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1

SELECTED METAETHICAL ASPECTS OF PHILIPPA FOOT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

100%
Chabada M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 1
1 – 13
EN
There are two main positions in metaethical discussions. The first, cognitivist, position is that moral evaluations may be true or untrue, and the second, internalist, position is that these evaluations guide actions such that the agent is internally motivated to act based on the content of that evaluation. These two positions conflict. Cognitivism has to deal with the problem of moral motivation, and internalism has to explain the relevance of moral evaluations. In this article we will explore the moral philosophy of Philippa Foot as presented in her Natural Goodness. Our aim is to reconstruct and explain Foot’s arguments in favour of cognitivist and externalist views. Hence the final part proffers a summary of the metaethical aspects of Foot’s moral philosophy, and thereby highlights both the originality and contribution it makes to contemporary ethical thinking, and sketches a constructivist interpretation of Foot’s moral philosophy that emphasises the function of practical reason in constituting moral normativity.
2

Kant's Discovery of Normativity

100%
Lukow P.
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4(52)
147-165
EN
Until the eighteenth century most European normative positions in moral philosophy presupposed strong motivational internalism. According to this assumption a belief about the good leads to action in accordance with it because the belief brings about a desire to act in this way or it is identical with this desire. Strong internalism is susceptible to fundamental difficulties. It cannot explain incontinence (the so-called weak will) or justify obligations for those who have not assented to (correct) beliefs about the good. An analysis of the 'Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals' and the 'Critique of Practical Reason' shows that Kant departed from strong internalism in favour of its weak version. Having drawn a clear line between facts and desires (the sphere of the empirical) on the one hand, and beliefs about the good (the sphere of the rational) on the other, Kant holds that a belief about the good does not necessarily lead to an appropriate action but may require a special motive. For this reason Kant distinguishes between facticity and normativity, and with a view to this purpose he analyses the concept of duty. This concept allows him to grasp the particular phenomenon of necessitation that is associated with beliefs about the good without presupposing that these beliefs will lead to actions that accord with them. In developing his conception of acting from duty Kant explains the possibility of both acting on beliefs about the good and of diverting from them. This 'discovery' of normativity has important consequences for moral theory and practice. Among other things, it requires a distinction between moral and other goods by identifying moral good with unconditional good.
3

INTERNALISTICKÉ ZNAKY V KONCEPCII INTUITÍVNEHO POZNANIA PODĽA DUNSA SCOTA

88%
Chabada M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
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vol. 71
|
issue 9
721 – 732
EN
The paper deals with internalist features of the conception of intuitive cognition according to Duns Scotus. Its first part is concerned with strong and weak internalism, the latter being compatible with externalism. In its second part attention is paid to Duns Scotus’ theory of intuitive cognition including internal states of the soul, acts of recollection and contingent truth propositions. The goal of the third part is to show the manner in which the internalist features are present in Scotus’ theory of intuition. In conclusion the author suggests that Scotus’ theory of intuition resembles the access internalism in its weak form and as such doesn´t contradict externalism.
4

SPORY O CHARAKTER ZDÔVODNENIA V SÚČASNEJ ANALYTICKEJ EPISTEMOLÓGII

88%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 6
517 – 522
EN
The controversy between internalists and externalists concerning the approach to justification is among central issues in contemporary analytic epistemology. In its first part, the paper briefly surveys the main points of controversy. In its second part, the author defends the view that internalist and externalist approaches are components of two different epistemological projects. If the presented view is true, then the controversy between internalism and externalism is in fact meaningless, because it does not concern the same subject.
5

PREČO EXTERIALISTICKÉ KRITÉRIÁ ZDÔVODNENIA PRINCIPIÁLNE ZLYHÁVAJÚ?

