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EN
This article presents a brief overview the Lithuanian experience in the ISAF and describes the main lessons learned for the Lithuanian armed forces and civilian participants in the operation. As a part of the ISAF, Lithuania took it upon itself to lead one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, which proved to be the most challenging but also the most experience-developing activity of the young military establishment. Therefore, this paper will pay much attention to precisely this part of the mission.
EN
The study in 2010 indicated that majority of armed conflicts that occurred in the first decade of 21st century have been recurrences, because deep-rooted causes of conflict have not been properly addressed (Sandole, 2010, p. 35). Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are examples of peace-building failures. Even with the cease-fire among parties in place or diplomatic solution to the conflict, the violence often continues regardless of all the peace-building efforts. As the peace-building strategies fail so often, many questions may arise: What have we done wrong? How was it possible that the largest and most expensive peace operations failed to put to an end some of the bloodiest conflicts of the post-Cold war era? Is the problem due to the misunderstanding and incapacity of peacebuilders to adequately address the roots of violence, or it is ignorance and neglect of local conflict dynamics? In other words, is there something in relation to conflict background, local society structure, or local culture, cultural norms and dynamics that peacebuilders should consider and rethink?
EN
The following chapters analyse the background of Estonia’s decision to join the military operation of Afghanistan, its links to Estonian society and political elites, but also a possible influence of the Afghanistan experience on the post-ISAF NATO. This article argues that the Afghanistan experience has offered two basic lessons to be learned by Estonia in framing its understanding of crisis management: 1) Estonia’s military achieved valuable combat experience against a “live” enemy; 2) our political elites learned the importance of post-conflict state-building, that civil support to state-building in the post-conflict situation is no less important than a military contribution.
PL
Wojsko Polskie od dawna uczestniczy w misjach poza granicami kraju. ISAF jest kolejnym wyzwaniem dla polskich żołnierzy. Od 2002 r. angażują się w kształtowanie bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, realizując zadania związane ze szkoleniem służb bezpieczeństwa państwa afgańskiego, jak i pomocą ludności cywilnej. Związane jest to również z odbudową infrastruktury, jak i stworzeniem podwalin poprawnie funkcjonującej administracji publicznej Afganistanu. Ponadto Polacy w dalszym ciągu z narażeniem życia uczestniczą w operacjach antyrebelianckich, wspomagając afgańską armię i policję. Do 2010r. zostało zrealizowanych mnóstwo projektów, wpływających na poprawę bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, jak i poziom życia cywili. Mimo niesprzyjającego do działania środowiska Polacy nieustannie angażują się w misję pod dowództwem NATO.
EN
The Polish Armed Forces have been participating in foreign missions for many years. ISAF is the next challenge for Polish soldiers who have been engaged in security building in Afghanistan since 2002 conducting tasks related not only to training Afghan security services but helping civil-ian population as well. It is also connected with rebuilding the infrastructure and creating the foundations of correctly functioning public administration in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Poles have been engaged in life-threatening anti-rebel operations supporting the Afghan army and police. Up to 2010 numerous projects have been accomplished which are affecting the im-provement of security in Afghanistan and civilians’ level of life. In spite of hostile environment conditions, the Poles are constantly engaged in the NATO-led mission.
EN
Multiculturalism defined as a multitude of cultures can be typified as a major trend in international relations, what is a chellenge for every participant of global affairs. The phenomen of multiculturalism is absolutely nothing new, but under conditions of progresive globalisation mechanism its importance has been appreciated.In practise multinational forces have to operate in culturally heterogeneous environment in an array of tasks to combat threats of mostly a non-military transnational nature. All the time there are a highly complex relations within coalition personnel, in cuturally diverse society living in the theatre of operation and between all them mutually.
PL
Wojska Sojuszu od 2001 roku są obecne w Afganistanie. Przez 13 lat sytuacja wewnętrzna w kraju uległa zdecydowanej zmianie, przede wszystkim z uwagi na zmianę modus operandi afgańskich Talibów. Z tego względu również strategia NATO dla Afganistanu powinna ulec zmianie. Przez ten czas siły ISAF (ang. International Security Assistance Forces in Afganistan) przeprowadziły szereg operacji przeciwko Talibom. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wskazanie, jaką rolę pełniły wojska Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego w konflikcie asymetrycznym, jakim jest wojna (misja stabilizacyjna) w Afganistanie. Autorka wskaże też na zależności pomiędzy misjami ISAF i Enduring Freedom. Ponadto, chce ukazać jak, na przestrzeni lat zmieniała się strategia wojsk sojuszniczych w Afganistanie oraz strategia afgańskich Talibów: początkowo wojska NATO zmagały się z zagrożeniem terrorystycznym, które z biegiem czasu przerodziło się w działania partyzanckie. Obecnie zaś obserwuje się przekształcenie tych działań w powstanie zbrojne, skierowane przeciwko władzom centralnym oraz siłom międzynarodowym. Artykuł ukaże zmieniającą się rolę NATO w XXI wieku, które obecnie stoi przed wyzwaniem sprostania nowym zagrożeniom.
