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EN
The Russian Federation is actively seeking to reestablish its influence in the Middle East, which at one time was an important area of geostrategic interests of the USSR. In the 1990s, Russia was trying to consolidate itself in the Middle East by demonstrating its participation in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in helping to curtail the Iranian nuclear program. Recently, the Russian Federation has strengthened its presence in the Middle East by supporting B. Assad’s authoritarian regime, besides, the provocation of instability in Syria, in the face of the fight against ISIS, has led to an increase in the flow of refugees to the European Union, which thereby undermines its stability and unity. Russia is also interested in spreading control over the extraction and transit of energy resources to Europe, and because of the support of the destruction in the region of the Middle East, Moscow is taking steps to eliminate energy rivals in the European market for hydrocarbons, as the oil and gas transit of the Persian Gulf is carried out precisely by the territory of Syria. In general, the overwhelming task of strengthening Russia’s influence in the Middle East is to patronize the creation of an anti-Western coalition from among such states as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Libya. An indication of this is the build-up of Russia’s supply of Iran and Egypt with the latest weaponry in order to increase their geopolitical weight and change the balance of power in the region as a whole. With all of the Russian-Turkish relations are unstable, primarily because of differences in the support of the Syrian regime, B. Asad.
EN
Nowadays, thanks to information published on TV, the Internet, radio or in the press, there is broad understanding of the phenomenon of disinformation as a tool for image creation. Since 2001, after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, one can see that the media have been a serious threat in the hands of terrorists. Reactions from public opinion have shown to terrorist organizations how important the role of the media is and how they can be used in their own propaganda (disinformation) activities. The media activity of the Islamic State is richer and more advanced in comparison with that provided by Al-Qaeda.
EN
Turkey’s political and military actions seem to be aimed not so much against the so-called Islamic State as against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is perceived as a threat to the Turkish state. Consequently, contrary to the expectations of the European Union and other Western partners, Turkey’s involvement in the fight against the self-proclaimed caliphate is unlikely to be deep, because the government in Ankara fears the Islamic State less than a potential establishment of some form of Kurdish authonomy on its territory. After the Suruç terrorist attack Turkey joined the U.S.-led coalition and in 2016 even launched a military operation in Syria, but its operations are rooted first and foremost in determination to fight the peshmerga – Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq and Syria.
ES
Terrorism is one of the most important problems facing the world. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is one of the most dangerous jihadist groups. It controls large parts of territory in Syria and Iraq. In June 2014 the group declared the creation of a caliphate and shortened its name to Islamic State to reflect its expansionist ambitions.This article presents the short history of ISIS, its structure and the source of financing. Moreover, it describes the relations between the Islamic State and the Latin America and the Caribbean region. Although there are not many links, we may say that they really exist. The future relations depend mainly on effectiveness of the the international community in its fight against the expansion of ISIS.RESUMENEl terrorismo es uno de los desafíos más importantes que encara el mundo. El Estado Islámico de Irak y del Levante es uno de los grupos yihadistas más peligrosos. Este grupo controla una gran parte del territorio de Siria e Irak. En junio de 2014 el grupo declaró la creación del califato y cambió su nombre al de Estado Islámico para reflejar sus ambiciones expansionistas.Este artículo presenta la breve historia de ISIS, su estructura y la fuente de financiación. Además, describe las relaciones entre el Estado Islámico y la región de América Latina y el Caribe. Aunque no hay muchos vínculos, pero algunos sí existen. Las futuras relaciones dependerán principalmente de la efectividad de la comunidad internacional en la lucha contra la expansión de ISIS.
