Search results

1

Kantowskie dedukcje pryncypiów prawa

100%

Guyer P., Żukowski B., Michałowski T. W.

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

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2016

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vol. 34 (3)

EN

Przekład na podstawie: Paul Guyer, Kant’s Deductions of the Principles of Right, [w:] Mark Timmons (red.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, New York 2002, s. 23-64.

2

Pedagogika moralna Immanuela Kanta jako wyraz wychowania do odpowiedzialności

55%

Nowicka A.

Biuletyn Historii Wychowania

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2010

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issue 26

87-100

EN

The author discusses I. Kant’s pedagogical views and beliefs related to moral education. In particular, the author attempts to prove the thesis that, for Kant, all education and proper upbringing was ultimately linked with moral education and that moral education, in turn, was just education to responsibility. After a presentation of the main assumptions of Immanuel Kant’s ethics, the author proceeds to discuss the status of pedagogy within its framework as a science that aims at educating people and forms attitudes that were understood to involve meeting of one’s obligations expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative, and precisely based on making one to the influence of a priori moral principles and on practicing skills of making everyday use of them in different life situations. The author characterizes notions that are related in Kant’s philosophy to the problems of prospective and positive moral responsibility, and discusses how this philosophy responds to the problem of feasibility and ways of developing a responsible attitude in man. Further on, the author discusses in detail Kant’s pedagogy, i.e. attempts to discover the connective concepts necessary to understand how Kant perceived the educational reality within the context of responsibility, attempts to answer what its goal and essence are and what measures are to be taken to successfully achieve the goal. The considerations on the notion of responsibility and pedagogy in Kant’s thought are summarized in a brief presentation of its essential significance for the pedagogy of morality.

3

Koncepcja dobra najwyższego w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu i Immanuela Kanta

54%

Sieńkowski M.

Nurt SVD

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2019

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issue 1

236-252

PL

Analizy przeprowadzone w niniejszym artykule mają na celu ukazanie istoty oraz roli, jaką koncepcja dobra najwyższego pełni na gruncie moralności realistycznej Tomasza z Akwinu oraz w filozofii transcendentalnej Immanuela Kanta. Pojęcie dobra najwyższego posiada odmienne znaczenie w obu systemach filozoficznych. Desygnatem tego pojęcia w filozofii realistycznej jest dobro i cel, które w pełni aktualizują wszystkie potencjalności człowieka. Tak rozumiane dobro najwyższe utożsamia się z Bogiem. Do niego jak do swego celu ostatecznego zmierzają poszczególne decyzje i działania człowieka. Analiza kantowskiej teorii postępowania moralnego dowodzi, że działania moralne człowieka zmierzają również do dobra najwyższego. Kant rozumie je jako to, czego nic nie przewyższa. Realizowanie dobra najwyższego również stanowi cel moralności, który wypływa z nakazu rozumu praktycznego. Jednakże tego rodzaju dobro nie utożsamia się z Bogiem w rozumieniu filozofii realistycznej. Jest ono konstruktem i złożeniem dwóch celów wynikających z natury ludzkiej. Jeden z nich wypływa z natury rozumnej, drugi ze zmysłowej. Dopiero aprioryczna synteza tych dwóch ujęć, czyli cnoty i szczęśliwości, stanowi dobro najwyższe. Jego zrealizowanie domaga się przyjęcia nieśmiertelności człowieka oraz istnienia Boga, czyli postulatów rozumu praktycznego.

EN

Analyzes carried out in this article aim at showing the essence as well as the role that concept of the highest good fulfills in the realistic morality of Thomas Aquinas and in the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The notion of the highest good has a different meaning in both philosophical systems. The designatum of this concept in realistic philosophy is the good and the purpose that fully update all human potentialities. The highest good understood in this way is identified with God. Individual decisions and human activities are directed towards it as an ultimate goal. The analysis of Kant’s theory of moral behavior proves that the human moral actions are also aimed at the highest good. Kant understands them as nothing beyond anything else. Realization of the highest good is also the goal of morality flowing from the imperative of practical reason. However, this kind of good is not identified with God in the sense of realistic philosophy. It is a construct and the composition of two goals arising from human nature. One of them flows from a rational nature, the other from a sensual one. Only the a priori synthesis of these two approaches, that is virtue and happiness, constitutes the highest good. Its implementation, however, requires the adoption of human immortality and the existence of God, that is, postulates of practical reason.

