The paper deals with the analysis of specific social and ethic consequences of neuro-enhancement. In the first part of the paper, we will present some of the basic methods and technologies that allow improving cognitive and emotional abilities. In the following sections, we will subsequently analyse the three most serious areas of socio-ethical problems related to the impact of neuro-enhancement on the individual and society. We will examine in more detail the threat to the principle of autonomy posed by two selected technologies used for neuro-enhancement, namely the integrated neuromodulation system (closed-loop BCI) and genetic technologies. Next, we will deal with the influence of social pressure on autonomous human decision-making and with the question of whether social pressure is a sufficient reason for the unacceptability of neuro-enhancement. Finally, in relation to the numerous concerns about the deepening of social inequality as a result of the spread of enhancement practices, we will examine whether the deepening of inequality can be prevented and whether the principle of equal opportunities can be considered a sufficient criterion of equality in a given situation.
The main thesis of this article is that thinking about man is rooted in the conception of human nature. From the perspective of the history of ideas, it is clear not only that the nature of man is intertwined with history but that the reaction of the 'essentialist' conception of man was and continues to be stronger than history. The best evidence of this is the discourse on man present in the legacy of Leszek Kolakowski. Kolakowski's faith in Reason and in Man already manifested itself in his 'Individual and Infinity: Freedom and Antinomies of Freedom in the Philosophy of Spinoza', published in 1958. There he sided with the 'figure of lone emancipation' - meaning the individual autonomy granted in Reason. Despite various intellectual tempests, he would remain faithful to that figure. The allure and magnetism of the works of Leszek Kolakowski lie, above all, in the fact that they not only constitute solid and interesting treatises in the field of the history of ideas, but that they are also motivating and inspiring commentaries on contemporary times. It is precisely in the context of those 'figures of lone emancipation' that the concept of the absolute (as is the case with several other philosophical categories) is tantamount to a concept burdened by internal contradiction. As such, it cannot comprise the foundation for anything indubitable; the paradox of relativists and advocates of the absolute stems from the belief that relativists are right for absolutist reasons'.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.