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Propaganda Daesh

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PL
The aim of the article was to show the diversity of Daesh propaganda. It consists of the of political, religious and social narratives. They have one task - to convince the world that the newly created ‘caliphate’ is a fact: it has the ability to defend its territory, no matter of how great is the efforts of ‘crusaders’, moreover, is an efficient state, which is an ideal home for Sunnis. Brutality is the element with which the propaganda Daesh primarily connotations, appears very frequently. It has specific role - to deter opponents. This reason why so often presents „hunting” on Iraqi soldiers, and mass executions. This brutality, in connection with mercy, meeting the needs of justice and belonging, makes propagandas an efficient tool for building ‘caliphate’.
PL
„Państwo Islamskie” jest powszechnie uważane za najlepiej zorganizowany międzynarodowy ruch dżihadystyczny, wyróżniający się dużą skutecznością administracyjną. Jego struktura powstała pod wpływem zarówno szariatu jak i potrzeb wynikających z rozwoju technologii. Islamiści ustanowili rząd aspirujący do stworzenia kalifatu i roszczący pretensje do władzy nad całym światem muzułmańskim. W opracowaniu przedstawiono przyczyny 3-letniego sukcesu ISIS, którego źródłem była sprawność wojskowa, oraz skuteczność scentralizowanej administracji. Opracowanie dotyczy okresu istnienia kalifatu, czyli lat 2014-2016.
EN
Islamic State" is widely regarded as the best organized international jihadist movement, distinguished by high administrative efficiency. Its structure was influenced by both sharia and needs resulting from the development of technology. Islamists have set up a government aspiring to create a caliphate and claiming power over the entire Muslim world. The study presents the causes of ISIS's three-year success, the source
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PL
„Państwo islamskie” to organizacja terrorystyczna, która przez kilka lat okupowała i administrowała rozległym terytorium, zamieszkanym przez kilka milionów ludzi. Było tak, chociaż wolę jej zwalczania wyrażały wszystkie znaczące siły polityczne świata. Przetrwanie w tak niekorzystnych okolicznościach zapewnił „Państwu islamskiemu” bardzo wydajny system ekonomiczny, oparty w największej mierze na rabunku dokonywanym na firmach, instytucjach i ludności podbitych terytoriów, dochodach uzyskiwanych ze sprzedaży surowców (głównie ropy naftowej i gazu ziemnego), handlu ludźmi, a także obiektami zabytkowymi pozyskiwanymi z muzeów i stanowisk archeologicznych. Niewielki udział w budżecie ISIS mają wpłaty od bogatych sponsorów z Kataru i Arabii Saudyjskiej
EN
The "Islamic state" is a terrorist organization that has occupied and administered a vast territory, inhabited by several million people for several years. This was so, though all the major political forces of the world declared the necessity of eliminating it from the international scene. Survival of the “Islamic state” in such unfavorable conditions was possible thanks to the creation of a very efficient economic system, based largely on the robbery of corporations, institutions and populations of conquered territories, income from the sale of raw materials (mainly crude oil and natural gas), human trafficking, as well as the historical objects from museums and archeological sites. A small share of the ISIS budget is donated by wealthy sponsors from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
PL
Artykuł omawia prawne i kulturowe aspekty ludobójstwa popełnionego przez „Państwo Islamskie” na synkretycznej mniejszości jezydów zamieszkującej północnozachodni Irak. Takie kwestie, jak masowe zabójstwa, przemoc seksualna i indoktrynacja dzieci są konfrontowane z przepisami Konwencji o ludobójstwie z 1948 r., interpretowanymi zgodnie z orzecznictwem trybunałów międzynarodowych.