EN
The army of NATO countries since 2001 are present in Afghanistan. For 13 years, the internal situation in the country has vast change, primarily due to the change in the modus operandi of the Afghan Taliban. For this reason, the NATO strategy for Afghanistan should change. During this time, ISAF carried out a series of operations against the Taliban. The purpose of this article is to identify the role played by the army of NATO in asymmetric conflict, which is a war (stabilization mission) in Afghanistan. The author also shows the relationship between the missions of the ISAF and Enduring Freedom. In addition, he wants to show how, over the years evolved a strategy of allied forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban strategy: NATO troops initially struggled with the terrorist threat, which over time turned into guerilla warfare. Currently, the observed conversion of these activities in an armed uprising against the central authorities and international forces. Article will show the changing role of NATO in the twenty-first century, which now faces the challenge to meet new threats.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia problemy finansów publicznych Prowincji Ghazni i budżetu państwa afgańskiego, które były obserwowane przez Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy podczas XIII i XIV zmiany w latach 2013 i 2014 oraz powodowały zasadnicze trudności w funkcjonowaniu misji ISAF. Nakreślono genezę sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej prowadzącej do niewydolności systemu fiskalnego, powodującej konieczność utrzymywania budżetu Afganistanu ze środków pomocy międzynarodowej koalicji antyterrorystycznej, w celu powstrzymywania naporu talibskiej rebelii.
EN
The paper presents the problems of public finances of the Ghazni Province and the Afghanistan state budget, which were observed by the Polish Military Contingent during XIII and XIV Rotation in 2014 and 2015. These problems caused major difficulties in functioning of the ISAF mission. The paper also presents an outline of the socio-economic situation leading to the system failure, causing the need to maintain Afghanistan fiscal budget by aid of the international anti-terrorist coalition, in order to suppress pressure of the Taliban insurgency.
EN
The terrorist attacks in New York on 11th September 2001 resulted in a new method of armed conflict which was asymmetric in character, on this occasion in Afghanistan. The ISAF faced the Taliban – a rival who had an advantage because of local knowledge and help from some of the neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, and international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. The Taliban maintained surveillance on the ANSF which supported ISAF. As a result, attacks described as green on blue happened which were caused also by a conflict of a cultural and religious basis between Afghan soldiers and ISAF soldiers. Due to its unpre-dictability and the impossibility of stating its area and time, they became one of the biggest dangers for ISAF soldiers during that difficult mission.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest podsumowaniu wniosków i rekomendacji z badań dotyczących międzynarodowych rozwiązań w zakresie operacjonalizacji kultury dla potrzeb przygotowania i prowadzenia operacji militarnych. Przeprowadzone zostały one przez Autorkę między innymi podczas wizyt studyjnych w międzynarodowych instytucjach wojskowych oraz wśród przedstawicieli państw koalicji w US CENTCOM w roku 2013, celem stworzenia całościowego modelu operacjonalizacji kultury dla potrzeb przygotowania i prowadzenia operacji militarnych przez Polskie Siły Zbrojne. W artykule omówiono rozwiązania w zakresie operacjonalizacji kultury w przygotowaniu i prowadzeniu operacji militarnych w armiach NATO (m.in. Kanada, Niemcy czy Turcja) oraz innych (np. Australia, Korea Południowa czy Nepal). Doświadczenia amerykańskie zostały omówione w osobnym artykule.
EN
The following article aims at summarizing the conclusions and recommendations from a study on the operationalization of culture for pre-deployment and operational training activities. The results are based on a research and interviews conducted by the author in Polish and foreign military institutions in the years 2009-2013 during study visits to, among others, international military institutions, the US Army War College and representatives of multinational coalition forces at US CENTCOM (2012). In this piece of research, the solutions implemented as part of the preparation and conduct of military operations of NATO forces (e.g. in Canada, UK, Germany and Turkey) and other armies (e.g. of Australia, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore and Nepal) have been analyzed. American experiences have not been discussed here.
PL
This article focuses on development of NATO missions in Afghanistan (both ISAF and Resolute support) from the political point of view. Authors describe an influence of political decisions adopted at the NATO summits and international donor conferences on the development of the security situation in Afghanistan and vice-versa. At the conclusion author tries to give possible future outcome of the security situation in the country.
