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Heidegger a prázdno

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EN
Otto Pöggeler, in his book Neue Wege mit Heidegger, states that there is an influence of the Taoist canonical work Dao De Jing, in particular of part I.11, on Heidegger’s analysis of the jug and its emptiness in his lecture Das Ding (The Thing). It seems much more probable, however, that, rather than a Taoist influence, the choice of the example of the jug is part of a programme of opposing Descartes’ rejection of the existence of empty space in his Priniciples of Philosophy, part II, section 17, where Descartes, in giving an example of a mistaken understanding of “empty” space, uses the very same case of the jug. Heidegger, then, probably chooses the example of the jug in order to tackle the modern reduction of the thinghood of a thing to the uniform extension of a body which precludes our conceiving a thing as such. The motif of emptiness, at the same time, plays a fundamental role in the sphere of the origin of the constitution of the meaning of a thing as such, which is a meeting of the quartet of heaven and earth, the godly and the mortal.
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Dzieło sztuki a misterium przemiany

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The aim of the text is to show the power of influence of a work of art on a human being. The power produces a specific shock in man (H.-G. Gadamer) which makes him transform his life... In this sense, it is a story touching upon aspects of Heideggerian considerations about a work of art, which have been presented in the light of some aspects of Merleau-Ponty's ontology of corporeality ( la chair), thus yielding recognition the truth of the truth revealed by a work in the form of apparent chasm originating from “a heart of the corporeal entity”. A specific temporality of a work of art has been shown basing on Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It organizes the existential human time into the following: the time of everyday ordinariness, the time crystallized in a work of art andthe holiday time. It turns out that a cascade of particular times released by a work of art reveals its transgressive features. A work of art, understood here as a crystallized truth, which makes us aware of the fear of death, has also been interpreted in the context of G. Bataille`s thoughts about eroticism. An author and his addressee are shown here lovers of existence, and the crystallized essence of a work of art as an expression of human sovereignty springing up from the dew of joy and pain. All this gives evidence of a role of human creativity in the divine grain of the Logos (Heraclitus)
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In 1929 Franz Rosenzweig, completely paralyzed, wrote his last text, a review of Cohen’s Religion of reason. The review has been published after his death, in 1930, under the title Vertauschte Fronten. This text is worth attention since Rosenzweig not only reviews the most important, as he says, book of his friend and teacher (moreover claiming that it is a radical break with the philosophy Cohen has hitherto represented); not only he inscribes it within the current that he proposes to call “the new thinking”, whose new name could just as well have been, as he suggest in a different place using a Schellingian phrase, “absolute empiricism”; but most of all he proposes to perform the act of “reversing the fronts”, and thereby he interprets in an astounding manner the recent Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer, presenting the situation, in the spirit of the new thinking, completely a rebours, since Heidegger, according to this last will of Rosenzweig, paradoxically turns out to be the inheritor of Cohenian thought and also Rosenzweigian, unlike Cohen’s direct successor, the philosophically misguided Cassirer. Thereby the philosophical lineage of “the new thinking” demarked by Rosenzweig looks as follows: “Cohen – Rosenzweig – Heidegger”. And this is what the Rosenzweig’s reversal of fronts is supposed to mean: an anointment of Heidegger as his proper successor.
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The philosophical meeting in Swiss Davos, happening on the turn March and April the year 1929, became a contribution to renewed analysing of foundations Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kant in its own opus magnum places arguments which into different – at first sight, irreducible to himself - the manner lay out Cassirer and Heidegger. Favoured problems determine the content of my article, wherein – using the addition Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuches placed into Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, the spacious Peter E. Gordon's work Continental Divide. Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos and determining the creature of my pronouncement the translation of Andrzej J. Noras Expositions and the disputation in Davos - I make the comparative analysis the tenet of marburgian neo-Kantianist with theorems the author Sein und Zeit.
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Fenomenologie z příhodného?