EN
Article discusses the legal and cultural aspects of the genocide perpetrated by the Islamic State on the syncretic Yezidi minority inhabiting north-western Iraq. Such issues as mass killings, sexual violence and indoctrination of children are being confronted with the regulations of the 1948 Genocide Convention, interpreted according to the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
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2019
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vol. 11
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issue 20
176-192
PL
Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej omówiono pozorowaną sytuację zakładniczą, czyli jedną z taktyk przeprowadzania zamachu, jaka została opisana w publikowanych przez ISIS magazynach informacyjno-instruktażowych przeznaczonych dla zwolenników tej organizacji mieszkających w UE i USA. Salafickie organizacje terrorystyczne od lat nawołują do dokonywania ataków na terytoriach zamieszkałych przez niewiernych, kierują apele do zradykalizowanych zwolenników, którzy często nie mają doświadczenia bojowego, ale są zdeterminowani i pełni entuzjazmu. Dla nich, oprócz materiałów o charakterze ideologicznym i motywacyjnym, przygotowuje się anglojęzyczne publikacje instruktażowe zawierające porady dotyczące zorganizowania ataku o charakterze terrorystycznym, którego celem mają być cywile, najczęściej zgromadzeni w ogólnodostępnym, niechronionym miejscu (cel „miękki”). Autorzy tych opracowań sugerują zastosowanie taktyki „aktywnego strzelca”, a następnie upozorowanie wzięcia zakładników. Pozorowana sytuacja zakładnicza służy przedłużeniu aktu terrorystycznego, negocjacje zaś nie mają na celu wypracowania ustępstw bądź uzyskania konkretnych korzyści dla napastnika, lecz tylko zyskanie dodatkowego czasu na skupienie uwagi mediów, opóźnienie pomocy rannym i przygotowanie się napastnika do dalszego etapu – zwykle szturmu i konfrontacji z oddziałami antyterrorystycznymi. Przykładem zastosowania tej taktyki jest zamach zorganizowany 12 czerwca 2016 r. w Orlando. Uzbrojony napastnik, który deklarował wierność ISIS, wszedł nad ranem do klubu i zaczął strzelać do uczestników imprezy. Celem jego działań było zabicie jak największej liczby osób, metodycznie realizował plan do momentu wkroczenia służb. Gdy wywiązała się strzelanina, upozorował sytuację zakładniczą, kilkakrotnie nawiązywał rozmowę z negocjatorami, chociaż jego działania nie miały na celu porozumienia ze służbami, ale zyskanie dodatkowego czasu i przeciągnięcie ataku. W artykule przeanalizowano taktykę zamachowca i sposób działania służb. Po zdarzeniu AQAP opublikowała analizę taktyki zamachowca i porady dla naśladowców, które także zostały omówione w artykule.
EN
The article consists of two parts. In the first part a simulated hostage taking was described, i.e. one of the tactics of an terrorist attack, which was described in ISIS magazines giving the followers of the organization from the USA and the European Union guidelines and information. Salafi organizations have call for many years to attacks territories where infidels live, their calls are directed towards radical followers often without military experience but full of enthusiasm and determination. Apart from ideological and motivational materials there are English-language instructions with guidelines how to organize a terrorist attack prepared for them, the target of which are civilians, most often gathered in easily accessible, unsecured place (soft target). The authors suggest the active shooter tactics and then simulating hostage taking. The simulated hostage taking is to prolong the attack, negotiations are not to work out any concessions or to get any particular benefits by the attacker but to gain additional time to attract the media, to postpone medical assistance to the wounded and preparing the attacker for a next stage – usually storming by the police and confrontation with counter terrorist units. An empiric datum was the Orlando shooting of 12 June 2016. The armed attacker who pledged allegiance to the ISIS, entered the club early in the morning, when the party was coming to the end and started shooting to participants there. The goal of his actions was to kill as many people as he could, completed his plan up to the moment the services entered. When the shooting started, he simulated a hostage taking, started phone calls with negotiators, however his actions had nothing to do with conciliation with services but getting additional time. In the article the tactics of the attacker was analysed as well as the way services acted. After the operation AQAP published the tactics of the attacker and guidelines for potential followers which were also described in the article.
