The author is concerned with fundamental problems of Rózewicz's diction: the construction of the writing subject and its cognitive barriers, the relation between poem and thing, silence as a consequence of his belief in inexpressibility, and, finally, with means of representing things, such as analogy, ekphrasis, or the search for the primordial image. The author adopts the framework of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger - an antithesis of Rózewicz's literary strategies.
In this article, the author 1) defines the scope of attitudes towards Eastern wisdom in European humanities from ancient times up to the present (Plotinos, Schopenhauer, Eliade, etc.), 2) characterizes the essence of the basic barriers which block the instrumental employment of the above-mentioned texts in humanistic research, 3) points out model cases of explicit (Schopenhauer) and implicit (Heidegger) openness of the European way of thinking towards Eastern wisdom, 4) reveals the following epistemological symptoms of the essential part of source texts of Eastern wisdom: a) focus on the suppositional field (always differentiating) of semiosis or the sign syntagmas, b) experiential wholeness, c) eudemonic character and d) radical assumptions.
The article points out the similarity of idea in poetry and philosophy. Poets and philosophers describe the same phenomena and walk the same path in solidarity. Mallarmé and Heidegger speak of Nothingness and show Nothingness. Mallarmé descended deeply enough into Nothingness to speak about it with confidence. Where to look for nothing and how to find it? How can nothing be shown? And what does nothing itself show? Nothingness is revealed through Anxiety. Therefore, the abnormal anxiety that possess the poet is an experience of suffering from Nothingness. Nothing is known as a thing or as a condition. It is happening as we speak. Nothingness is expressed as it is, as an „empty salon“.
The author considers the tradition of nihilism, in its Nietzschean and Heideggerian version, to be of use in interpretation of a number of important phenomena of 20th-century arts and literature. He advocates a thesis that weak ontology, in a variety of versions, has not only been emphatically expressed in modern arts and literature but in fact, has formed their ontological and aesthetic foundations. He focuses on how the various practices, discourses and areas of human expression have attempted at naming the phenomenon which he himself perceives not only in terms of an academic issue but as a keen experience of our time.
This article investigates Heidegger՚s and Hegel՚s understanding of Being. The main focus is on Heidegger՚s late work and on his thinking conversation with Hegel. However, in Hegel՚s understanding of metaphysics there is a significant absence of the notion of being as such in its unity with the highest being, but also a desire to identify Being itself as opposed to Being of being. In Hegel՚s ontology Being exists always just as a Being of being. The ontological difference, which Heidegger aims to fill in all of his work, turns out to be the dead end of his thinking. Heidegger՚s efforts to answer the question of Being itself therefore ends in failure.
The aim of the article is to investigate the relationship between the consciousness of one's own death, of the death of others, as well as the mode of existence which is commonly called authentic in the existential philosophy. The core of the investigation is the 'dispute' of Martin Heidegger and Emanuel Levinas concerning death, which is complemented by the insights of other philosophers and psychologists. The attention is paid to common people's attitudes towards death and mortality rather than to pure theoretical considerations. Everyman is understood as that side of all of us, which does not aim at an intense cogitation and self-reflection. The questions of personal and impersonal attitudes towards death, the fear of death, the otherness of death and the others are the topics discussed in the article together with non-physical aspect of death.
Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's 'Logical investigations' as presented in his lectures 'History of the concept of time: Prolegomena' (1925) was a remarkable contribution to the development of phenomenology: First, Heidegger starts with the interpretation of intentionality and his considerations become thus methodologically transparent (contrary to the language of 'Being and time', in which the term is missing). Second, Heidegger managed to answer the question: Why is Husserl's phenomenology the philosophically decisive alternative when compared to the domination of reflexive consciousness and logical judgment in modern philosophy? It is because concepts are not the representations of things any more; as the 'states of things' they are explicit expressions ('parts') of an implicitly given meaning ('whole'). Third, Heidegger's interpretation includes the fundamental question of being in its three meanings (copula, the sentence about existence, the sentence about identity), due to which the status of the explanation of 'reality' (which is more than the 'reality' of single things) changes as well.