4

Rosyjski renesans religijno-filozoficzny wobec filozofii Kanta

51%

Mazurek S.

Estetyka i Krytyka

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2012

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issue 4(26)

215-221

XX

The paper constitutes an attempt to answer briefly the question how Russian religious philosophy (so called Russian Religious Renaissance) was influenced by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The author tries to sum up the Russian religious dialogue with Kant, describing its different levels and discordances, if not contradictions, among them. Kant became the inspiration for Russian moral thought, but in the Russian philosophy of history he was treated as a bête noir representing all vices of rational western civilization; for the metaphysics of all-unity he was an important polemical context, while he was, in fact, rather insignificant for the religious existentialism.

5

Reinhard BRANDT, Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?

51%

Brandt, R., Szyrwińska A.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

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2011

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vol. 1

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issue 1

143-145

6

Przedmiotowy aspekt wiary według Immanuela Kanta

51%

Sieńkowski M.

Studia Ełckie

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2018

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vol. 20

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issue 4

429-439

EN

The object of faith in the sense of Kant is the postulates of practical reason that is, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. Together, they constitute the conditions for the possibility of the highest good. Objects of faith are natural, which means that they are constructed by human reason and not revealed by God. On the subject of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, Kant speaks only from the perspective of pure practical reason. A comparison of the conception of faith of pure practical reason with the conception of Christian faith makes the differences between these two perspectives of faith visible. These differences indicate the specificity of each of them. It is particularly important that rational faith acknowledges the existence of postulates of practical reason, and the supernatural faith concerns the content revealed by God. Faith according to Kant is a natural activity, whereas revealed faith is a supernatural act. Furthermore, rational faith is limited only to the order of practical reason, whereas Christian faith is the activity of reason and will at the same time.

7

Corporate social responsibility in the light of Kant’s categorical imperative

51%

Tapek K.

Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym

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2018

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vol. 21

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issue 7

85-96

EN

Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, especially his categorical imperative, is one of several ethical theories mainly used to morally legitimize actions, referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility. The aim of the current article is to evaluate if Kant’s philosophy can be used as the ethical foundation for Corporate Social Responsibility as well as to present its advantages and disadvantages in a theoretical and practical approach.

8

Důležitá kniha o Kantově etice : Kantův morální zákon Z německých originálů sestavil a přeložil J. Kuneš

45%

Sobotka M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 3

445-456

EN

The two expansive articles from which the book has been compiled show that the starting point and basic principle of Kant’s moral doctrine is moral law in a more universal formulation than what the categorical imperative presents. According to Cramer, moral law is not a prescriptive, but a descriptive proposition; according to Wolff, it is a postulate. With Cramer, Wolff shares a focus on pure will as the subject of an a priori moral metaphysics. Pure will is where the determining reason for an action is the universalization of its intent (“maxim”). Such a maxim becomes a practical law. The a priori moral theory is – we might add – Kant’s solution to the problem of giving reason a higher meaning than the mere alleviation of life. Up to this point, Kant’s theory of morality is a polemic with the Enlightenment conception of reason.