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This review study analyses Martin Nitsche’s monograph devoted to Heidegger’s Contributions to philosophy (Bei­träge zur Philosophie), primarily addressing the question of whether Nitsche succeeds in displaying the phenomenological character of the Contributions. It identifies a key step in Nitsche’s interpretation; that is, Heidegger’s shift from emphasising the specific entity of Dasein to emphasising the distinctive “phenomenological” or “relational field”, which is understood as an “ontological locality”. The study focuses on the question of whether it is possible, subsequent to this shift, to preserve the phenomenological character of (Heidegger’s) thought, and it arrives at a negative conclusion in this regard: Heidegger does not offer a phenomenological description - nay, he presents a conceptual, or perhaps even narrative, structure, in which he lays claim to the possibility of speaking from a principled position of (the experienced) “enowning”.
Diametros
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2012
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issue 34
34-50
EN
The work of Gilbert Ryle maintains a notable proximity to the philosophical disposition assumed by the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. This is due largely to their critiques of the Cartesian tradition of philosophical anthropology. By employing the metaphysical positions of univocity and analogy as a hermeneutical device, this study attempts to draw out the fundamental differences between the projects of Ryle and Heidegger. It is my contention that Ryle is not a phenomenologist precisely because he affirms the Scotist doctrine of the univocity of being. In contrast, Heidegger is a phenomenologist precisely because he disaffirms univocity in favor of a modified version of Thomistic analogy. By recalling this important debate in medieval metaphysics, it is possible to gain important resources for debate between the “analytic” and “continental” camps – at least insofar as those labels correspond to the figures of Ryle and Heidegger in a meaningful way.
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K Heideggerově koncepci výpovědi a pravdy

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This paper contributes to the discussion of Heidegger’s conception of statement which rejects the classical understanding of it as being the automatic place of truth and reveals it to be a phenomenon rooted in much deeper hermeneutical and, above all, temporal structures. The article systematises Heidegger’s conception of the three conditions for the untruthfulness of a statement in relation to its primary, that is apophantic, function. The conclusion is a fundamentally ontological conception of the statement which can be applied to the traditional dispute between Russell and Strawson about the statement the current king of France is bald. Fundamental ontology also reveals how the starting point of this dispute is incorrect. If one had to say that one said was right, however, truth would be closer to Russell and not to Strawson, as it is generally thought nowadays.
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Heidegger a Hegel

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The author investigates the parallel conceptions of the overall philosophical goal of M. Heidegger and G. W. F. Hegel. He is of the opinion that the main parallel in the philosophical work of these two thinkers is evident when we compare Heidegger’s conception of the first and second beginning of the history of being with Hegel’s historical scheme of the two phases of the return of the absolute idea to itself. Hegel’s moment of one’s own fully-conscious self-understanding determining the mediation of oneself, and thus overcoming one’s own externality is revealed to be the foreshadowing counterpart of Heidegger’s conception of the overcoming of the first beginning. This overcoming, which Heidegger calls a second beginning, is the overcoming of a movement that substitutes being with the highest being. Heidegger takes the first beginning of the history of being as its necessary initial movement, and only thus can being become aware of itself as the mediating movement of the historical possibility of the second beginning. Hegel’s and Heidegger’s thought are thus revealed to follow analogical and parallel paths in expressing the ultimate conceptions of philosophical thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Pobyt po obratu

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This text examines the oft-neglected difference in Heidegger’s philosophy between Dasein as it is analysed in Being and Time and as it is (das Da-sein) thought from Being (das Seyn) after the turn (die Kehre). Both periods show a common endeavour to renew and think through the question of being. In Being and Time the path to being is found by virtue of the explicit distinction of being (das Sein) and entity (i.e. ontological difference), with the help of phenomenological analyses that have an enduring relation to being (and thus man is das Dasein). After the turn, on the other hand, Being (das Seyn) is thought from Being, or rather from the history of being. The history of the first beginning is the history of metaphysics ending in the forgetting of being in positivism and nihilisim. Our historical moment is characterised as becoming aware of the forgetting of being and as a preparation for the passage to another or different beginning. All this takes place where Being happens, to that which Being (as the event of adoption, das Ereignis) gives and by which it is adopted, and becomes thus the place of Being (das Da-sein, or rather das Da-seyn) a person may become Dasein as the place of Being (das Da-sein). After the turn, or rather in the passage to the second beginning, in distinction to Being and Time, god (gods) is thematised, which certainly belongs to the history of metaphysics and is present at the end of that history as absent. In Being and Time being is thought from the entity which has an enduring relation to being (das Dasein), while after the turn Being (das Seyn as das Ereignis) is thought from the history of the first beginning – Being needs a place to happen, and this place can become a person (as das Da-sein).
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Existenciální tělesnost

