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EN
This article sets out to explore the socio-linguistic situation of Goa, a small territory corresponding to the former district of Goa of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, occupied and annexed by India in 1961. Goa had to choose between local language, Konkani, and the language of the neighbouring state of Maharashtra, i. e., Marathi, which was traditionally used as a cultural language by the Hindus of Goa, who nowadays form the large majority of the population. Even if virtually every Goan is able to speak Konkani, this was, according to recent statistics, the mother tongue of only 61 % of the population of the state, the rest being forms by people from other parts of India, who migrated here. This phenomenon explains the feeble proportion of Konkani speakers in the total population of the state, which favours the resort to English as a means of communication and explains why Konkani only keeps an elevated status in churches, where it is currently used for praying and preaching. Drawing upon historical facts, but also on socio-linguistic consideration, we will try to explain this paradox.
EN
Using an empirical approach, this study addresses the question whether followers of different religious beliefs (Christians, Muslims, and Hindus), as well as Atheists and Agnostics manifest different senses of humour when rating a variety of jokes. The study further investigates whether one’s religious background influences the threshold of what is considered offensive. And finally, it seeks to answer whether jokes targeting religions other than one’s own are always perceived as funnier. Analysing the results of a public survey (N=783) containing a blend of religious and non-religious jokes (including irreverent ones), we found that Hindus demonstrate overall the highest humour appreciation among all the groups, while Christians were the least amused by the jokes presented on the survey. Muslims had overall robust humour responses, despite reporting the highest incidence of being offended. Atheists were the least likely to be offended, and they generally enjoyed irreverent jokes. All groups agreed that if a joke was seen as offensive, its funniness was reduced.
EN
This article seeks to determine whether the ideology of Hindu nationalism has influenced the course of Republic of India’s foreign policy since 2014 (when Hindu nationalists took over power). The conclusion is that while Hindu nationalism might have been and probably was important in certain regards, the broad direction of the policy generally remained the same as during the previous governments. Despite the anti-Muslim stance of Hindu nationalists, India has not changed its stance towards certain Arabic Muslim countries, while building warmer ties with Israel. New Delhi has also not employed any new tactics or solutions – whether bold or conciliatory – towards Islamabad. India’s China policy has not become more aggressive while the ‘Act East Policy’ that focuses on ties in East and Southeast Asia did not employ more references to common heritage than previously. New Delhi also tried to retain it similar cooperation with Russia and the US, though the one with Washington is visible growing (as ideological overtones are not visible in Indian policy on Russia, US and China, sections on relations with these powers were not included in the final version of this article). These conclusions lead the author to believe that India’s foreign policy will largely remain the same even if the Hindu nationalists retain power after the 2019 elections.
EN
During the twentieth century, it had become increasingly common among scholars working on modern India to oppose Indian leaders and authors advocating the idea of multicultural and secular India to those promoting a nation based solely on the so‑called “Hindu way of life.” While the discourse attributed to the former category has regularly been qualified as “universalist,” “inclusivist” or “tolerant,” the kind of nationalism fostered by the latter has variously been called “communalist” or “exclusivist.” While these antagonistic positions might certainly fit with the positions of iconic and emblematic figures such as M.K. Gandhi or V.D. Sawarkar respectively, they might well be misleading and too restrictive when applied to the discourses of authors such as Rabindranath Tagore (1861‑1941) and S.H. Vatsyayan ‘Agyeya’ (1911‑1987), to take into consideration only two among the most influential and celebrated authors and poets of modern India. Based on the analysis of Tagore’s and Agyeya’s texts, this contribution questions the accuracy of such a dichotomist categorization and more specifically the assertion that the works of twentieth‑century authors considered as “universalists” were actually presenting a picture of a united India with both Hindus and Muslims looking forward to a peaceful future together (Cush and Robinson, see footnote 3). It shows that, notwithstanding the real cosmopolitan worldview of both these authors, the Muslim realm is almost completely absent from their works. In conclusion, it is argued that far from being an exception, the position of these writers is illustrative of what can be called a “non‑exclusive Hindu nationalism,” which was pervasive among the Indian intellectuals of the twentieth‑century India.
EN
According to literature and researches in European society there is a fear of Islam, the intensity of which is usually inversely proportional to the average citizen contacts with this religion. Taking in to account the long historical experience of multicultural Britain we wanted to see how it looks like in this society. In 20132014, the Inter-Institutes Migration Research Unit, of Cardinal St. Wyszynski University in Warsaw, did a limited research in England: Attitudes towards Muslims and Hindus in the UK. Limited Study. For the purpose of this research 77 persons were chosen by “snowballing method”. They completed questionnaires prepared according to the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. We asked two questions: Are there any significant differences in our respondents’ attitudes to Hindus and Muslims? Can we say on the base of these differences that it indicates a fear of Muslims? We were interested particularly in the respondents’ attitude to Muslims. Their attitudes towards Hindus were needed only for comparison. This study is treated as exploratory research, that means it does not aim to provide the final and irrefutable answers to the research questions, but merely explores the research topic and shows whether it would be worthwhile to undertake a broader research.
PL
Według literatury i badań w społeczeństwie europejskim panuje lęk przed islamem, którego natężenie jest zwykle odwrotnie proporcjonalne do kontaktów przeciętnego obywatela z tą religią. Biorąc pod uwagę długą historię doświadczeń wielokulturowych Brytyjczyków postanowiono sprawdzić, jak to wygląda w ich społeczeństwie. W latach 2013-2014 Międzyinstytutowy Zakład Badań nad Migracją UKSW podjął w Anglii ograniczone badania stosunku do muzułmanów i hindusów. Przeprowadzono je przy pomocy ankiety na próbie 77 osób wybranych metodą „kuli śniegowej”. W kwestionariuszu użyto skali dystansu społecznego Bogardusa. Badanie było zorientowane na muzułmanów, postawy wobec hindusów służyły jedynie do porównań wyników. Okazało się, że wprawdzie występowały różnice między stosunkiem do hindusów i muzułmanów, ale tak niewielkie, że na ich podstawie nie można wyciągać wniosków o lęku przed muzułmanami. Pozwala więc to przyjąć tezę, że doświadczenia wielokulturowości z czasów Brytyjskiego Imperium mogą mieć wpływ na obecne społeczeństwo. Były to jednak tylko badania eksploracyjne, co oznacza, że ich celem nie było uogólnienie wyników na całą populację ale raczej pokazanie, że warto ten problem bardziej zgłębić.
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