CS

Oba rozsáhlé články, z nichž je kniha sestavena, ukazují, že východiskem a základním principem Kantovy morální nauky je morální zákon v obecnější formulaci, než jakou představuje kategorický imperativ. Podle Cramera je morální zákon nikoli preskriptivní, nýbrž deskriptivní větou, podle Wolffa je postulátem. Wolff sdílí s Cramerem zaměření na čistou vůli jako předmět apriorní morální metafyziky. Čistá vůle je tam, kde určujícím důvodem jednání je univerzalizace jeho záměru („maximy“). Taková maxima se stává praktickým zákonem. Apriorní morální teorie je – dodáváme – Kantovým řešením problému, jak dodat rozumu vyšší smysl, než je pouhé ulehčení života. Potud je Kantova teorie morality polemikou s osvícenským pojetím rozumu.

DE

In beiden umfangreichen Artikeln, aus denen das Buch besteht, wird gezeigt, dass der Ausgangspunkt und das Grundprinzip von Kants Morallehre das moralische Gesetz in einer allgemeineren Formulierung ist, als sie der kategorische Imperativ vorlegt. Laut Cramer ist das moralische Gesetz kein vorschreibender, sondern ein beschreibender Satz; laut Wolff ist es ein Postulat. Wolff eint mit Cramer der Blick auf den reinen Willen als Gegenstand der apriorischen moralischen Metaphysik. Reiner Wille ist dort, wo der bestimmende Handlungsgrund die Universalisierung seiner Absicht („Maxime“) ist. Die Maxime wird zum praktischen Gesetz. Die apriorische Moraltheorie ist – so fügen wir hinzu – Kants Lösungsansatz für das Problem, wie der Vernunft ein höherer Sinn als der bloßen Vereinfachung des Lebens zu verleihen ist. Bis dahin ist Kants Moraltheorie eine Polemik mit der aufklärerischen Auffassung von Vernunft.

9

Od biologii zachowania się zwierząt do biologii ludzkiego poznania

45%

Łepko Z.

Seminare. Poszukiwania naukowe

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2015

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vol. 36

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issue 2

81-92

EN

The article discusses the effects of Konrad Lorenz’s work at the University of Königsberg. They constitute a response of biology to Immanuel Kant’s question regarding the possibility of making synthetic a priori judgments, which he presented in monographs “Kant’s Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie” and „Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung”. The two Lorenz’s publications present the main thesis of evolutionary epistemology which can be understood both as phylogenesis of human cognitive abilities and as a theory of epistemological process of approaching the truth of the reality. Evolutionary epistemology’s significance is lies in an attempt to show the way of overcoming the opposition between rationalism and empiricism and between realism and idealism. The attempt raises a controversy and questions concerning the methodological status such epistemology which bridges biology and philosophy.

10

Vznešeno v přednáškách Františka Xavera Němečka. O vztahu pražské předbřeznové univerzitní estetiky ke Kritice soudnosti

45%

Hlobil T.

Slovo a smysl - Word & Sense

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2021

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vol. 18

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issue 37

13-28

EN

This study reconstructs František Xaver Němeček’s concept of the sublime by examining notes on his lectures at the University of Prague taken by Peter Eduard Bolzano during the 1811–1812 academic year. After demonstrating how Němeček’s concept deviates from Kant’s in the Critique of Judgement, the study goes on to describe the relationship between the two.

11

Benedykta Bornsteina recepcja filozofii Immanuela Kanta

45%

Śleziński K.

Folia Philosophica

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2017

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vol. 38

EN

Benedykt Bornstein belongs to a group of philosophers, who demonstrated an opportunity for development of the scientific metaphysics with the use of the axiomatic method. His general theory of existence was developed under the influence of critical discussion on the major problems related to Kant’s theory of cognition. Arguments presented in this article are to be an attempt to recognise all the assumptions and conditions which our philosopher investigated. It is stressed that in the context of native philosophy Bornstein is neo-kantian as well as a representative of Polish analytical philosophy. However, his epistemological and ontological analyses have not met the proper reception by the environment of Lvov-Warsaw School. Although, he has remained Kazimierz Twardowski’s student in terms of character ofhis methodological research, strive for terminological precision and the use of formal language in his arguments.

