Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 15

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Heidegger Martin
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
PL
Celem tekstu jest refleksja nad możliwością myśli filmowej poza uwarunkowaniami metafizyki. Esej rozważa tę kwestię na marginesie filmu Abbasa Kiarostamiego „Smak czereśni”, w nawiązaniu do myśli Martina Heideggera i Jean-Luca Nancy’ego. Autor krótko interpretuje film, wskazując jego główny problem oraz sposób jego rozwiązania przez reżysera – zastosowanie niekonwencjonalnych środków artystycznych w relacji do przekazywanych treści zmusza widza do wyjścia z nawykowego rozumienia filmu, ale i z myśli o rzeczywistości. To wyjście można opisać filozoficznie – film pozwala doświadczyć nieoczywistej oczywistości i zwrócić uwagę na jej prymarną zależność od samej możliwości bycia: prześwitu. W nim wszelkie obrazy winny być traktowane jako na-widzenia, napływające ku człowiekowi z samego światła i wyzwalające ku współtworzeniu świata. Dzieło Kiarostamiego jest przykładem spotkania otwartego artysty z dynamiczną ewidencją bycia, zrealizowanego na błonie filmowej niczym acheiropoietyczne ikony.
EN
The aim of the article is a reflection on the possibility of taking cinema thought beyond the considerations of metaphysics. The essay is considering this issue in relation to Abbas Kiarostami’s film ‘Taste of Cherry’, with reference to the thoughts of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy. The author briefly interprets the film, identifies its main problem and the solution proposed by the director – using unconventional artistic methods in relation to the transmitted meanings forces the viewer to go beyond the habitual understanding of film as well as reality. This can be described in terms of philosophy – film permits one to experience the unobvious obviousness and forces one to note its primary dependence on the very possibility of being: a clearing. In it, all images should be treated as an evidence, coming to the people from light itself and liberating them to co-create the world. Kiarostami’s work is an example of an open artist’s meeting with a dynamic evidence of being, recorded on film like acheiropoieta.
EN
For several years an interesting debate has unfolded regarding the extent to which Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time can be classified as either idealist or realist, or rather, and for many this is Heidegger’s official stance, as an attempt to overcome the presuppositions that give rise to these doctrines. One way of considering the debate regards the question as to whether the conditions of intelligibility or, as Taylor Carman calls them, the ‘hermeneutic conditions,’ that Being and Time lays out, are to be understood as access conditions to, or as metaphysical conditions of, entities. The first but not the second interpretation is compatible with a realist reading of Being and Time. For many, including me, the realist reading is the most satisfactory one, both exegetically and theoretically. Several attempts at working out a way of making sense of the transcendental conditions as access conditions have been made, starting with Dreyfus’s and Spinosa’s widely discussed paper. A very important contribution to the debate is owed to Taylor Carman’s excellent Heidegger’s Analytic, where he makes a case for a full-blooded realist reading of Heidegger’s early work. I will argue, however, that Carman’s reading is not completely successful in making sense of the conditions of intelligibility as access conditions rather than metaphysical conditions. I will present a general diagnosis of Carman’s impasse and argue that it results from a thought that has no hold in Heidegger’s way of thinking.
EN
Heidegger has many critics, but not all critics are alike. This paper analyses the work of one of the more forceful and provocative of Heidegger’s detractors, Walter Kaufmann (1921–1980). The paper argues that Kaufmann’s criticisms of Heidegger deserve analysis in their own right. To make this case it unpacks Kaufmann’s biographical and scholarly involvement with Heidegger, explaining how Kaufmann (a refugee from Germany) was instrumental in bringing Heidegger to the attention of the American academic public. At the same time, the paper argues that Kaufmann’s intense opposition to Heidegger’s thought comes from his equally strong engagement with issues that preoccupied Heidegger as well. Specifically, Kaufmann’s own search to find a more honest and meaningful way to speaking about existential questions caused him to recoil from what he saw as Heidegger’s efforts to deflect, rather than spark, thought and engagement. The logic of Kaufman’s argument, as well as the implications of his criticisms of Heidegger are explored in the essay.