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2019
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vol. 11
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issue 20
368–381
EN
The article consists of two parts. In the first part a simulated hostage taking was described, i.e. one of the tactics of an terrorist attack, which was described in ISIS magazines giving the followers of the organization from the USA and the European Union guidelines and information. Salafi organizations have call for many years to attacks territories where infidels live, their calls are directed towards radical followers often without military experience but full of enthusiasm and determination. Apart from ideological and motivational materials there are English-language instructions with guidelines how to organize a terrorist attack prepared for them, the target of which are civilians, most often gathered in easily accessible, unsecured place (soft target). The authors suggest the active shooter tactics and then simulating hostage taking. The simulated hostage taking is to prolong the attack, negotiations are not to work out any concessions or to get any particular benefits by the attacker but to gain additional time to attract the media, to postpone medical assistance to the wounded and preparing the attacker for a next stage – usually storming by the police and confrontation with counter terrorist units. An empiric datum was the Orlando shooting of 12 June 2016. The armed attacker who pledged allegiance to the ISIS, entered the club early in the morning, when the party was coming to the end and started shooting to participants there. The goal of his actions was to kill as many people as he could, completed his plan up to the moment the services entered. When the shooting started, he simulated a hostage taking, started phone calls with negotiators, however his actions had nothing to do with conciliation with services but getting additional time. In the article the tactics of the attacker was analysed as well as the way services acted. After the operation AQAP published the tactics of the attacker and guidelines for potential followers which were also described in the article.
PL
Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej omówiono pozorowaną sytuację zakładniczą, czyli jedną z taktyk przeprowadzania zamachu, jaka została opisana w publikowanych przez ISIS magazynach informacyjno-instruktażowych przeznaczonych dla zwolenników tej organizacji mieszkających w UE i USA. Salafickie organizacje terrorystyczne od lat nawołują do dokonywania ataków na terytoriach zamieszkałych przez niewiernych, kierują apele do zradykalizowanych zwolenników, którzy często nie mają doświadczenia bojowego, ale są zdeterminowani i pełni entuzjazmu. Dla nich, oprócz materiałów o charakterze ideologicznym i motywacyjnym, przygotowuje się anglojęzyczne publikacje instruktażowe zawierające porady dotyczące zorganizowania ataku o charakterze terrorystycznym, którego celem mają być cywile, najczęściej zgromadzeni w ogólnodostępnym, niechronionym miejscu (cel „miękki”). Autorzy tych opracowań sugerują zastosowanie taktyki „aktywnego strzelca”, a następnie upozorowanie wzięcia zakładników. Pozorowana sytuacja zakładnicza służy przedłużeniu aktu terrorystycznego, negocjacje zaś nie mają na celu wypracowania ustępstw bądź uzyskania konkretnych korzyści dla napastnika, lecz tylko zyskanie dodatkowego czasu na skupienie uwagi mediów, opóźnienie pomocy rannym i przygotowanie się napastnika do dalszego etapu – zwykle szturmu i konfrontacji z oddziałami antyterrorystycznymi. Przykładem zastosowania tej taktyki jest zamach zorganizowany 12 czerwca 2016 r. w Orlando. Uzbrojony napastnik, który deklarował wierność ISIS, wszedł nad ranem do klubu i zaczął strzelać do uczestników imprezy. Celem jego działań było zabicie jak największej liczby osób, metodycznie realizował plan do momentu wkroczenia służb. Gdy wywiązała się strzelanina, upozorował sytuację zakładniczą, kilkakrotnie nawiązywał rozmowę z negocjatorami, chociaż jego działania nie miały na celu porozumienia ze służbami, ale zyskanie dodatkowego czasu i przeciągnięcie ataku. W artykule przeanalizowano taktykę zamachowca i sposób działania służb. Po zdarzeniu AQAP opublikowała analizę taktyki zamachowca i porady dla naśladowców, które także zostały omówione w artykule.
