1410 has been arousing controversy as the sources do not allow for its clear-cut determination.From the moment when Jagiello’s army crossed the Vistula river at Czerwińsk (3rd July) until it reached the fields of Grunwald only some of its halting-places are known. The passagefrom Dąbrówno to the battlefield covered on the 15th of July is given special attention in the historians’ discussion. S. Ekdahl claims that the Polish-Lithuanian army pitched a camp tothe north of Dąbrówno and stormed the town from that direction. Other historians incline towards the opinion that the army’s camp was situated to the south of Dabrówno, near the village Kalbornia. As a consequence they assume that the town was also attacked from the south. A few routes of the march from Dąbrówno to the site where the battle was supposed to take place were suggested in the present literature. According to S. Ekdahl, Jagiello’s army moved from the camp situated to the north of Dąbrówno to the east through Samin to stop near Grunwald. In the newest monograph of the 1409-1411 war it was stated that Jagiello’s army got to Grunwald by a route running through previously captured Dąbrówno and later on through Samin to Grunwald Jagiello’s army, after breaking up its camp at Kolbornia, moved east to turn north after a few kilometres and continue its march through Osiekowo, Łodgowo. A. Nadolski did not agree with those assumptions as he believed that from the camp in Dąbrówno the army headed for Turowo and then marched north towards Mielno circumventing the Ulnowo Lake from the east. The author of the article propounds a hypothesis that Jagiello’s army could act both to the north and south of Dąbrówno where the main camp of the Polish-Lithuanian forces was situated. He also considers that the conception of S. Kuczyński criticised by A. Nadolski and S. Ekdahl concerning the final phase of the march should still be taken into consideration as very probable. The author believes that there was no serious discussion on the Grunwald campaign during the last twenty years in Poland. Both the last monograph of the 1409–1411war and this article show that a new view on that topic is still possible.

7

Czy duchowni kronikarze potraĮ li opisać „wielkie starcie”? Uwagi o bitwie, liczebności i stratach obu armii w świetle źródeł i nowszej historiograĮ i polskiej

80%

Rajman J.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

26-74

PL

The author of the article presents an in-depth analysis of nar rative sources about the battle, namely: “The chronicle of the conflict between Wladyslaw, King of Poland and the TeutonicKnights” (“Kronika konfliktu Władysława króla polskiego z krzyżakami”), “Continuation” of the Teutonic chronicle of Johann von Posilge, a comprehensive description by Długosz in the9th book of his Yearbooks (Roczniki) as well as the account of so-called Toruń Annalist. The author confronts this analysis with the findings published in the most impor tant works ofPolish historians, archaeologists and historical geographers. Particularly controversial is the issue of the armies’ strength. The author believes that the calculations presented in the morerecent literature, especially those per taining to the Teutonic army, are not reliable. He also indicates that the issue of the number of casualties in both armies should be re-discussed. Theauthor depicts the battle on the basis of narrative sources from which he tr ies to pick up the elements that could have come from the witnesses and participants of the battle and separatethem from the authors’ own combinations. “The chronicle of the conflict” does not provide any details concerning the strength of the Jagiellonian and Teutonic armies, shows some omissionsin recounting the episodes of the battle known from Długosz’s account and generally perceived as authentic. It does not provide any information on the fall of the gonfalone with the eagleduring the encounter of the Great Chorągiew of Cracow. No mention of the heroic behaviour of the Smolensk Chorągiew and of the abandonment of the battlefield by the mercenary CzechChorągiew (events accepted by the Polish historians) need to be enumerated among the most important omissions of “The chronicle.” The Teutonic “Continuation” and the account of theToruń Annalist are characterised by brevity consisting in using just a couple of sentences to describe a day-long battle. Długosz created his depiction of the battle of Grunwald when notonly the outcome of the Great War had already been known but also the effect of all other wars with the Teutonic Order, including the Thirteen Years’ War (1454–66). While the author of“The chronicle” wanted to create the account mainly of the facts, Długosz wanted to describe the reasons as well. He blamed Vytautus and the Lithuanians as well as a couple of Cracovianmagnates for the withdrawal form the siege of Malbork. He could not, however, decide whom to blame for the course of the battle of Grunwald. The author of the article believes that Długosz gives the same account of the battle as “The chronicle of the conflict,” but he falsely described the stance of the Lithuanian army failing to mention an extremely important fact i.e. the return of the Lithuanian army to the battlefield. Initially, the Cracovian historian also falsely described the alleged passivity of the king towards the approaching Teutonic army, on the morning of the 15th of July. From the whole Długosz’s descr iption emerges an image of a king skilfully commanding his army.