The paper discusses Richard Rorty’s views on intercultural hermeneutics as presented in his essay “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” and in his correspondence with the Indian philosopher Anindita Niyogi Balslev. The focus is primarily on Rorty’s presumption that instead of providing an “authentic” picture of another culture, the goal of intercultural studies or hermeneutics should be to look if there is anything “of use” in a given culture what is not offered by ours.
This article draws on some of Martin Heidegger's ideas to examine the functioning of the mode of self-imposed silence ('falling silent') in the poems of Tadeusz Rózewicz. Crucial to this inquiry is the question about the meaning of Rózewicz's gesture of stopping and giving up writing. It may represent his deliberate choice of 'the space of non-naming', the relinquishing of words in the face of mystery, or falling silent after reaching an extremity beyond which it is impossible to move. The article also presents some strategies of deconstructing the subject employed by Rózewicz. In the context of the preceding discussion they appear as a deliberate activity opening up the perception of being.
During a meeting in Hütte in Todtnauberg on 25 July 1967, the poet Paul Celan and the thinker Martin Heidegger hatched a conspiracy of silence in their 'Muttersprache'. The background for it was the experience of Holocaust, and its important expression - Celan's (un)poetical 'Todesfuge' (Fugue of Death) from 1944. 'Fugue of Death' is however not a metaphor of Holocaust but a language saved from it. This language does not assume a simple contradiction of speech and silence. This contradiction breaks down in Auschwitz. It creates a rift in which the speech is not not-silence, and silence - only not-speech. The logos in the antropo- and theological realm breaks down. The coming out of the 'abysmal', redeeming of words is supposed to come into being through an attempt of silence, such as the one created between Celan and Heidegger, in making the non-speech of the witness of the Holocaust sanctified.
The author presents the views of late Heidegger on language and analyses the role played by the language in the philosophical creation of the German philosopher after the so-called Turn. The article is based on the assumption that the conception of language of the late Heidegger allows us to understand better, what is the essence of language and on what does rely the conceptional part of the language in the process of the intercommunication of people and in the cognition and interpreting of the world.
In this article criticism of the belief of existential basis of the idea of guilt is presented: the belief that the idea of guilt can exist only owing the existential guilt. Additionally, a hypothesis is presented that it is rather denotation and not ontology that may be the basis or condition of this idea. The author concentrated predominantly on texts by Martin Heidegger and showed stands concerning guilt and donation therein. To justify the presented hypothesis he also addressed the works of Jean-Luc Marion. The issue of condition of the idea of guilt can be viewed in a light that the existential problem may remain detached from donation and the very phenomenology of donation needs to be supplemented with the category of guilt.
The paper deals with the problem of the historical incorporation of Greek metaphysics into Christian theology. The adopted approach is inspired by Martin Heidegger's ideas. Heidegger identified the platform for the incorporation of Greek metaphysics into Christian theology with the understanding of thinking as uncovering of being as being. According to Heidegger, every reductive understanding of thinking has a common source, which is the objectification of thinking. In Western tradition it leads to the hegemony of logic. Logical basis of metaphysics gave rise to onto-theological structure in both: in the thought of ancient Greeks (according to Heidegger this is already the case with Aristotle) as well as in Christian theology. Through the presentation of Heidegger's analysis, the paper calls for rethinking the nature of metaphysics and theology, as well as for rethinking the relations between modern philosophical and theological conceptions.
The history of philosophy is an essential element of Heidegger's philosophy. The paper raises the question: Could Heidegger have successfully completed his 'Being and time' as he proclaimed in its first edition? In the author's view, the fact that the second part of the book remained unwritten was an inevitable consequence of the turn: The question of being in the second part of 'Being and time' remained unresolved, therefore Heidegger later focused on the understanding of being in Hegel, Leibniz, Heraclites and Parmenides. The author argues, however, that even this important re-orientation could not lead to a successful accomplishment of Heidegger's original intention. i.e. to conceive being without existence, what would have enabled him to pass on from the metaphysics of existence to the metaphysics of being.
