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David Hume a jeho pojetí prostoru a času

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EN
It is generally agreed that the account of space and time in the Treatise of Human Nature does not belong to the best of Hume’s writings, although running against this general consensus is the opinion of V. F. Kruse. This article argues that Hume’s treatment of space and time, especially his argument against infinite divisibility, suffers from serious imperfections. It must be admitted, however, that Hume’s difficulties arise mostly from the consistent application of his doctrine of impressions and ideas. Perhaps Hume’s own dissatisfaction and his ambition to find favour with the public were the reasons why there is no corresponding part dealing with space and time in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. But as the main principles have not been changed in this later work, Hume would not have come to substantially different conclusions if he had dealt with the same subject in detail in the Enquiry.
EN
When studying various aspects of art and aesthetic tastes, contemporary evolutionists have no doubt that art is part of human nature, we have it in the brain and in the genes, as we might say today. Following the path set out by Aristotle, Hume, Darwin and his followers, evolutionary aesthetics (inspired by evolutionary psychology) develops in its three main branches: (1) anthropological ethological (E. Dissanayake, 1890s Darwinian art theorists: H. Balfour, A.C. Haddon, F. Clay), (2) evolutionary aesthetics (Dutton and continuators) and (3) literary Darwinism (B. Boyd, J. Carroll, J.Gottschall, D.S. Wilson). The article examines the theoretical proposals of D. Dutton, the author of The Art Instinct as well as the views of his predecessor, E. Dissanayake.
EN
The reign of the Hanoverian dynasty was a period of stability and prosperity in Great Britain, until the 1770s. The perfect symbiosis between the Whig oligarchy and the Crown was the cause of exceptional political stability. During this period, however, there were also neither major constitutional disorders nor sophisticated systematic analyses. According to the author, the most important attempt to describe British political mechanics is the political reflection of David Hume. David Hume, the most eminent British philosopher of the 18th century, is the author of an original and penetrating analysis of British political institutions. Arguing without regard to party sympathies, he broke down Whig and Tory conceptions of political systems, and instead proposed a dynamic vision of Great Britain’s political system, from its past as a barbarian monarchy, through a civilised monarchy, to a mixed modern monarchy. He sees this evolution as a dialectical struggle between power and liberty, the two most important forces that govern political systems. This article presents an attempt to reconstruct Hume’s coherent constitutional theory based on historical, political, and philosophical aspects of his argument. According to the author, all three perspectives form a coherent argument that makes Hume one of the classics of English constitutionalism. The author develops these ideas on the basis of a detailed analysis of Hume’s works, starting with the History of England.
EN
The Author presents two different currents in Anglo-Saxon conservative political philosophy. He argues that their founders – David Hume and Edmund Burke – represent completely different approaches toward the issue of natural law. For Hume, the natural law is nothing but the product of social practices. It is changeable and evolves together with society itself. In turn, Burke appeals to the conception of natural law in its classical version. For him, it is universal, commonly binding and immutable. It constitutes the main source of the legitimacy of all social and political institutions. The Author indicates that it is the reason why it is appropriate to consider these two conceptions of natural law separately. The former accepts slow, evolutionary changes regardless of their direction. The latter assumes that they are bound to be correlated with the natural law order.
EN
Insofar as agent causality still plays a role in contemporary philosophy, there is no longer a distinction between causality per accidens and causality per se. Using various examples, I will highlight the importance of this distinction for philosophical analysis. Furthermore, the central determinations of these two types of agent causality will be presented and conclusions for causal theory will be drawn.
DE
Sofern die Agenskausalität in der Gegenwartsphilosophie noch eine Rolle spielt, wird nicht mehr unterschieden zwischen Kausalität per accidens und Kausalität per se. Anhand verschiedener Beispiele werde ich die Bedeutung dieser Unterscheidung für die philosophische Analyse herausstellen. Weiterhin sollen die zentralen Bestimmungen dieser beiden Arten der Agenskausalität dargestellt werden und daraus Schlussfolgerungen für die Kausaltheorie gezogen werden.
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Skepticismus a fideismus. Montaigne a Hume

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EN
The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community.
