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HYPERINTENSIONALITY OF DEONTIC MODALS: AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

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Glavaničová D.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2019

vol. 74

issue 8

652 – 662

A plenitude of motivations can and has been enlisted to speak for the hyper intensionality of epistemic modals. This fact is well-known and many logical frameworks have been introduced to capture the fine-grained nature of epistemic modals. Recently, hyper intensionality of deontic modals has been brought into the focus. Paradoxes of deontic logic and the failure of substitution of classical equivalents have been enlisted to motivate hyper intensionality in deontic logic. This paper formulates a new argument for hyper intensionality of deontic modals. The argument is based on an over-looked analogy between epistemic logic and deontic logic. This leads us to the question whether any hyper intensional framework apt for epistemic modals would be apt for deontic modals as well. The paper argues that many, but not all would be.

DEFINÍCIE Z POHĽADU HYPERINTENZIONÁLNEJ SÉMANTIKY

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Glavaničová D.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2017

vol. 72

issue 1

15 – 23

We are often told that the meaning of a definiendum of an adequate definition is identical to the meaning of its definiens. This claim appears in Frege’s theory of definitions, and so it appears in Russell’s theory. However, it is worthwhile to remember both philosophers were advocates of the extensional semantics. Yet, the claim is often accepted beyond the realm of extensional theories. Admittedly, the claim is sustainable in the intensional semantics. However, as the author will argue, it is untenable in the theory of definitions based on hyperintensional semantics.

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HYPERINTENSIONALITY OF DEONTIC MODALS: AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

DEFINÍCIE Z POHĽADU HYPERINTENZIONÁLNEJ SÉMANTIKY