PL

Benedykt Bornstein (1880-1948) należy do grona tych filozofów, którzy wykazali możliwość budowania metafizyki naukowej przy zastosowaniu metody aksjomatycznej. Jego ogólna teoria bytu została wypracowana pod wpływem krytycznej dyskusji nad głównymi problematami Kantowskiej teorii poznania. Argumenty przedstawione w niniejszym artykule mają stanowić próbę rozpoznania wybranych założeń i uwarunkowań, w których prowadził badania nasz filozof, ze szczególnym zwróceniem uwagi na to, iż w rodzimej filozofii Bornstein jest nie tylko neokantystą, lecz także przedstawicielem polskiej filozofii analitycznej.

12

Wiedza w ujęciu realizmu ewolucyjnego Bolesława Józefa Gaweckiego

45%

Fiut I. S.

Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne

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2017

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vol. 5

217-236

PL

Artykuł rekonstruuje poglądy polskiego filozofa, Bolesława Józefa Gaweckiego (1889–1984) związane z jego koncepcją realizmu ewolucyjnego, w którym kluczową rolę pełni ewolucyjna koncepcja wiedzy. Filozof uzasadnia swoje stanowisko rozwojem nauk przyrodniczych i społecznych w ramach tzw. „systematu metafizycznego”. Uważa, że wiedza jest formą adaptacji ewoluującego ludzkiego podmiot poznania do ewoluującego środowiska jego życia i działania. Poglądy te są rozwinięciem filozofii pozytywistycznej, szczególnie empiriokrytycyzmu rozwijanego w duch filozofii krytycznej Immanuela Kanta.

EN

The article reconstructs the views of a Polish philosopher Bolesław Józef Gawecki (1889–1984) related to his concept of evolutionary realism, which plays a key role in his evolutionary concept of knowledge. The philosopher justifies the development of the natural and social sciences in the framework of the so-called “metaphysical systemat.” He considers knowledge a form of adaptation of the evolving human subject of cognition to the evolving environment of its life and activity. These views are an explication of positivist philosophy, especially empiriocriticism in the spirit of critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

13

Koncepcja intelektu a rozumienie wiary. Zestawienie poglądów Tomasza z Akwinu, Immanuela Kanta i Augusta Comte’a

45%

Sieńkowski M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2019

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vol. 8

139-156

EN

Faith is a complex activity, which consists of the action of the intellect and the will. The understanding of these two authorities affects the understanding of faith. Therefore, it can be concluded that a specific conception of faith is associated with a specific conception of the intellect. The reason justifying this conclusion is the ability of the intellect to demonstrate the existence of God. The conception of the intellect showing that God exists creates the pos-sibility of receiving revelation, or the supernatural faith that is the recognition of what God has revealed. This type of intellect is characteristic of the realistic philosophy represented by Thomas Aquinas. Kantʼs conception of intellect is related to the very study of phenomena. In the order of theoretical knowledge, it is not possible to show that God exists because He is not a phenomenon. This possibility exists in a practical order, where God is the idea of reason. Therefore, the recognition of the existence of God is made thanks to the rational faith present only on the ground of morality. In turn, Comteʼs understanding of the intellect associated with the knowledge of facts and permanent relationships between them in the form of laws precludes the possibility of stating that God exists. The positivist understanding of the intel-lect is in no way connected with searching for the existence of God. This kind of intellect does not include Godʼs reach because it is limited to the examination of facts and laws. The only faith accepted by him is the natural faith that constitutes trust in the person who conveys the heritage of positivism.

14

Schellings Reflexion des Kantischen Begriffs Weisheit

45%

Jacobs W. G.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica

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2018

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issue 32

91-99

EN

Kant characterizes wisdom as knowledge of the will of the highest good and appropriateness of the will to this good. He understands the highest good as a union of morality and happiness. Since these are not to be conceived upon the same lawfulness (Gesetzlichkeit), Kant thinks of the mediation of the postulates of immortality and of the existence of God. To determine, in a sufficient form, the idea of the highest good practically, i.e., as the maxim of our rational behavior, is for Kant the wisdom doctrine; in scientific reflection it is philosophy. Schelling agrees with that; for him, too, philosophy is the will of wisdom. Wisdom looks at the ultimate goal, the one which should actually come about. To know this and to make it the determining reason of the will is wisdom for Schelling.