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The present paper is an interpretation of the absence of systematic analysis of corporeality in Heidegger’s Being and Time. We do not only ask why this analysis is missing, but also in what way it is missing. Heidegger, in fact, avoids the problem of corporeality in a specific way which enables us to think about it a little further than he himself did. Our paper, therefore, is an attempt to present a sketch of what the existential corporeality might eventually consist in. Our aim is not to correct or to fill the gap in Being and Time, but rather to investigate certain possibilities of the existential-analytical thought. Our attempt draws systematically on phenomenological topology: the body (Körper) is understood as a point which provides the centre of the concrete human perspective and the existential corporeality (Leiblichkeit) is understood as a structured whole within which the changes and alternations of the partial corporeal perspectives make sense.
EN
Heidegger developed his non-concept Gelassenheit after World War II. Its meaning remains uncertain and controversial, something different from notions of everyday conversation. In Slovene, however, it has been translated as sproščenost, which is parallel to English ‘relaxedness’, thus producing hybridity between notions of relaxedness, relaxation and releasement, which is, together with letting-go, a proper English translation of Gelassenheit.This hybridity was (ab)used for political slogans during the 2004 elections, when Heidegger's term was repeated on and on, until it entered popular discourse as well as other domains such as the economy, culture, and media. This phenomenon was examined by Boris Vezjak in The Relaxed Ideology of Slovenes (The Peace Institute, Ljubljana 2007). Relaxedness-releasement entered sport jargon as well, but Vezjak's book did not cover this field. At first abundant, this term more or less disappeared later. With one exception: in ski jumping, where it became one of the main words used to explain what was missing from Slovenian ski jumping during 2004-2009 period. In Slovenia, ski jumping is a national sport, and the absence of excellence during this long period created additional pressures on athletes and the whole ski jumping commonwealth.To examine the numerous cases where releasement was used to explain what is wrong with ski jumpers, or what they finally achieved in rare examples of success during that period, the only Slovene sport daily, "Ekipa" (The Team), was consulted for research. This study revealed that releasement was indeed lost in translation, appearing in ads as a signifier without any certain signified, and functioning as a je-ne-sais-quoi of sport performance and excellence. Through cases of repeated use of releasement as mystical and at the same time scientific (instead of relaxation) and colloquial notion (which is relaxedness, even carelessness), we get at inoculation of kinesiological mechanicism and psychological technique with philosophical mysticism.
EN
Book review: May, Shaun (2016). A Philosophy of Comedy on Stage and Screen: You Have to Be There. Bloomsbury Methuen Drama. London: Bloomsbury, 213 pp. ISBN: 9781472580436
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Pravda a řeč