EN
The extent of Heidegger’s crucial influence on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics became fully visible only relatively recently with the discovery of the young Heidegger. Early Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity as an attempt to understand human existence had a profound impact on Gadamer. Gadamer’s hermeneutics opens up the horizon of mediation between the manifestation of Being and human understanding. Language, as the mediation between human beings and the world, discloses their original belonging together: In itself, the word is mediation; the word mediates itself. Gadamer’s radicalization of Heidegger’s question of Being leads him to the fundamental question of human understanding.
5
71%
EN
This paper articulates an existential conception of culture using as an analogy the existential conception of science as formulated by Heidegger. As with the existential conception of science, the existential conception of culture corresponds to a mode of existence of Dasein. This distinguishes the existential conception of culture from other prevalent notions of culture that view culture as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. However culture is not simply a mode of Dasein’s existence.It is a mode of existence that discloses that very mode of existence. More precisely, in culture Dasein discloses its very being by concretely working it out. Moreover, it is argued that the task of culture is to exist in such a way that one realizes values in an uncommon manner.
EN
The concept of facticity that was developed by Heidegger from 1919 to 1923 composes the basis of all his further thought: the conceptions of Dasein and ontological temporality will originate namely from this concept. The article analyzes various expressions of the factitious life (care, Er-eignis, life, Self- Destruction, meaningfulness, death), yet the special consideration is paid to its religious aspects. Really the essence of facticity is treated by Heidegger as a temporality that is essentially correlated with the Christian experience. The influence of Saint Augustine to Heidegger and the Heideggerian concept of methodical atheism are analyzed and this analysis raises the intricate problem of the relation of the Black Forest philosopher to Christian faith and to God.
EN
The present paper explores parallels between Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views on the body phenomenon problem, paticularly considering the articulation between language, gesture and art. Initially, I argue that Heidegger and Merleu-Ponty find similar connections between body and language, in light of an ontological approach to language in which language is considered to be a structural component of existence. Accordingly, I suggest that both philosophers introduce the notion of gesture in order to articulate the relationship between body and language, thus showing that meaning is inherent to bodily comportments, something that is particularly clear in artistic practices. Then, I conclude that both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty consider gesture to be a creative response to the world, which discloses latent meanings of things, just as happens with the work of art. In this sense, the notion of gesture alludes to a spontaneous or creative capacity that belongs to Being, that pertains to our background understanding of the world, and therefore cannot be confined either to the limits of a subject or to the limits of a body-object.
EN
Around 1930, Martin Heidegger approached Hölderlin’s poetry, welcoming his solicitations and hints in order to redeem the experience of the usage of language after the linguistic interruption of Being and Time that showed him the poverty of metaphysical language. Linguistic poverty is closely linked to metaphysical poverty and to the historical and destiny-related impossibility to grasp Being. From the 1930s onwards, the issue concerning the sense of Being becomes for Heidegger an issue concerning the sense of language. Heidegger appears to be “employing” Hölderlin, subordinating his philosophical intuitions to the gears of ontology. Thus, in Heidegger’s meditations, Hölderlin’s merit is outlined as the intuition of the outcome of Western metaphysics in terms of the extreme oblivion of Being and the rambling of thinking, foreseeing the end of an era and introducing the dawn of a second beginning: the one of poetizing thinking.
EN
It is clear that the question of language is of utmost importance to Heidegger’s work from the late 1930’s, the period of the so-called seynsgeschichtlich treatises. This preoccupation has become increasingly evident thematically, but is equally apparent in the interruptive and fragmentary presentation of the writing itself, a writing which seems to seek to bring into question the very possibility of philosophical discourse. This paper will argue that decisive, in these texts, both to the development of Heidegger's conception of language and to its mode of enactment, is an engagement with Herder’s work on the origin of language. This engagement is evidenced by the intensive address to that text that we find in the seminar notes from 1939: Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (GA 85). Herder's text allows Heidegger to develop a relation to the fragmentary that is decisive for the unfolding and development of his thinking.