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89%
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2022
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vol. 20
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issue 1
22-34
EN
The aim of this article is to explain the processes that influence women's involvement in terrorist activities in the ranks of international jihadist organizations. Although the activity of women in terrorist groups has been visible for many years, there is a need to recognize gender dynamics in the process of radicalization. This article contains theoretical aspects related to the presentation of the concept of radicalization and the recruitment stage resulting from this process, which is a necessary element. Moreover, indications of the radicalization of women's attitudes and behawior were demonstrated, including individual factors, factors attracting and pushing them to participate in a terrorist attack.  
PL
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie procesów, które wpływają na zaangażowanie kobiet w działalność terrorystyczną w szeregach międzynarodowych organizacji dżihadystycznych. Mimo iż działalność kobiet w ugrupowaniach terrorystycznych jest widoczna od wielu lat, to jednak istnieje potrzeba rozpoznania dynamiki płci w procesie radykalizacji. Niniejszy artykuł zawiera aspekty teoretyczne związane z pojęciem radykalizacji i przedstawia wynikający z tego procesu etap rekrutacji, który jest jego niezbędnym elementem. Ponadto, wykazano przesłanki radykalizacji postaw i zachowań kobiet, w tym czynniki indywidualne, czynniki przyciągające i popychające do udziału w ataku terrorystycznym.
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88%
EN
Poland is regarded as a country relatively free from Islamic terrorist threat. According to official statements, the four-level terrorism threat scale assessed the terrorism threat in Poland as low (‘zero’). The Islamic minority living in Poland is small and very specific, connected with the historical background of the country and well integrated. For years, relations with most of the Islamic countries were good, or even very good, until the beginning of the XX century when Poland got involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and became a member of the anti-ISIS coalition. That might have attracted the attention of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to the country and its citizens as possible targets of attacks. Surprisingly, 20 to 40 Polish citizens went to Iraq or Syria to fight as foreign fighters (FTFs). More than 10 per cent of Polish criminals wanted by the Interpol is charged with participation in the terrorist organization (ISIS). The article aims to present the relations between this Central European country and the jihadist terrorist organization and to reverse the common belief that Poland has no links to ISIS and no reasons to regard the organization as its serious problem.
EN
The fight that Europe and the West must wage against jihadist terrorism will take some time, but if we live up to our values of integration and democracy, we will come out of it soon. As Giovanni Falcone, the Italian judge killed by the Mafia, once said about the Mafia: “It is a human phenomenon, and as all human phenomena has a start and an evolution, it will have also an end”. Jihadis have been using Twitter at least since 2010, with the Shabaab joining the site in December 2011, but never before to this extent. One early adapter of Twitter, the Afghan Taliban, began to establish their social media presence in December 2010, through which they issued brief bulletins about their actions and alerts for forthcoming communiqués. Many of the most prominent jihadi groups have followed the same path, including the Shabaab al-Mujahideen, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The content of these Twitter accounts has tended to closely mirror material released to jihadi forums. For example, the Afghan Taliban may post the text of a communiqué to their website, to a jihadi forum, and to the Twitter account of one of their spokesmen. Mirroring jihadi groups, elements of the online jihadi community have also migrated to social media sites, with prominent forums such as Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar al- Mujahideen English Forum creating Twitter accounts to publicise notable releases and discussions. Concurrently, many individual jihadis and jihadi supporters have joined Twitter, enthusiastically circulating propaganda among themselves and promoting it to potential recruits. Yet, the benefits conferred by social networking come with a substantial cost: social networking platforms can sow great confusion if known official accounts are deleted and re-established or if there are multiple accounts claiming to represent a specific jihadi group. In order to reach the new official accounts, followers must be able to distinguish the legitimate social media accounts of jihadi groups from non-authenticated users, which is a level of ambiguity that is not found on jihadi forums.
EN
Author analyses the terrorist attacks in Bombay, 2008 and in Paris, November 2015 – several targets in Paris. In both attacks the same strategy was adopted – named here as a sequential terrorist attack. They were made by well prepared and equipped groups of terrorist attacking different targets once by once in short periods of time – like a city guerrillas. Some comparison to the attack on “Charlie Hebdo” editorial’s office, January 2015 is made – the attacks of November are not a separated act of terror but should be seen as a part and a consequence of war with Islamic State (ISIS). In this context, also including war in Eastern Ukraine, Polish security is analysed and crucial issues are outlined.
