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INTENTIONALITY AND AWARENESS OF SUBJECT (Intencjonalnosc i swiadomosc podmiotu)

100%
Drabarek A.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2010
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vol. 46
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issue 2
253-269
EN
Authors and supporters of the category of intentionality claim that the foundations of all knowledge on the really existing world is perception approached as a subjective act of awareness thanks to which we recognize things directly. Perception of things is based on an individual seeing, hearing or touching; it is an experience of awareness which concerns a specific object. Many philosophers and psychologists connects awareness with emotional states. However, we cannot evoke emotions as we like and get rid of them even though we want it very much. Conscious emotions though - or the logic of emotions as F. Brentano used to terms them has a very intense and essential influence on the direction of actions and choices made by man.
2

HUSSERL'S AND INGARDEN'S CONCEPTION OF THE COGNITIVE IMPASSE

100%
Chadzynski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 2
93-99
EN
The main thesis of this paper is that, in their epistemological views, both Husserl and Ingarden accept two non-controversial theses that lead to logico-ontological problems. One of them is the conception of the intentionality of consciousness. The second is the conception of cognition as a synthesis of identification. The acceptance of both at the same time does not seem to be controversial at first glance. However, deeper investigation shows that one who accepts them both stands in the face of the logico-ontological problem of the identification of a kind of being with nothing in cognitional syntheses, or of the infinite identification of two intentional objects in every act of consciousness. Both consequences lead to the actual impossibility of active acts of cognition, even if we accept that most cognitional syntheses occur in the domain of passivity. The problem is shared by Husserl's conception of knowledge from his 'Logical Investigations' through the later writings, where he uses the concept of noema. There is a contemporary interpretation of the latter concept as identical to Ingarden's concept of intentional object. Therefore, the problem remains in Ingarden's theory of knowledge, which is based on Husserl's original theory of cognition as a synthesis of identification.
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Granice redukcji w fenomenologii Husserla a kres filozofii transcendentalnej

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Trykowska M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2010
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vol. 38
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issue 3
25-48
EN
The article considers the evolution of the basic epistemological mechanism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the (phenomenological) reduction, in its main variants (the Cartesian way, the way through intentional psychology, the way through ontology). These are further radicalized into the primordial reduction and the reduction to the living present. An analysis of the key assumptions and results of Husserl’s reduction makes it possible to conclude that the most radical, far-reaching version of the reduction (to the living present) may exhaust the philosophical potential of intentional phenomenology. What is left in the area of transcendental philosophy (the philosophy which moves beyond the attitude of “natural objectivism”) are phenomenological positions that resign from the concept of intentionality as the crux of (phenomenological) cognition: Heidegger’s and Henry’s standpoints allow for a critical examination of Husserl’s philosophy from a new perspective, while at the same time opening new vistas for transcendentalism. These positions make it possible to note the limits of Husserl’s method and show that a different kind of reduction is possible.
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SARTROV POJEM INTENCIONALITY OPTIKOU AKTUÁLNYCH SKÚMANÍ

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
457-467
EN
The paper deals with those current Sartrean researches, which are concerned with Sartre's early phenomenological writings. The researchers involved see the latter as important as Sartre's later fundamental works. Their interpretations go beyond the view traditional of those works. Beside Sartre as a philosopher of subjectivity they try to emphasize the 'other' Sartre, who is concerned with the power 'of things' and the potential abilities of the consciousness deprived of ego as the uniting centre of experience. Adopting this perspective requires to resort to his conception of intentionality. It is necessary to comprehend, how the world oriented consciousness with its typical compulsory self-transcendence becomes also self-consciousness due to the experience of the sense of the given. The issue under question is not only the profit brought by this process, but also the loss involved in such approach to consciousness.
5

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

100%
Lipski J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2018
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vol. 25
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issue 1
53 – 73
EN
According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper the author will offer one such criterion. More specifically, he argues that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.
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SUÁREZOVA TEORIE POMYSLNÝCH JSOUCEN A JEJÍ RECEPCE

100%
Novotný D. D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 1
35-48
EN
The problem of non-being and intentionality has been among the topic subjects of Western philosophers from Parmenides to Quine. In medieval and post-medieval scholastics the issue was articulated mainly as ens rationis (a being of reason). The paper deals with the character and division of beings of reason in Francisco Suarez (1548 - 1617). An immanent critique of Suarez's theory is given as well. The paper offers also a brief outline of the history of its later reception by Baroque authors.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAIN EFFECTS AND SIDE EFFECTS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE KNOBE EFFECT