The paper gives an analysis of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s, which was a shared philosophical platform for Hartmann and Heidegger. Both philosophers are to be conceived of mainly in the context of Neo-Kantianism, which ends, when the conception of epistemology as prima philosophia is replaced by ontology. While Hartmann conceived of metaphysics through the optics of what remains unknowable in grasping the problems logically, Heidegger saw the metaphysics of that time on the background of the forgetfulness of being.
The inspiration for this article was Heidegger's claim in the second volume of Nietzsche that philosophy of will to power was the final result and complement of European metaphysics. Metaphysics of will is one of four main plots of a book prepared by the author of article, entitled Problem of Metaphysics. The Evolution of European Metaphysics in the View-point of late Heidegger. The paper begins with Heidegger's problem of destruction of metaphysics. This destruction is in fact the immanent critique of European philosophical consciousness. An analysis of the notion of will to power and the notion of will to will follows. Next, the author supports her claim that 'incubation' of the will to power began in the Middle Ages, not in the modern times (Descartes), as Heidegger maintained. Reflection upon Heidegger's opinion on German idealism (except for late Schelling) was concerned with will to self-consciousness as a specific prelude to Nietzsche's will to power. At the end of the paper, the overman as shape of humanity related to the ontological project of will to power is taken into account. The Second World War proved how real was the peril of destruction of human nature, argues Heidegger. After the war, the general attitude to a being as a whole didn't change, so the danger is still there. Therefore, the statement of late Heidegger: 'to give up the will' becomes especially important; it is worthwhile to indulge in contemplative thinking (just like Greeks) as opposed to the modern instrumental reason.
This text tries to reconstruct a debate concerning the philosophical status of the relation between man and animal. The author outlined the conception proposed by Martin Heidegger and then cited its critical presentations by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. Their deconstruction of the German philosopher's discourse comprises a radical attempt at severing links with the anthropocentric tradition of philosophy. The ultimate objective of the reflections pursued in the essay is, however, not yet another critique of metaphysics, but saving man from the desperate gesture of enrooting the specificity of his existence in a privileged relation with death. In this manner, man is supposed to not only come closer to others but also to distance himself from death.
The paper focuses on the fact that, in recent political philosophy, we have witnessed a critical overturning of an earlier philosophical idealism that invoked friendship as the destination of the political and, in its place, of what the author will call a non-philosophical understanding that has determined a certain war (pólemos), and the “friend-enemy” relation, as the permanent ground from which any critical or strategic understanding of the political must now depart. This tendency can most clearly be illustrated by Jacques Derrida’s commentaries on the German jurist Karl Schmitt and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. In this article, the author will address Derrida’s overt polemic and/or Auseinandersetzung with these two thinkers in his later writings. First, she will discuss his polemic with Schmitt from The Politics of Friendship (1990), and will conclude with some preliminary remarks on the culmination of this polemic in his reflections on Heidegger from the same period.
Non-binary gender as an umbrella term refers to any gender beyond the male/female categories. With the progressing LGBT+ movement and future predictions referring to all persons equally „regardless of their chosen gender” (Cave, Klein, 2015), the question of philosophical and societal limits of being non-binary is a fundamental one for understanding the patterns in the current sign system. Binary, as such, is of a philosophical nature and can be interpreted as political; as in the works of Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler who both accelerated feminist criticism by analysing how the masculine is privileged in the construction of meaning. Also, for Martin Heidegger binary is a subject of criticism as he tried to establish a new dualistic-thinking humanism in which being comes before metaphysical oppositions. The goal of this article is to compare the approaches of these three scholars to find the possibilities, preconditions and limits of non-binary gender. The author argues that the point of clash of their arguments dwells in the interlinkage of thinking, acting and signifying of a politicized material body. All of them problematize authenticity and repetition.
The article reviews the freedom of oeuvre issue in the teaching of M. Heidegger, in particular according to his understanding of notions of tradition, free thinking, creative digestion, just and false, et cetera. Subjects of analysis include the philosopher’s approach to definition of being and matter, subjectivity and objectivity, and their relation with freedom of oeuvre.
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