88%
Nuhlíček M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
|
issue 1
37 – 49
EN
The article concerns two basic approaches to the problem of epistemic belief-justification: internalism and externalism. The article aims to showing that internalism as well as externalism, when confronted with the problem of philosophical scepticism, face various kinds of problems, which lead to implausibility of their respective accounts of justification. The author provides a special focus on the externalist approach which was invented as a direct response to the threat of scepticism. The central part of the article contains a brief analysis of main attributes of externalism, and subsequently its criticism which aims to showing that the criteria of justification proposed by externalists do not accomplish the basic function of distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs. The author argues that the discussed deficiencies of externalism result from its elementary rationale, which implies that they are incurable, and therefore the externalist criteria of justification inevitably fail.
6

PROBLÉM VNÚTORNÝCH A VONKAJŠÍCH FAKTOROV V HRUŠOVSKÉHO KONCEPCII VÝVINU VEDECKÉHO POZNANIA

88%
Viceník J., Zigo M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
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vol. 65
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issue 10
939-952
EN
In the first part of the paper the authors describe Hrusovsky's model of the development of scientific knowledge, which, due to the influence of logical empiricism, he saw as cumulative, hypothetical-confirmational and internal, i.e. taking into account only scientific factors. In the second part it is showed, that Hrusovsky acknowledged the influence of the external factors, emphasizing at the same time the fundamental independence of scientific knowledge. He dismissed the vulgar economism as well as the extreme internalism (immanentism).
7

Internalizm w wersjach de dicto i de re w kontekście sporu o kognitywizm metaetyczny

75%
Kuźniar A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2011
|
vol. 39
|
issue 4
5 - 24
EN
The present paper is devoted to a critical analysis of the de dicto internalist cognitivism (DDIC) theory presented by Jon Tresan. The result is not only a rejection of DDIC, but above all the strengthening of de re internalist non-cognitivism (DRIN) as the most adequate metaethical concept consistent with the position of internalism. DDIC makes the belief that something is morally good/wrong concepts distinctive far beyond necessity. This is due to the rejection of the that-clause, whereby, if a state of mind that a p concept applies to something, it necessarily applies to it, and the attribution to belief that something is morally good/wrong concepts of the status of further entailers, although the propositional content of each state of mind is its intrinsic and non-relational, and not extrinsic and relational, characteristic. Tresan does not notice the advantage of DRIN over his approach because in the course of the argument he confuses the level of concepts with that of terms. The advantages of DRIN are also linked to the ability to explain the source of metaethical disputes. The most important advantage of this approach, however, is its consistency with naturalistic moral realism, which deprives DDIC of the monopoly on being a theory compatible with both internalism and realism, devoid of metaphysical extravagance with regard to the ontological status of moral facts and properties.
8

(UN)HOLY GRAIL OF EPISTEMOLOGY

63%
Ziȩba P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
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vol. 22
|
issue 1
21 - 33
EN
As formulated by Duncan Pritchard and John McDowell, epistemological disjunctivism is the claim that perceptual experience can provide the subject with epistemic justification that is reflectively accessible and externally grounded at the same time. Pritchard calls this thesis ‘the holy grail of epistemology’, since it reconciles two traditionally rival theories of justification, namely epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. The main objection against epistemological disjunctivism thus understood is that it does not do justice to the well-known internalist intuitions expressed in The New Evil Demon and Brain-in-a-Vat scenarios. The author defends epistemological disjunctivism from this objection by indicating that those who apply to such scenarios commit themselves to implausible views in the philosophy of mind. He concludes that epistemological disjunctivism accurately expresses the epistemological attitude of a non-reductive materialist regarding the body-mind problem.
9
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THE PROBLEM OF ACTION INDIVIDUATION AND INTERNALIZATION (Problem indywiduacji i internalizacji dzialan)

63%
Paprzycka K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 11
291-315
EN
One of the striking features of Davidson's account of action individuation is the internalization of actions to the domain of bodily movements. I reconstruct Davidson's arguments for that claim as applying mainly against naive externalism (according to which actions are simple events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body) but also against externalist moderationism (according to which actions are complex events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body). I show that the debate between Davidson's internalist minimalism and externalist moderationism is at a standstill. Externalist moderationism is better at explaining some of the claims we are prepared to make about actions (the temporal problem) while internalist minimalism is better at capturing some deeper intuitions about actions. I argue that one can use the old distinction between process and product as applied to agency to help get out of the impasse and restore healthy externalist intuitions.
10

K PREDPOKLADOM A SÚVISLOSTIAM FAKTU V SOCIÁLNOM POZNANÍ

63%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 7
613-624
EN
The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The applied approach is historical (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiation between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Intentionality and the structure of social facts in terms of Searle's construction of the social are underlined as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, which contents are conceived - contrary to Searle's internalism - in terms of externalism.
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