100%
Waleszczyński A., Obidziński M., Rejewska J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 2
228 – 248
EN
The characteristic asymmetry in ascribing intentionality, known as the Knobe effect, is widely thought to result from the moral evaluation of the side effect. Existing research has focused mostly on elucidating the ordinary meaning of the notion of intentionality, while less effort has been devoted to the moral conditions associated with the analysed scenarios. The current analysis of the moral properties of the main and side effects, as well as of the moral evaluations of the relationship between them, sheds new light on the influence of moral considerations on the attribution of intentionality in the Knobe effect. The moral evaluation of the relationship between the main and side effects is significant in that under certain circumstances it cancels asymmetry in intentionality ascription.
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THE MEANING OF INTENTIONAL EXPRESSIONS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY

100%
Czesna E.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 2
141-157
EN
The issue of intentionality occurs in Wittgenstein's later philosophy in at least two contexts. In the first one, the author of the 'Philosophical Investigations' approaches the classical problem of thoughts referring to reality, showing that the relationship between thought and reality is a matter of grammar. The second context concerns the concept of intention connected with human actions, both verbal and nonverbal. According to Wittgenstein intention is not a psychological or mentalistic category, since it is 'embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions'. On the basis of 'On Certainty' the authoress considers the issue of the relation between the philosophical intention of making knowledge claims and the rules of epistemic language games. On the basis of Moore-type propositions (the scheme: 'I know that p'), Wittgenstein points out the existence of a hiatus between how Moore wants to use an expression, i.e. what he wants to say, and how he can use it, i.e. what can meaningfully be said in given circumstances. Considerations on this subject can be formulated as the issue of how the feature of intentionality is related to the meaningfulness of expressions.
9

Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

100%
Duraj J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 1(61)
281-290
EN
The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.
10

MY V JA ALEBO JA V MY? KOLEKTÍVNA INTENCIONALITA A JASTVO

100%
Zahavi D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 10
801 – 820
EN
The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.
11
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THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL OBJECTS VERSUS THE ADVERBIAL THEORY

100%
Chrudzimski A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
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issue 1
117-130
EN
AIn this paper the author presents a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects which can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the adverbial theory, a version of which is typically associated with Chisholm. However, he shows that this competitor of the theory of intentional objects faces serious difficulties. The most serious of them is that within the framework of the adverbial theory the relation between the representing entity ('adverbially specified' mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that within the framework of the adverbial theory we are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this 'representing relation'. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all.
12

DO EMOTIONS REPRESENT VALUES BY REGISTERING BODILY CHANGES?

88%
Duringer E. M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 1
62-81
EN
This paper outlines Jesse Prinz's theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz's theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.
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Fenomenologia jako horyzont normatywności

88%
Maciejczak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 2
35-49
EN
My aim is to put together Husserl’s main ideas on the phenomenological method, to show the phases of its development as the consciousness’ reflection about itself. The condition of possibility of such reflection is that there be a point of view which guarantees access to the intentional domain, and also that the subject be able to enquire into the ways its intentional experiences are connected to the world. This condition, it is argued here, should be considered to be a regulative idea. Phenomenological reduction, which enables phenomenological reflection, is really an unending process, a series of reductions that lead to evidence. Looking for evidence is the source of the dynamic of consciousness; this primary curiosity, this striving to fulfill intentions lies at the bottom of all its interests and purposes. Cartesian clara and distincta perceptio motivates the positing of each object as real or unreal, possible, probable, or dubious. The search for evidence is, therefore, the character of consciousness as such; striving for evidence makes life of the mind rational, i.e., oriented toward truth and objectivity. Phenomenology, seen as reviving the norms of cognizing and acting, makes it possible to think of the unity of philosophy, science, and life, and is still worth being treated as a cure for today’s irrationality and subjectivity.
14

Theory of Intentionality in 'Logische Ungersuchungen' by Edmund Husserl

88%
Plotka W.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 1(65)
111-123
EN
The article examines the problem of intentionality in the Husserlian philosophy. The author is interested especially in the theory of intentionality, which is presented by the philosopher in the 'Logical Investigations'. According to Husserl phenomenology is the science which is founded on the genuine knowledge. The genuine character of knowledge means that it has direct character. Also scientist would have infallible and unmediated link to the reality. Consideration about relationship between the structures of intentionality and the language, could question legitimacy of the postulate of the direct experience. Syntactical and semantical structures of language seem to determine Husserl's considerations about the intentionality of consciousness. If it was so, knowledge about the intentionality always would be indirect. The knowledge mediates in the earlier pre-reflective understanding of expressions. The postulate of the direct character of knowledge had been specific to the 'Logical Investigations', but Husserl's attitude to that postulate was changed in his mature philosophy. The author suggests that we could find in Husserl's mature philosophy the new model of science. The new science is founded on the confidence that the knowledge is always indirect.
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INTENTIONALITY AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EMPIRICAL MENTAL ACTS AND AS A TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITION OF THE POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE (Intentsiinist' yak kharakterystyka empirychnykh psykhichnykh aktiv i yak transtsendentalna umova mozhlyvosti dosvidu)