EN
This paper aims to redeem part of the Enlightenment project through a critical appreciation of David Hume’s practical philosophy. It argues that Hume’s practical philosophy, if interpreted correctly, is immune to two major charges leveled against the Enlightenment in critical theories and in philosophical ethics, respectively. One trend is represented by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who claim that inherent to the advocacy of rationality typical of the Enlightenment is the irrational adoration of instrumental reason, which obliterates individual particularity, commodifies human relationships, and oppresses the human urge to express passionately. The other trend is represented by Alasdair McIntyre, who claims that the Enlightenment project is doomed to fail because it ventures to justify a historically and culturally conditioned morality as universal. Against the first critique, I argue that Hume’s reliance on the affective tendencies to derive a standard of moral values avoids the idolatry of rationality. Against the second critique, I argue that Hume’s characterization of virtues as qualities of personality that facilitate interpersonal relationships allows ample room for the cultural variance of values.
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2017
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vol. 8
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issue 25
29-41
EN
  RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: Do Smith, Hume and other Scots have an argument to reject John Brown’s claim in his Estimate that a society based on self-interest lacks cohesion? And can they do so without accepting Hobbes’ argument that the necessary cohesion can only be provided by the threat of coercion from a sovereign? THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: Problem: The eighteenth century debate on the nature of commercial society. Method: Analysis of key texts in the debate as it occurred in Scotland. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The Scots argue that a society where everyman lives by exchanging, operating on the assumption of selfinterest, is a more peaceable, more equitable and thus more cohesive than that envisioned by Brown. When reinforced by the rule of law, self-interested behaviour supports mutually supportive behaviour. Ultimately this embodies a constant and universal principle of human nature. Human behaviour is not random or chaotic and a commercial society not only exemplifies that fact but also sustains a form of societal life superior to any that has one before. RESEARCH RESULTS: Nostalgia for an earlier time is mis-placed. For all its vehemence Brown’s critique is mis-directed and thus unjustified. CONCLUSION, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: This selection of the Scots should be widened to investigate whether Ferguson, Kames, Wallace among others have the same resources as Hume and Smith to rebut Brown.  
EN
My paper explores critical objections to the concept of the artistic canon, conceived as a summary of works with an objective aesthetic value that have stood the test of time. To begin with, the objections of feminist and postcolonial criticism are discussed and examined. However, the sociological objection questioning the axiological foundation of the canon, i.e. the possibility of generally applicable aesthetic judgment, has been identified as the most crucial. My paper proceeds to discuss the theory of ideal perception as a solution to the problem of justifying aesthetic judgments. My aim is to prove that from the axiological perspective, the theory of the ideal critic gets entangled in the never-ending regress of a logical circle, or it eventually finds its justification through a particular social practice. This theory is also problematic in its erroneous assumption of the logical independence of the descriptive and evaluating components of aesthetic concepts. The impossibility of separating the evaluating attitude from the conditions of the use of aesthetic concepts indicates the relative applicability of aesthetic value and the artistic canon, depending on the “personal economy” of the evaluating subject.
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David Hume: Unwitting Cosmopolitan?

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EN
If Hume is considered cosmopolitan in his ethics at all, he is said to be so through his anti-mercantilist approach to commerce. Prevailing commercial interpretations attribute to Hume a cosmopolitanism that is best described as instrumental and supervenient. I argue that Hume’s principles lead to a cosmopolitan ethic that is more demanding than commercial interpretations recognize. Hume’s cosmopolitanism is more than merely supervenient and its instrumentality is such that cosmopolitan regard becomes inseparable from healthy patriotic concern. I show sympathy and duty, not merely justice, central to Hume’s cosmopolitanism and address how Hume’s moderate cosmopolitanism might be enacted in society. I suggest Hume’s view can contribute to contemporary cosmopolitan discourse, aiding both those forms with which it is consonant and the practical ends of otherwise opposed, Kantian forms.
EN
The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.
EN
David Hume is considered to be the founding father of metaethical non-cognitivism and his moral philosophy is often taken to be a classical example of motivational internalism. In this paper I discuss Hume’s view on the problem of moral motivation depending on natural and artificial virtues. I also analyze some recent interpretations of his moral philosophy. I conclude that Hume can indeed be treated as a non-cognitivist, but his theory is very different from present-day non-cognitivism. The main difference is that Hume did not consider moral emotions as necessarily motivating.