DE

Kant bestimmt Weisheit als Erkenntnis des und Angemessenheit des Willens zum höchsten Gut. Dieses versteht er als Vereinigung von Moralität und Glück. Da diese nicht aus derselben Gesetzlichkeit zu begreifen sind, denkt Kant zur Vermittlung die Postulate Unsterblichkeit und Gott. Die Idee des höchsten Guts praktisch, d. i. für die Maxime unseres vernünftigen Verhaltens, hinreichend zu bestimmen, ist für Kant die Weisheitslehre, wissenschaftlich reflektiert die Philosophie. Schelling schließt sich dem an; auch für ihn ist Philosophie Wollen der Weisheit. Diese sieht auf das letzte Ziel, auf das, was in Wahrheit sein soll. Dieses zu wissen und zum bestimmenden Grund des Willens zu machen ist für Schelling Weisheit.

15

Interpretacja kantowskiego pojęcia intuicji intelektualnej w myśli Xaviera Tilliette’a

45%

Smoleń A. M.

Logos i Ethos

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2022

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vol. 60

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issue 2

137-160

EN

The paper focuses on the Kantian understanding of the concept of intellectual intuition and its interpretation by the contemporary French philosopher Xavier Tilliette. The aim of this paper is to present and examine the legitimacy of the search for intuitive knowledge in the work of the Kant, and to present Xavier Tilliette’s understanding of this problem. At the beginning of the article, the context of the creation was described and the concept itself was defined, which in the light of Immanuel Kant’s work appears to be controversial. Furthermore, Tilliette’s interpretation is presented: as a German idealism scholar and an heir to the French philosophical tradition, he takes a critical look at the Kantian understanding of the concept, pointing to its ambiguity and outlining the problem of inconsistency and accuracy.

PL

Artykuł koncentruje się na kantowskim rozumieniu pojęcia intuicji intelektualnej i jego interpretacji przez współczesnego francuskiego filozofa Xaviera Tilliette’a. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie i zbadanie zasadności poszukiwania wiedzy intuicyjnej w twórczości królewieckiego myśliciela oraz ukazanie rozumienia tego pojęcia przez Tilliette’a. Na początku omówiono kontekst powstania i definicję samego pojęcia, która w świetle twórczości Immanuela Kanta wydaje się kontrowersyjna. Ponadto zaprezentowano interpretację Tilliette’a: jako znawca niemieckiego idealizmu i spadkobierca francuskiej tradycji filozoficznej krytycznie przygląda się kantowskiemu rozumieniu tego pojęcia, wskazując na jego wieloznaczność i nakreślając problem niekonsekwencji jego użycia.

16

Kolistość rozumienia a dwoistość poznania, czyli po co Heideggerowi Kant

45%

Hoły-Łuczaj M.

Estetyka i Krytyka

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2012

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issue 4(26)

135-150

XX

This article aims to show that formulated by Immanuel Kant distinction between spontaneity and receptivity of perception as two inseparable aspects of it is one of the most important themes in the Heidegger’s reception of Kantian philosophy, since it allows Heidegger to express the principle of circularity of understanding. Martin Heidegger, referring to Kant’s concept of perception, explains that man as there-being (Dasein) is able to see being (Sein) in beings (Seiende) only if one regards them as being (seiende), what one does according to his own being. The analysis of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) and the What is a Thing (1935) presented in the article investigates this particular topic.

17

Sapere aude. About the contribution of elderly people to cultural life

45%

Meynen D.

