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EN
A specific form of relativism characteristic for Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophy is discussed in the paper. The authors focus on mutual translatability between languages in the context of conceptual schemes connected with tradition constituted moral enquiry. They locate the source of MacIntyre's relativism in incommensurability of various conceptual schemes and discuss the chances of its overcoming. They address their attention to two claims made by MacIntyre: a weaker one (i) that there does not exist a language that would be neutral with respect to non-linguistic reality, and a stronger one (ii) that non-linguistic reality does not exist at all. Consequently the choice of language predetermines the body of truths that can be expressed in that language. A gradual improvement of descriptive adequacy is however possible. MacIntyre points out that it is always possible to adopt a new language that enables a better description of some moral problems, especially when the traditional language is unable to deal with some aspects of moral dilemmas. To this strategy he adds another. It is also possible to learn a new language as a 'second-first-language'. The ultimate goal of the paper is to assess these proposals.
EN
The paper emphasizes the role of ancient mathematics in the philosophical considerations in Pythagorean school and contains a reconstruction of some basic mathematical ideas giving reason for the explanation of many early-Pythagorean fragments. Some contributions to the discovery of incommensurability within Pythagorean school are presented. Their importance for mathematics cannot be overestimated. Then the course of mathematically oriented inquiries is set against some purely philological studies.
World Literature Studies
|
2013
|
vol. 5 (22)
|
issue 2
52 – 63
EN
This article approaches the topic of the “incomparable” in contemporary comparative literature in four steps. Firstly, it systematizes the problem, i.e. it describes the most important contemporary aspects of the thesis of the “incomparable” (or of the “incommensurable”). Secondly, it historicizes the discussion, meaning it tries to prove that many of the current controversies replay – frequently using the same arguments or arguments inferred from them – some of the older debates on the “incomparable” nature of literary works. Thirdly, it “trivializes” the issue – in the meaning of the pragmatic concept proposed by Richard Rorty, for whom “trivialization” is the philosophical procedure of limiting the differences in nature among specific phenomena to differences of degree. Fourthly, it re-examines in brief the problem of the “comparable” from the perspective of its relevance for the contexts of literary interpretation. The conclusion of the article is an advocacy of the comparative approach to literary practices, which, for now, remains a challenge rather than a well-defined field of study within current comparatism.
EN
In this paper, the author investigates the logical relation between two claims: (1) observations are theory-laden and (2) there is no empirical common ground upon which to evaluate the successive scientific theories that belong to the different paradigms. At first, he constructs an argument where (1) is the main premise and (2) is the conclusion. He argues that the term 'theory-laden' has three distinct senses: semantic, psychological and epistemological. If 'theory-laden' is understood in either epistemological or psychological senses, then the conclusion becomes a claim about people. If incommensurability is to be a claim about theories, then 'theory-laden' in the main premise should be understood in the semantic sense. The author then argues, that there is a further distinction to be drawn between the absolute and relative senses of theory-laden. The relative sense of theory-laden allows the observations that are relatively neutral between the theories under examination. He then concludes, that the argument from theory-laden only shows that foundational empiricism is not a tenable philosophical position, but it fails to show that no empirical test can decide between successive theories that belong to different paradigms.
EN
The watersheds in the development of mathematics that lay bare the ambiguities and contradictions among its very basic notions and conceptions are commonly described as 'crises' in mathematics. They coincide with periods of intense mathematical research, often inspired by philosophical doctrines which help to clarify the notions and methods with the use of which many fundamental theorems are proved. The paper presents three best known and most widely discussed crises in the foundations of mathematics, reviews the causes of their appearance and discusses the difficulties that they have led to as well as possible ways of their resolution. The three crises arose in connection with the discovery of the incommensurable line segments in the Pythagorean School, in connection with the operations on the infinitesimals by the creators of the differential calculus (17th-18th centuries) and with respect to the foundations of mathematics connected with operations on the actually infinite sets (19th and 20th centuries).
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