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The article focuses on the relation between speech and truth, elaborated by Heidegger in the period of Being and Time. It argues that Heidegger’s notion of truth is a deeply linguistic one. The basic language unity is not the proposition (statement), but the situated act of speech. The author reconstructs Heidegger’s reading of the Aristotelian theory of statement as well as Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s analysis of truth. The conclusion arrived at is that if speech is in early Heidegger to be true, it must be context-bound and interpretative.
EN
There have been several criticisms of Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) from the political Left. Perhaps the most frequent one has been that OOO’s aspiration to speak of objects apart from all their relations runs afoul of Marx’s critique of “commodity fetishism.” The main purpose of this article is to show that even a cursory reading of the sections on commodity in Marx’s Capital does not support such an accusation. For Marx, the sphere of entities that are not commodities is actually quite wide, including all the beings of nature not subject to exchange, as well as bartered goods, and tithes and rents paid in kind to feudal lords. In short, the theory of commodity fetishism is a theory of v a l u e, not an anti-realist theory of b e i n g, and thus does not touch on OOO at all. In closing, I make some brief comments on Marx’s relation to Kantian formalism and to Heidegger’s famous account of present-at-hand (vorhanden) and ready-to-hand (zuhanden).
PL
Recenzja ksiązki: Maria Kostyszak, Spór z językiem. Krytyka ontoteologii w pismach Nietzschego, Heideggera i Derridy, Wrocław: Arboretum, 2010
PL
Recenzja ksiązki: Maria Kostyszak, Spór z językiem. Krytyka ontoteologii w pismach Nietzschego, Heideggera i Derridy, Wrocław: Arboretum, 2010
DE
Recenzja książki: Henryk Benisz, Schopenhauer, Nietsche, Heidegger. Fundamentalne kwestie filozofii życia, Kęty: Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, 2015, ss. 600.
ES
Hannah Arendt es una pensadora que en los últimos años ha cobrado relevancia en el ámbito de la filosofía política gracias a sus sugerentes reflexiones sobre el totalitaris-mo, la revolución, la naturaleza de la libertad, la condición humana, por mencionar al-gunos campos. Se trata, sin duda, de una de las filósofas políticas más sugerentes del pasado siglo XX. En el artículo se propone a leer a Arendt a la luz de Kant y Heideg-ger. Además, desde esta perspectiva, se introduce la pregunta, ¿cuál es la relación en-tre el pensamiento de Arendt y la cuestión mexicana?
EN
Hannah Arendt is a thinker who has gained importance in the field of political philosophy thanks to her evocative reflections on totalitarianism, revolution, the nature of freedom, human condition, to name a few fields in recent years. This is undoubtedly one of the most inspiring political philosophers of the twentieth century. The article proposes to read Arendt in the light of Kant and Heidegger. Moreover, from this perspective, it introduces the question, what is the relation between Arendt’s thoughts and Mexico like?
PL
Artykuł przedstawia pojęcie „czasu marnego“ Friedricha Hölderlina i jego odniesienia: aksjologiczne, egzystencjalne, religijne. Martin Heidegger, badacz jego twórczości poetyckiej jest autorem jednej z najlepszych interpretacji elegii Chleb i wino. Jego zdaniem „czas marny” to czas bez Boga, zapominanie nawet śladów boskości. Według Heideggera powinnością poezji jest nie tylko diagnoza takiego stanu, ale i jego transformacja.
EN
The paper presents the concept of ‘destitute time’ of Friederich Hölderlin and its various ref- erences: axiological, existential, religious. Martin Heidegger, who studied his poems, offered one of the most striking interpretations of his eleg y Bread and wine . He claims that ‘destitute time’ is the time when God is absent, when His trace comes to be forgotten. The obligation of poetry is not only to diagnose this stage, but rather to transform it.
EN
This essay argues that Luther’s “metaphysics” is present in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy), a text many consider to be Heidegger’s second magnum opus. I argue that Luther’s “metaphysics” is present in Heidegger’s Contributions in primarily two ways: (1) there is a Lutheran structure (of existential categories) that Heidegger appropriated not only in Being and Time, but also much earlier in his lectures on St. Paul from the 1920s, of responding to a call and converting in anxious anticipation toward a futural not-yet (what Heidegger calls “the last god”); and (2) Contributions’ project concerns overcoming metaphysics, which involves first thinking through to metaphysics’ conditions for possibility, which means recognizing the “ironic nature” of beyng via what Heidegger calls “thinking concealment,” the logic of which originates in Luther’s attacks on not only Greek metaphysics, but upon Judaism and the Mosaic law as well.
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