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1

IMPOSSIBILISTS’S PARADISE ON THE CHEAP?

100%
Vacek M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
283 – 301
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, the author presents two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, he evaluates the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well-defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, he does not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, the author discusses the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. He concludes that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, he motivates a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.
2

CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

100%
Vacek M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 6
523 – 529
EN
The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Further, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is presented. It is argued that the argument can be weakened by rejection of one of its premises. Finally, two objections against the proposal are countered. Although my strategy accounts for the Opinion concerning the impossible, it allegedly violates another Opinion which conceives the reality classical. It seems, however, that there is no no-question-begging reason to think that reality is classical. How can we know, after all, which logic describes reality? Without a definite answer to the question, the incredibility objection then simply collapses into a statement of a possibility dogma.
3

BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE TRIVIAL WORLD

88%
Sendłak M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
|
vol. 23
|
issue 2
162 – 176
EN
The subject of this paper is the notion of similarity between the actual and impossible worlds. Many believe that this notion is governed by two rules. According to the first rule, every non-trivial world is more similar to the actual world than the trivial world is. The second rule states that every possible world is more similar to the actual world than any impossible world is. The aim of this paper is to challenge both of these rules. We argue that acceptance of the first rule leads to the claim that the rule ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet is invalid in classical logic. The second rule does not recognize the fact that objects might be similar to one another due to various features.
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