PL
Edmund Burke, angielski mąż stanu, teoretyk polityki i filozof jest ojcem założycielem politycznego konserwatyzmu. Jego Rozważania o rewolucji we Francji – święta księga konserwatyzmu – jest jednym z najbardziej znanych intelektualnych ataków na rewolucję francuską. Jednakże pamflet ten jest również doskonałym studium samej rewolucji. W niniejszym artykule autor bada źródła Burke’owskiej teorii rewolucji i dynamiki procesu rewolucyjnego. Dowodzi, że jego myśl jest zakorzeniona w filozofii politycznej i filozofii historii Dawida Hume’a. Jest prawdopodobnie zaskoczeniem, że Burke, formułując swe polityczne zasady, bazował w dużym stopniu na pismach historycznych Hume’a – swego największego politycznego wroga. Lecz w refleksjach Hume’a dotyczących Wielkiej Rebelii możemy odnaleźć pierwszą analizę rewolucji w nowoczesnym znaczeniu jako wydarzenia społecznego, politycznego i religijnego o nadzwyczajnym charakterze. Opisując rewolucyjnych purytanów, Hume odkrył, że niekontrolowany, wytrwały i niebezpieczny duch innowacji prowadzi do destrukcji ładu społecznego. W końcu, zaczynając od przesadnego pragnienia wolności, naród popadł w najskrajniejszą niewolę. Spostrzegł również, że rewolucję wywołują siły umiarkowane, kończą zaś radykałowie. Dlatego, czytając Historię Anglii, Burke mógł w roku 1789 przewidzieć następne akty francuskiego dramatu, ponieważ zdał sobie sprawę, że francuscy rewolucjoniści byli podobni do angielskich z czasów rewolty purytańskiej. Autor zatem dowodzi, że polityczne proroctwo Burke’a byłoby niemożliwe bez obserwacji rewolucyjnej dynamiki, której dokonał Hume.
EN
Edmund Burke, an English statesman, a political theorist, and a philosopher is the founding father of political conservatism. His Reflections on the Revolution in France – the holy book of conservatism – is one of the best known intellectual attack against the French Revolution. However this pamphlet is also a perfect study of a revolution itself. In this article the Author examines the sources of Burke an theory of revolution and the dynamics of revolutionary process. He argues, that his thought is rooted in David Hume’s political philosophy and his philosophy of history. Perhaps the surprising fact is that Burke by formulating his political principles found it possible to profit to an even greater extent from the historical writings of Hume – his greater political enemy. But in Hume an reflections on the Great Rebellion we can find the first analysis of revolution as social, political and religious extraordinary event in modern sense. Describing the revolutionary Puritans Hume discovered, that uncontrolled, obstinate, and dangerous spirit of innovation inclined to destruction of social order. In the end, starting from the exaggerated pursuit of liberty, the nation fell into the most abject servitude. But he also observed that although revolution is triggered by some moderate powers, it is completed by radicals. Therefore reading his History of England in 1789 Burke could have foreseen the next acts of the French drama, because he realized, that French revolutionaries were similar to English ones during the Puritan Revolution. So the Author argues, that Burke an political prophecy would be impossible without Hume’s observations of revolutionary dynamics.
DE
Der Artikel rekonstruiert den Einfluss der Gedanken des französischen Philosophen und Historiker Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) auf die Philosophen und Literaten der britischen Aufklärung. Dieser Einfluss war sehr breit, wozu die weiteren englischen Ausgaben seines Hauptwerkes – des Historischen und kritischen Wörterbuchs (1697) – beigetragen haben. Bayle übte einen sehr starken Einfluss sowohl auf die Freimaurer und die Deisten (Toland, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Collins), als auch auf die führenden britischen Empiristen (Locke, Berkeley und Hume) aus, obwohl es dabei oft zu Verfälschungen seiner Ansichten gekommen ist.
EN
The article reconstructs the influence the thought of Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), the French philosopher and historian, had on British enlightenment philosophers and men of letters. The reason of his deep impact was the success of three succcessive English editions of his greatest work, namely Historical and critical dictionary (1697). To Bayle’s thought indebted were both eighteenth-century freethinkers and deists (Toland, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Collins) and most eminent British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume), though its reception was frequently accompanied by various misunderstandings. Summarised by Adam Grzeliński
PL
Artykuł rekonstruuje wpływ myśli francuskiego filozofa i historyka Pierre’a Bayle’a (1647–1706) na filozofów i literatów brytyjskiego Oświecenia. Wpływ ten był bardzo szeroki, do czego przysłużyły się kolejne angielskie edycje jego najważniejszego dzieła, jakim był Słownik historyczny i krytyczny (1697). Bayle bardzo silnie oddziałał zarówno na wolnomyślicieli oraz deistów (Tolanda, Shaftesbury’ego, Mandeville’a Collinsa), jak i czołowych brytyjskich empirystów (Locke’a, Berkeleya i Hume’a), choć bardzo często dochodziło przy tym do przeinaczania jego poglądów.
