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MODAL REALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF ISLAND UNIVERSES

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Vacek M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2013

vol. 68

issue 10

868 – 876

The paper outlines and immediately discusses the so-called ‘soft’ impossibility, i.e., non-logical impossibility generated by modal realism. It will be shown that although in a particular case genuine modal realism, straightforwardly applied, deems impossible a proposition that other philosophers have claimed to be (intuitively) possible, there are a variety of methodologically acceptable moves available in order to avoid the problem. The impossibility at issue is the existence of island universes. Given the Lewisian analysis there are three points at which we might try to square genuine modal realism with such a controversial and problematic claim of (im)possibility, namely: a) the contraction of our pre-theoretical opinions about possibility, b) the revision of some Lewisian definitions and/or c) the extension of our ontological commitments. The author shall look at each of these approaches applied to the problematic case.

IMPOSSIBLE EVENTS AND THE KNOWABILITY PARADOX

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Jespersen B., Carrara M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2023

vol. 30

issue 1

53 – 65

This note disambiguates the predicate ‘is an unknowable event’ and shows how Transparent Intensional Logic interprets the sentences “Agent a is calculating the final decimal of π” and “Agent a has calculated the final decimal of π”. The knowability paradox is used to set the stage.

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1 Filozofia (Philosophy)

1 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 2023

1 2013

1 Carrara M.

1 Jespersen B.

1 Vacek M.

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MODAL REALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF ISLAND UNIVERSES

IMPOSSIBLE EVENTS AND THE KNOWABILITY PARADOX