8

Bitwa pod Grunwaldem w pracach historyków litewskich

80%

Baranauskas T.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

75-91

PL

The author of the article explores the onomastic conceptions of the battle of Grunwald appearing in the Lithuanian literature. The name „Žalgirio mūšis,” which is a translation ofthe German “Grünwald” into Lithuanian, was adopted. The author discuses the works of the Lithuanian historians which were developed in a strong opposition to the Polish apprehensionwritten by Karol Szajnocha. The main reason for the criticism of Szajnocha’s work, as well as of numerous other Polish studies, was that they uncritically adopted Długosz’s version about theLithuanians’ abandonment of the battlefield. The Lithuanian historiography has always been sensitively reacting to any attempts of belittling the importance of the Lithuanian army andVytautas’ role in the battle of Grunwald. Instead, the Lithuanian historians were developing a conception of a diversionary flight manoeuvre which was generally accepted before SvenEkdahl published the famous letter of a Teutonic commander. For a long time, a thesis that the Polish army was unwilling to fight and the whole burden of combat in the battle of Grunwaldwas borne by the Lithuanians was prevailing in many works of the Lithuanian historians. The author shows that the tense Polish-Lithuanian relationships during the interwar period had influence on the historiography. The Lithuanian literature attaches much importance to the account of Bychowiec’s Chronicle which is usually disregarded by the Polish historians and considered rather unreliable. With the course of time, analyses of various aspects of the battle conducted mainly from the military point of view, started to appear (the place of the battle, the route of the march, the strength of the army, the ar t of the war fare and thecourse of the battle). Many aspects, i.e. the strength of the army, are still discussed in the works of the Lithuanian authors. In the most recent literature the issue of the diversionaryflight manoeuvre still arouses controversy. The manoeuvre is almost commonly accepted as a historic fact, however, the historians dispute whether the Lithuanians culled it from theTatars or was it an immanent feature of their art of war fare. The author concludes his article with a discussion of the latest treaties by M. Jučas, R. Batūra, E. Gudavičius, K. Gudmantas, R.Petrauskas. The significant role of the Lithuanians in the initial and final stages of the battle is contemporarily commonly accepted. The author concludes that for a long time theLithuanian historiography has been presenting the battle of Grunwald as an epoch-making event that led to the destruction of the power of the Teutonic Order.

9

Wstęp

80%

Rajman J.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

3-6

PL

Foreword

10

Książę Witold Wielki w kampanii letniej 1410 r. w ocenie Jana Długosza

70%

Mačiukas Ž.

Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 11

113-125

PL

The author of the article shows that both the Polish and Lithuanian historiography pays great attention to the opinion of Jan Długosz on Prince Vytautas the Great. The reason for this interest is the fact that Jan Długosz devoted a lot of space to Prince Vytautas, presenting his activity during an extended period of time (1376–1430) and, in his description of the 1410 campaign, depicted a highly ambiguous picture of the Prince of Lithuania. The Polish and Lithuanian literature assumes that Prince Vytautas played an extremely significant role in the preparation and the course of the Great War of Poland and Lithuania with the Teutonic Order whose climaxwas the battle of Grunwald. It is generally known that the Prince participated in that battle in person. The author of the article discusses the development of the Lithuanian research onthe activity of Prince Vytautas. Three aspects of forming evaluation of Vytautas the Great in the time of the 1410 military campaign are visible in Długosz’s opinion: military, moral andpolitico-diplomatic. Długosz also evaluates the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania which participated in the battle of Grunwald. The literature on the topic underlines that Długosz’sdescription of the battle of Grunwald is one of the most exhaustive portrayals of Vytautas as a warrior and leader preserved in the medieval sources. The author concludes that Długosz presents an extraordinarily positive opinion about Prince Vytautas with reference to the battle of Grunwald while his evaluation of the Lithuanian army and its alleged abandonmentof the battlefield are definitely negative. In the description of the next stages of the 1410 campaign, Długosz’s opinion about Prince Vytautas undergoes a radical change which was supposed to stem from the change of the Prince’s politics towards Poland and the Teutonic Order. From a staunch ally and the commander of the battle of Grunwald he transforms into a politician interested solely in the welfare of Lithuania, insincere towards Poland or even plotting with the Teutonic Knights against Poland. Długosz, who in 1410 wished to make the most of the Grunwald victory, wrongly blames Prince Vytautas for ruining the opportunity of capturing Malbork.

11

Pola bitew – ważny element dziedzictwa

41%

Wrzosek J.