PL
W związku z ogłoszeniem terminu zakończenia misji ISAF na 31 grudnia 2014 r. niezbędnym stało się szybkie przygotowanie sprawnych afgańskich sił bezpieczeństwa zdolnych do przejęcia odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo w Afganistanie. Talibowie podjęli działania, które miały w zamyśle storpedowanie powyższego procesu. Głównym ich celem było podkopanie wzajemnego zaufania między siłami ISAF a afgańskimi siłami bezpieczeństwa (Afghan National Security Forces – ANSF). Jednym z takich działań były ataki dokonywane przez członków afgańskich sił bezpieczeństwa przeciwko swoim sojusznikom z ISAF, określane w nomenklaturze międzynarodowej jako „Green-on-Blue” („GoB”) lub „Inside the Wire Threat”. W artykule zdefiniowano problem ataków do 2012 r., przedstawiono ich przyczyny, konsekwencje oraz środki zaradcze, które zostały podjęte dla neutralizacji zagrożenia. Publikacja niniejsza jest w całości oparta na treściach anglojęzycznego artykułu, zamieszczonego w The Magazine of the Joint Force Training Centre, March 2013, Issue No. 3, s. 33–39.
EN
Due to the fact that final date of ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) operation had been establish for 31 December 2014, it was necessary to train Afghan Security Forces that could take over the responsibility for security in Afghanistan after the ISAF forces have withdrawn. Taliban began offensive aiming to paralyze that process. Their main goal was to undermine the trust between ISAF and ANSF forces. One of their main activity was to conduct attacks which are often referred to as „Green on Blue” („GoB”) or „Inside the Wire Threat”. The author tries to define the problem till the 2012, present its causes, consequences and countermeasures undertaken to neutralize.
EN
The article attempts to answer the question concerning the reasons for the spectacular failure of the U.S. policy in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the rapid takeover by the Taliban in 2021. U.S. and allied troops have failed to stabilize the situation in the country for more than 20 years despite massive funding and infrastructure investment. The author considers several groups of factors responsible for this state of affairs. These include Americans' misunderstanding of the country's culture in the face of great ethnic diversity, the high level of corruption in the Afghan authorities, the actions of superpowers seeking to gain influence in Afghanistan, as well as the lay of the land, which allows for effective guerrilla warfare for many years.
PL
Artykuł stanowi próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie dotyczące przyczyn spektakularnego niepowodzenia polityki USA w Afganistanie, wycofania wojsk amerykańskich i szybkiego przejęcia władzy przez talibów w 2021 roku. Wojskom amerykańskim i sojuszniczym przez ponad 20 lat nie udało się ustabilizować sytuacji w kraju pomimo ogromnych nakładów finansowych i inwestycji infrastrukturalnych. Autor rozważa kilka grup czynników odpowiedzialnych za ten stan rzeczy. Jest to m.in. niezrozumienie przez Amerykanów kultury tego kraju przy wielkim zróżnicowaniu etnicznym, wysoki poziom korupcji we władzach Afganistanu, działania mocarstw starających się o zdobycie wpływów w Afganistanie, jak również ukształtowanie terenu umożliwiające skuteczną walkę partyzancką przez wiele lat.
EN
The article is devoted to the development of Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in the second decade of its existence. The Corps, which is based in Szczecin, has been operating since 1999 as a part of NATO’s military structures. The Corps was created by three founding countries: Denmark, Germany and Poland. In accordance with the Convention of September 5th, 1998, the aim of the corps is to plan and carry out activities for the benefit of collective defense purposes under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to participate in multinational missions and military operations. Between 2004 and 2015, the Corps was joined by other countries as “participating members”: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (2004), Slovakia and the Czech Republic (2005), United States of America (2006), Romania (2008), Slovenia (2009), Croatia (2012), Hungary (2013), Sweden (2014), and the UK (2015). In the second half of 2015 the corps was extended with the representatives of the Armed Forces from Turkey, France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Finland. The Corps headquarters in Szczecin is organized according to NATO standards. It includes the Command Group (rotationally manned by personnel from Demark, Germany and Poland) and nine functional divisions. Military units that function under the authority of the Corps (70–100 thousand soldiers) are deployed in their bases in the founding states. Up until now, the soldiers from the Corps has participated in 3 ISAF missions in Afghanistan. Decisions to strengthen signifi cantly the force of the Corps were made on 4–5 September 2014 during the NATO Summit in Newport. During the summit, the founding states also decided to raise the level of combat readiness of the Corps. Since then, the Corps has been undergoing another transformation, the most important one since its inception. In NATO, it is assumed that at the end of 2016 the Corps will reach its full readiness to command various military formations of the Alliance, including: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), NATO Response Force (NRF), and also NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. This implies the need for further infrastructure development of the Corps and the increase of the scope of its responsibilities in the field of allied defense. This task was regarded as a priority before the next NATO Summit scheduled for 8–9 July 2016 in Warsaw.
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