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Contradiction and Aphairesis in Plato’s Republic

100%

Gutiérrez R.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

2015

vol. 6

issue 1

71-92

The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato uses contradictions in the Republic as an impulse to think and to advance in the ascent to the Idea of the good. The procedure to dissolve the main contradictions in the text is that of aphairesis, complementary to that of prosthēsis. Also if they are explicitly named just at the beginning and at the end of the ascent (Books II and VII), I will show that aphairesis and prosthēsis are consistently applied throughout the ascendant argument of Republic I-VII. Starting with the separation of the opposites at the sensible level, the process will continue separating the rational and the irrational in the soul and culminate when explicitly naming the aphairesis of the One/Good at the intelligible level. As will be seen, the opposites in question are unity and indeterminate/indefinite multiplicity. But also if named, the culminating aphairēsis of the Idea of the Good will not be consistently developed in the Republic. Some important allusions to it will also be found in the Parmenides allowing us to solve the main unresolved contradictions in the Republic in consonance with the theory of principles of the agrapha dogmata.

The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato uses contradictions in the Republic as an impulse to think and to advance in the ascent to the Idea of the good. The procedure to dissolve the main contradictions in the text is that of aphairesis, complementary to that of prosthēsis. Also if they are explicitly named just at the beginning and at the end of the ascent (Books II and VII), I will show that aphairesis and prosthēsis are consistently applied throughout the ascendant argument of Republic I-VII. Starting with the separation of the opposites at the sensible level, the process will continue separating the rational and the irrational in the soul and culminate when explicitly naming the aphairesis of the One/ Good at the intelligible level. As will be seen, the opposites in question are unity and indeterminate/indefinite multiplicity. But also if named, the culminating aphairēsis of the Idea of the Good will not be consistently developed in the Republic. Some important allusions to it will also be found in the Parmenides allowing us to solve the main unresolved contradictions in the Republic in consonance with the theory of principles of the agrapha dogmata.

Metamorfozy Platońskiej „metafory słońca” (Respublica 509b) w hetero- i ortodoksyjnej teologii (I-III w.): gnostycyzm, Klemens z Aleksandrii i Orygenes

58%

Mrugalski D.

Vox Patrum

2017

vol. 68

21-58

The metaphor of the sun, in which Plato (Republic 509b) compares the idea of the Good to the sun that dwells above the earth yet affects the phenomena occurring on it, was an inspiration for both heretical and orthodox theology in the first Christian centuries. The Gnostics, Clement of Alexandria and Origen all believed that God, like the Platonic idea of the Good, is radically transcendent in relation to the world, but at the same time is the cause of everything that exists in it. Unlike Plato, who believed that the idea of the Good is knowable and can be the subject of science, the Christian theologians of the first centuries believed that God was like a blinding light. This means that God, according to them, though intelligible, is unknowable in His essence. Therefore, God cannot be the subject of science. Another modification of the Platonic metaphor was the introduction of the element of sunlight, to which the philosopher from Athens did not refer. For the Gnostics, the rays of the sun were “eons” – spiritual beings that existed in the space between the first principle of all things and the material world. For Clement and Origen, the light that comes from the sun was the Son – the power and wisdom of God. In contrast to the Gnostics, who believed in the progressive degradation of the spiritual world through successive emanations, the Alexandrian Fathers believed that the Son possessed all the knowledge of God and therefore revealed to man the true God. Yet the revelation of God by the Son, and even the grace that assists human beings in the process of learning about God, do not give man complete knowledge of the essence of God. Thus the Gnostics, Clement and Origen, despite some doctrinal differences, all accepted the concept of the radical transcendence of God on the ontological and epistemological levels.

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1 Peitho. Examina Antiqua

1 Vox Patrum

1 2017

1 2015

1 Gutiérrez R.

1 Mrugalski D.

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Contradiction and Aphairesis in Plato’s Republic

Metamorfozy Platońskiej „metafory słońca” (Respublica 509b) w hetero- i ortodoksyjnej teologii (I-III w.): gnostycyzm, Klemens z Aleksandrii i Orygenes