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Formy uzasadnienia etyki

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DE
In den folgenden Überlegungen wird versucht, einen Überblick über Begründungsformen der Ethik zu bieten. Ich skizziere zunächst fünf klassisch gewordene, wirkungsgeschichtlich zentrale Ansätze, beziehe diese in einer kurzen Übersicht aufeinander und verweise schließlich auf einige aktuelle Begründungsformen und ihr Verhältnis zu diesen zentralen Ansätzen.
EN
In this article I attempt to present an overview of the forms of justifying ethics. I begin with outlining five concepts considered classical and are central in terms of their historical impact; I then move on to compare them, concluding with selected contemporary forms of justification and their relation to classical concepts.
PL
W rozważaniach tych podejmuję próbę dokonania przeglądu form uzasadniania etyki. Najpierw szkicuję pięć koncepcji, które nabrały charakteru klasycznego i są centralne, gdy idzie o historyczne oddziaływanie; następnie dokonuję ich ich krótkiego zestawienia, a na koniec pokazuję pewne współczesne formy uzasadniania oraz ich stosunek do koncepcji klasycznych.
EN
A perplexity about singular existence statements (for example, ‘Socrates exists’) is that for their negations to be true their subject terms do not name anything. For example, in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ ‘does not exist’ is not said in respect to the referent of ‘Pegasus’ since there is none. But, then, in respect to what is that said? The paper answers the question by proposing a metalinguistic interpretation of singular existence statements, according to which singular existence statements are about names. It is argued that this interpretation fits in well with Frege’s views on existence, presupposition, and his idea that names have senses.
PL
Numer został przygotowany przy wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego (1222/P-DUN/2015).
EN
The paper aims to analyze the concept of habit in Hume and its operations in two theoretical dimensions: theory of knowledge and theory of religion. Hume considers habit as an instinctual basis for all judgments (beliefs) about the external world and also about the supposed existence of the supernatural. Hume’s thought, both in the domain of epistemology and philosophy of religion can thus be viewed as naturalized, claiming that the biological, instinctual traits of human nature are responsible for our beliefforming operations. Especially, Hume’s naturalization of religion seems to be ahead of its time and his methodological approach is now being developed by many leading anthropologists, biologists and philosophers.
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Umiarkowana obrona sceptycyzmu

50%
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2021
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vol. 52
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issue 1
1-29
EN
The article is an attempt to present a credibility of the philosophical skepticism and its intrinsic connection to wisdom. In the paper I explain basic presupposition of the tradition and then revise them within the framework a few modern skeptical clues (rhetorical nature of all argumentation, L. Wittgenstein's language games, hermeneutic concept of knowledge). Taking into considerations widespread accusations against the philosophical skepticism, I reveal their limitations, doing it in a reference to Sextus Empiricus' original remarks. In the last section of the paper I present the skeptical tradition as a certain way of being, which has some significant moral qualities.
PL
Artykuł stanowi próbę ukazania wiarygodności filozofii sceptycznej oraz jej ścisłego związku z mądrością. Objaśniam w nim podstawowe założenia sceptycyzmu, które staram się następnie zrewidować w kontekście kilku nowoczesnych „tropów sceptycznych” (retoryczny charakter wszelkiej argumentacji, gry językowe L. Wittgensteina, hermeneutyczna koncepcja wiedzy). Uwzględniając najczęściej spotykane zarzuty w stosunku do filozofii sceptycznej, objaśniam ich ograniczenia, powołując się na uwagi Sekstusa Empiryka. W ostatniej części artykułu ukazuję sceptycyzm jako pewien sposób bycia, który posiada istotne walory moralne.
EN
Diverse concepts of animality have played important role within the processes of modern secularisation and its anti-theological turn in the modern making of “man.” By turning the conceptual focus towards the animal side of human being, and specifically by describing and explaining “the human nature” in terms of its “animality,” modern philosophical anthropology has changed, gradually, into naturalistic, godless discourse of a purely material life. The discovery of the “animal in man,” its increasing impact through evolution theory eventually led to the denial of human supremacy. Since secularisation in its essence intends to emancipate humanity, it is interesting how animalisation can be related to emancipation. In the article Montaigne’s conception of animality is examined as an early case of this thinking.
Diametros
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2014
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issue 40
176-200
XX
This essay re-examines some key fundamentals of the Enlightenment regarding individual rights, responsibilities and republicanism which deserve and require re-emphasis today, insofar as they underscore the character and fundamental importance of mature judgment, and how developing and fostering mature judgment is a fundamental aim of education. These fundamentals have been clouded or eroded by various recent developments, including mis-guided educational policy and not a little scholarly bickering. Clarity about these fundamentals is more important today than ever. Sapere aude!
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