EN
The article concerns European volunteers travelling to Iraq and Syria to participate in armed jihad. It includes an analysis of propaganda materials prepared for potential ISIS fighters from Europe and the broadly understood West and the characterisation of the type of motives leading to the decision to travel to the territories occupied by the so-called Islamic State (the Caliphate). The theoretical system of reference was based on push-pull model combined with the cost-benefit theory which allowed to analyse this phenomenon in the context of the most popular theories of migration.
PL
The aim of the text is to present and systematize the most important reasons for the „Islamic State” dramatic rise to power and significance. The reasons are the sum total of a number of diverse and mutually linked factors. These fall into the three categories: A. effective use of hard power connected to military activities and terrorist attacks; B. appropriate use of soft power concerning financial, logistics or propaganda sphere; C. different events of processes of local or international character. These three groups of factors and their interactions result in the so-called triad of the „Islamic State” phenomenon.
PL
The material constitutes a review of articles published in 2015 in British academic journals dealing with International relations. Texts have been selected from sixteen issues of: „International Affairs”, „The British Journal of Politics and International Relations” and „The Political Quarterly” . The articles published in these journals have been analyzed in context of thematic groups such as: the Ukrainian conflict, Middle East issues, migration policy, British policy and climate change.
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Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Rynek medialny ISIS

87%
EN
The subject of this thesis is the official media so-called Islamic State and its propaganda activities in social media. The term “official media” could means: magazines, films, songs, bulletins and guides issued by the ISIS unit – Al-Hayat Media Center. The aim of the work is to analyze an innovative communication strategy Islamic State, its methods and measures, with a clear division into – ideological materials, guides for new members as well as songs and films.
PL
Tematem niniejszej pracy są oficjalne media tzw. Państwa Islamskiego oraz jego działalność propagandowa w mediach społecznościowych. Poprzez sformułowanie „oficjalne media” można rozumieć czasopisma, filmy, pieśni, biuletyny i poradniki wydawane przez jednostkę ISIS – Al-Hayat Media Center. Celem pracy jest analiza innowacyjnej strategii komunikacyjnej tzw. Państwa Islamskiego, jej metody i środki, z wyraźnym podziałem na – materiały światopoglądowe, poradniki dla nowych członków oraz pieśni i filmy
EN
In her seminal 1998 work on ‘new wars’ Mary Kaldor developed a heuristic framework usefully for understanding the characteristics of armed non-state groups involved in contemporary conflicts. This framework was derived from analysing the 1992-1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. Some two decades after this however, adjustments may now be necessary. A focussed examination of the strategy used during 2014 by Islamic State Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) reveals Kaldor’s framework may now need to include a more explicit focus on the transnational. Since the mid-1990s, the transnational has been made more accessible by advances in social media in particular, and by globalization more generally. ISIS’s use of the transnational indicates this may be an area that astute non-state actors can advantageously exploit - perhaps better than states - although there are some difficulties involved. ISIS’s success suggests that the transnational may in time have greater influence on the politics of international society.
EN
The article gives general characterisation of the ways in which these organizations use modern communication technologies. Currently, every major terrorist organisation maintain robust media wings, which focus on producing videos, publishing magazines and sharing them with the public via the Web. The empirical system of reference is based on the activity of al-Qaeda, her franchise AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIS (the so-called Islamic State). While analysing the media of terrorist organisations, the Lasswell model was applied. This formula is a standard research procedure used for investigating acts of communication by answering the questions: who, says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?. The author also present typology of videos produced by jihadist organisations, characterised the most important and active media actions of terrorist organisations and a typology of recipients of such messages. The article presents a number of reasons why the Internet has become such an important tool for terrorists.
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