Ochrona Zabytków

|

2010

|

issue 1-4

173-182

EN

Battlefields are where historical events took place. They differ in significance, which is either national or global. It is usually difficult to determine the exact area of conflict. This particularly concerns battles that were fought in ancient or medieval times. The more recent a battle, the more abundant historical sources are, and it is easier to determine the field of conflict in question. In order to discover its precise location, historical and other types of research are conducted. This sometimes might shed new light on what historians have established so far. The answer to the question of whether a battlefield constitutesa monument is of course affirmative and there should be no doubt about it. The Polish law recognises, among others, places that commemorate events as monuments, and an area where a battle was fought is most certainly such a place. In Poland there are five fields of battle which are legally protected by being inscribed on the register of monuments. These are: Grunwald (1410), Racławice (1794), Maciejowice (1794), Raszyn (1809) and Westerplatte (1939). As many as three of them – Grunwald, Racławice and Westerplatte – are considered Monuments of History and are of special significance to the State. Which is the best form of protecting a place such as a battlefield? The Act of July 23, 2003, on the Protection of Monuments and the Guardianship of Monuments introduces forms of protection other than the inscription on the register of monuments. These are the creation of cultural parks and the introduction of protection arrangements into local spatial development plans. It might seem that the above measures are more flexible and efficient in preventing the degradation of battlefields. A question arises then: how to legally protect a battlefield without inscribing it on the register of monuments? It seems that the best way is to indicate that such an area is under conservation protection and to list it in the Voivodeship Record of Historical Monuments. In the case of battlefields where elements such as the remains of field fortifications or graves of those killed in battle were preserved, it appears that the best solution is to implement a combined strategy. The area of the battlefield itself can be protected by the conservator and might be included in the Voivodeship Record of Historical Monuments. Other aforementioned monuments can be inscribed on the register of monuments. This will ensure both the protection of the area and the protection of the immovable monuments, though on a smaller scale. There are at least 4 stages of the proceedings that need to be undertaken in order to determine an area where a battle was fought in the past: Stage I – Detailed historical and cartographic analyses. Stage II – Field research consisting in determining where in the modern landscape the characteristic elements of the landform features, hydrography, or roads, related to particular historical events, can be found. Stage III – Archaeological research, which will enable to specify the exact area of the field of conflict, determine the places where particular parts of the battle were fought, or verify the immovable monuments associated with it. Stage IV – Determining the zones under conservation protection. There are several ways to enhance the attractiveness of areas where a battle was fought in the past. One of them is creating a museum dedicated to this particular historical event. Choosing this option, one must bear in mind that the museum has to be modern and present its message in an attractive way. Another, cheaper solution is to stage historical events with the participation of the so-called groups of historical reconstruction. In the years 2008-2011 the National Heritage Board of Poland, initially known as the National Centre for the Research and Documentation of Monuments (KOBiDZ), undertook the task of conducting archaeological research involving 3 fields of battle. The battles in question were 2 battles of the Seven Years’ War fought in Sarbinowo in the Zachodniopomorskie Voivodeship (Zorndorf 1758) and in Kunowice in the Lubuskie Voivodeship (Kunersdorf 1759), as well as the battle of Ossów in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. Battlefields are unique monuments. They are not buildings or other monuments that are noticed immediately. Their boundaries are blurred and it requires a lot of effort to determine their approximate surface. Protecting them constitutes another problematic issue, as their areas are significantly large. Research, exploration and protection of such monuments can all become important factors with regard to social integration among local communities, raising historical awareness or, last but not least, awakening patriotic sentiments.

12

Zaangażowanie społeczeństwa II Rzeczypospolitej w obchody rocznic historycznych (na wybranych przykładach)

36%

Załęczny J.

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio F – Historia

|

2016

|

vol. 71

EN

Anniversaries celebrations during the Second Polish Republic helped to build historical consciousness of the society united after years of occupation. Celebrations connected with historical calendar commemorated Polish achievements, they made the society proud and conveyed patriotic values. This work describes anniversaries from the period of the Kingdom of Poland and Napoleonic era. They commemorated victories of Polish army and inspired the society to build the power of the state.

PL

Obchody rocznic służyły w II Rzeczypospolitej budowaniu świadomości społeczeństwa jednoczonego po latach niewoli. Uroczystości związane z kalendarzem historycznym przypominały o dokonaniach Polaków, budziły poczucie dumy narodowej i kształtowały postawy patriotyczne. Omówione w artykule rocznice odnoszą się do czasów Polski królewskiej i okresu napoleońskiego. Przypominały one o sukcesach oręża polskiego i miały inspirować do udziału w budowie potęgi państwa.

Refine search results

6 Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne

4 Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

1 Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio F – Historia

1 Ochrona Zabytków

3 2016

2 2013

6 2011

1 2010

2 Ekdahl S.

2 Grabowski J.

2 Rajman J.

1 Baranauskas T.

1 Grabarczyk T.

1 Mačiukas Ž.

1 Sperka J.

1 Wrzosek J.

1 Załęczny J.

Udział Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w dniach Grunwaldu w 2012 roku

Udział Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w Dniach Grunwaldu w 2012 roku

Einstellung der Bevölkerung Preußens zur Herrschaft der Ordensritter

Einstellung der bevölkerung Preussens zur herrschaft der Ordensritter

Beneficjenci Wielkiej wojny wśród rycerstwa polskiego

Armia króla Władysława Jagiełły w drodze pod Grunwald

Czy duchowni kronikarze potraĮ li opisać „wielkie starcie”? Uwagi o bitwie, liczebności i stratach obu armii w świetle źródeł i nowszej historiograĮ i polskiej

Bitwa pod Grunwaldem w pracach historyków litewskich

Wstęp

Książę Witold Wielki w kampanii letniej 1410 r. w ocenie Jana Długosza

Pola bitew – ważny element dziedzictwa

Zaangażowanie społeczeństwa II Rzeczypospolitej w obchody rocznic historycznych (na wybranych przykładach)