EN
Each history of hermeneutics written since the second half of the 20th century contains a chapter on Martin Heidegger. It is often said the German philosopher revolutionized the discipline by giving existence the place long held by the text. Although this statement is widely justified, I will draw on a few pages of Heidegger’s 1923 lecture-course Ontology and compare them to Dilthey’s 1900 essay The Birth of Hermeneutics in order to support three intertwined ideas. First, Heidegger’s contribution to hermeneutics is not reducible to Being and Time but goes back to the early 1920’ and starts with radical evaluation of its history. Second, even if existence becomes the main focus point, Heidegger in no way devaluates texts. Third, authentic hermeneutics as it articulates itself in the 1927 magnum opus is made possible by the retrieval of the sacred dimension of understanding and then of “selected” religious roots of hermeneutics.
EN
Gandhi’s philosophy and practice of nonviolence was undergirded by his own interpretation of Hinduism. As the interest in his work has moved to the West, certain questions have arisen about its applicability to Western culture and thought. Martin Luther King, Jr. used his version of Christianity, for instance, to import Gandhi into a powerful movement in mid-20th century America. American philosopher, Gene Sharp, has written about Gandhi’s influence in terms of methods that work, with or without a metaphysical or religious foundation. This paper contends that some sort of metaphysical foundation is necessary for nonviolent movements to be effective with large groups of people over time. In service of finding a Western metaphysics that would support nonviolence, the writings of Martin Heidegger are employed. First, Gandhi’s metaphysics is discussed. In light of this discussion, Heidegger’s insights into the relationship of beings to Being are compared to some of Gandhi’s interpretations of Hinduism, especially with regard to nonviolence (ahimsa), Sat (truth) and the active confrontation of violence (satyagraha). In the work of both these thinkers there lies an apparent paradox of boldly confronting the truth that violence and injustice exists while holding to a belief in the impossibility of possessing truth totally. At the heart of this paradox is the danger that a self-righteous “holding to truth” (satyagraha) itself may be a source of much violence, both physical and structural and therefore is the antithesis of nonviolence. It is precisely at this point of contradiction that Gandhi’s and Heidegger’s metaphysical insights converge and transcend this paradox and can be employed as a metaphysical foundation for nonviolence as an ongoing, active struggle with violence.
EN
The major importance attributed by Heidegger to the ontological status of the tool has allowed a series of challenging insights into its role and significance in Being and Time, leading to a questioning upon the very existence of an autonomous phenomenology of technology in it. In what follows, we chose to thematize two of the most recent attempts to evaluate the status of technique in the 1927 Grundwerk. Graham Harman’s approach is situated within the broader context of a recent trend in continental philosophy designated as speculative realism, whereas Peter-Paul Verbeek’s is largely inspired by Don Ihde’s postphenomenological account of technology. The extreme diversification of these two hermeneutic projects renders their treatment on a common ground quite difficult. Nevertheless, we argue that both of them share several common points, despite their fundamental and unbridgeable gap. Harman’s and Verbeek’s efforts to refine the hermeneutic access to one of the most influential sections of Heidegger’s major work exemplify a vivid interest in Being and Time itself, but also in the contemporary phenomenology of technology in general.
EN
The paper is a short summary of a critique of Heidegger, which I formulated at greater length in The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken (Catholic University of America Press, 2006), and Heidegger: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Eerdmans, 2008). The critique is motivated by ethical and theological concerns and interrogates Heidegger’s key methodological distinction between ontological investigations and ontic discussions. I argue that this distinction allows Heidegger to re-populate the ethico-theological horizon with presuppositions that remain unexamined and, under the terms of the distinction, unexaminable. These presuppositions set the stage for Heidegger’s politics in the 30s and his theological impact on Catholic and Protestant theology in the latter half of the 20th century. In conclusion I argue that ontology must never be divorced from the ethico-theological concerns which are endemic to it.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.