88%
Kebuladze V.
Філософська Думка
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2009
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issue 4
84-91
EN
The article is intended to investigate the concept of intentionality of Edmund Husserl in terms of the phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Such an approach makes possible to consider the reflection of Husserlian understanding of intentionality in the philosophical conception of Vincent Descombes. The author aims to show two different levels of intentionality - psychological intentionality and transcendental-philosophical intentionality. In this way he tries to solve the problem of the passive intentionality.
16

Kategoria pasywności w fenomenologii materialnej Michela Henry`ego

88%
Walczak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2018
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vol. 46
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issue 4
5-21
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the notion of passivity in Michel Henry's material phenomenology. I focus on three main issues: noetic-noematic structure, internal time consciousness, and phenomenological method. What I consider my main reference point is the classical Husserlian version of phenomenology, which is what is discussed by Michel Henry. In particular, I pay attention to those of Husserl's works where the notion of passivity is introduced. For instance, Husserl refers to it when analyzing passive synthesis, which is performed at the level of internal time consciousness. I present Husserl's ideas, which have met with skepticism from Henry's side. In comparing works written by both philosophers I probe whether this criticism is justified and show how Henry’s innovative ideas shed a new light on phenomenology. Some of them allow him to move beyond the limits of the traditional phenomenological approach. To cite an example, defining the notion of préimpression in an utterly different way leads to associating it with suffering (souffrir), which is considered a exemplary model of experiencing. Consequently, adopting this approach enables Henry to uncover the substance of material phenomenology ‒ the pathetic immediacy in which life experiences itself.
17

MISREPRESENTATION AND ROBUSTNESS OF MEANING

88%
Aytekin T., Sayan E.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2010
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vol. 17
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issue 1
21-38
EN
According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality and his causal theory of content can account for it. The robustness of meaning refers to the fact that kennings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. The authors claim that Fodor's treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor's theory of content, they propose a new theory of content which explains how misrepresentation is possible as a result of meaning-forming causation, and extend it to account for the property of robustness of meaning.
18

On the existential analysis

88%
Marosan B. P.
Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)
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2004
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vol. 48
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issue 4
495-523
EN
The essay tries to give a Husserlian interpretation of the existential analysis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Though in the period of 'Being and Time' there was already an extreme distance between the phenomenological method of Heidegger's and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, on closer examination Heidegger's phenomenology of that time turns out to be in a certain way compatible with Husserl's methodology. If we interpret the phenomenological results of 'Being and Time' in the Husserlian terminology of intentionality then the methodology of existential analysis is proved to be a macro-phenomenology: the phenomenology of human life-story's horizon as a whole in contrast to the husserlian micro-phenomenology of the life of consciousness. On a thematic level the sharpest difference of the transcendental phenomenology and existential analysis seems to be the concept of self. Heidegger often criticizes the traditional phenomenal-phenomenological view of the self-identical, 'empty' I-pole, saying that that view interprets the self like something 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden). This paper deals mostly with this charge. At the 'Being and Time' to give a phenomenon the interpretation of presence-at-the-hand (Vorhandensein) means to uproot this phenomenon from its real context in the life-world. The author tried to show on one hand that we can interconnect the Husserlian concept of transcendental ego with the Heideggerian here-being through the concept of the here-being's 'ever-mineness' (Jemeinigkeit), on the other hand that the context of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) is approachable in the same manner or a Husserlian interpretation.
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FENOMÉN MEZI INTENCIONALITOU A POČITKEM. LEVINAS A HUSSERL

88%
Novotný K.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 8
221-231
EN
The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.
20
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Twórczość z punktu widzenia teorii czynności. Twórca czy szaleniec? Demiurg czy bricoleur?

75%
Bobryk J.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2011
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vol. 47
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issue 4(190)
533-541
EN
The main aim of the paper is rethinking Descartes’s concept of cogito in the framework of the theory of actions and products and the general theory of human creativity. The final conclusion is that Descartes’s cogito is not a subject but an act. It is the act (or the string of acts) connecting the subject with the object. This conclusion is a bridge between Cartesian methodological skepticism and Brentano’s theory of intentional acts.
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