Journal of Education Culture and Society

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2016

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vol. 7

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issue 1

11-17

EN

Nicolaus Copernicus is shown as an ideal of senior students. He represents all the intellectual qualities that we connect with the spiritual movement of the Enlightenment. This movement has led to the unfolding of the sciences with all its good and bad consequences, to the appearance of natural rights and religious tolerance. The modern concepts of education, civil rights and the development of a critical general public are not conceivable without the ideas of the Enlightenment. But the idea of Enlightenment has shown more and more clearly two different faces during its development: One is showing the enlightenment of human beings concerning the environment they are part of and the other is showing the enlightenment about themselves. Both will be comment on. Without doubt we are in need of a new Enlightenment. It should teach us to trust our own spiritual capabilities, to look for a critical exchange with other minded people and other cultures, to create communities of free thinking people and to create protected public spaces for critical thinking

18

"Moci už nechtít." K Schopenhauerově kritice Kanta

45%

Sikora O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2022

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vol. 70

|

issue 1

23-41

EN

The aim of the paper is to provide an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kantian philosophy in its three pivotal areas: the notion of metaphysics, the basics of epistemology and ethical theory. The study shows the grounding of this criticism in the rehabilitation of the world in its immediate givenness. The next point of discussion is an analogy of Schopenhauer’s ethics in relation to Kant, its inner contradiction related to the concepts of compassion and resignation, as well as their inspiring character.

CS

Stať interpretuje hlavní body Schopenhauerovy kritiky Kantovy filosofie: koncept metafyziky, východiska teorie poznání a rozvrh etiky. Jejich společným jmenovatelem je rehabilitace bezprostředně daného světa, „v němž žijeme a jsme“. Spolu s tím se ukazuje jednak analogie Schopenhauerova projektu metafyziky vůle ke Kantově metafyzice autonomie, za druhé jeho rozporuplnost, projevující se zejména v motivech soucitu a rezignace, a nakonec inspirativní význam těchto motivů.

19

Against Psychological Atomism

45%

Slote M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2022

|

issue 1

249-263

EN

Total permissiveness can be captured by the phrase “anything goes.” Psychological atomism can be informally characterized by the idea that in the mind anything goes with anything. There is a strong tendency toward such thinking in Western philosophical thought—both in classical antiquity and during and since the Enlightenment. Perhaps the two most important philosophers of the Enlightenment, Hume and Kant, accepted more or less limited forms of atomism, and I shall explain in what follows in the main text and footnotes, why and how I think their atomism goes astray. Since much of Western philosophy since the Enlightenment to some extent bears its imprint, we shall also be seeing some recent examples of ill-conceived atomism. However, and despite the main themes of the present volume, I shall go well beyond the task of dealing with themes in Enlightenment thinking. In fact, I shall be relying on some unfamiliar aspects of Chinese thought to correct quite generally what I take to be erroneous atomistic thinking.

20

Spór o formalną naturę czasu. Stattler-Weishaupt-Kant

45%

Skowron A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2019

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vol. 47

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issue 3-4

97-111

EN

The article describes the critiques of Kant’s concept of time published by two eighteenth-century German philosophers: Benedict Stattler and Adam Weishaupt. In the two-volume work Anti-Kant, Stattler opposes the a priori nature of time, believing that the concept of time comes from experience. Weishaupt, on the other hand, in his Doubts about Kant's Concepts of Time and Space argues that time is not a form of intuition, but exists objectively – outside the subject.

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Kantowskie dedukcje pryncypiów prawa

Pedagogika moralna Immanuela Kanta jako wyraz wychowania do odpowiedzialności

Koncepcja dobra najwyższego w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu i Immanuela Kanta

Rosyjski renesans religijno-filozoficzny wobec filozofii Kanta

Reinhard BRANDT, Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?

Przedmiotowy aspekt wiary według Immanuela Kanta

Corporate social responsibility in the light of Kant’s categorical imperative

Důležitá kniha o Kantově etice : Kantův morální zákon Z německých originálů sestavil a přeložil J. Kuneš

Od biologii zachowania się zwierząt do biologii ludzkiego poznania