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EN
Republic of Bulgaria: Decision number 13 of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria of 27 July 2018
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Sexual sphere  : thin line between freedom and crime

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EN
The paper addresses the issues of sexual sphere, which is protected by criminal law. Given the special sensitivity of this area, the question is raised on the need to clearly define the limits of criminal behavior. A range of behavioral acts, related to sexual intercourse, which are recognized as socially acceptable and should not entail the application of criminal law repression measures, is defined. At the same time, an attempt to simulate the optimal system of criminal violations in sexual sphere is made. Modern trends in the area of criminal law protection of sexual sphere in the countries of continental Europe are researched. Specific attention is given to the Istanbul Convention as the international law document, which has a significant impact on the formation of criminal law policy in the mentioned area. Achievements and flaws of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, concerning liability for crimes of sexual freedom and sexual integrity of a person and related to the implementation of the Istanbul Convention provisions, are found.
PL
One can often hear Polish politicians saying there is no violence against women in Poland, since Polish men respect their women and women hold a strong position in Polish culture. The conviction rates for domestic abuse in Poland are indeed low, though the attrition rates are high. Every year, for approximately 75,000 registered cases of domestic violence, there are roughly 10,000 convictions. Most of the prison sentences are conditionally suspended. Protective orders or other punitive measures are seldom handed down. There is a visible reluctance on the part of the criminal justice system to punish and correct domestic abusers. One of the reasons is that domestic abuse provisions in the Polish Penal Code (Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code from 1997) criminalises a very different behaviour than is defined in the Counteracting Family Violence Act from 2005. Another, possibly even greater, reason is the culture of sentencing (both in general and of domestic abuse) within the Polish judiciary and the very strong conservatism of Polish decision-makers and society. The protection of family values by legislators and the judiciary is often enforced at the expense of the victims’ right to life and to a life free from violence. This article discusses the Polish system for preventing domestic violence, which was set up in 2005 and the construction and jurisprudence of crime described in Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code. In particular, the question of culpability raises many problems when it comes to prosecution. First, we must compare Article 207 with the definition of ‘family violence’ specified inthe Counteracting Family Violence Act and the Istanbul Convention. Then, I will explain how such an understanding and interpretation of Article 207 translates into the dynamics of sentencing and penal decision-making and the virtual ineffectiveness of both penal provisions (the lack of deterrent effect) and the system of counteracting family violence designed by lawmakers.   Powszechnie przyjmuje się, że art. 207 kodeksu karnego kryminalizujący znęcanie się nad najbliższymi osobami jest formą kryminalizacji przemocy domowej w polskim ustawodawstwie karnym. Jednak czy tak jest w istocie? Gdy Polska ratyfikowała konwencję stambulską (Konwencja Rady Europy ws. zwalczania przemocy domowej i przemocy wobec kobiet, CETS 210) w 2015 r. uznano, że nasze ustawodawstwo odnośnie do przemocy domowej spełnia wymogi konwencji, jeśli chodzi o zintegrowane, kompleksowe i skoordynowane ogólnokrajowe strategie obejmujące środki mające na celu zapobieganie wszelkim formom przemocy objętych zakresem konwencji. Pod względem ścigania aktów przemocy domowej uznano, że art. 207 jest wystarczającym instrumentem prawnokarnym, by zadośćuczynić wymogom konwencji. W artykule przedstawię polski system przeciwdziałania przemocy w rodzinie ustanowiony w ustawie z 2005 r. oraz zarysuję wzajemne relacje między systemem z ustawy o przeciwdziałaniu przemocy w rodzinie a regulacjami prawnokarnymi, a dokładnie to, czy zachowanie stypizowane w art. 207 k.k. pokrywa się z ustawową definicją przemocy w rodzinie. Te relacje bardzo wyraźnie obrazują liczby, które pokazują, że państwo polskie nie jest specjalnie responsywne na przemoc domową, a owa niska responsywność tylko po części wynika z niedoskonałych przepisów prawa, a w ogromnej części z pewnej inercji podmiotów stosujących prawo, archaicznej wykładni znamion omawianego przestępstwa i braku woli politycznej.
EN
One can often hear Polish politicians saying there is no violence against women in Poland, since Polish men respect their women and women hold a strong position in Polish culture. The conviction rates for domestic abuse in Poland are indeed low, though the attrition rates are high. Every year, for approximately 75,000 registered cases of domestic violence, there are roughly 10,000 convictions. Most of the prison sentences are conditionally suspended. Protective orders or other punitive measures are seldom handed down. There is a visible reluctance on the part of the criminal justice system to punish and correct domestic abusers. One of the reasons is that domestic abuse provisions in the Polish Penal Code (Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code from 1997) criminalises a very different behaviour than is defined in the Counteracting Family Violence Act from 2005. Another, possibly even greater, reason is the culture of sentencing (both in general and of domestic abuse) within the Polish judiciary and the very strong conservatism of Polish decision-makers and society. The protection of family values by legislators and the judiciary is often enforced at the expense of the victims’ right to life and to a life free from violence. This article discusses the Polish system for preventing domestic violence, which was set up in 2005 and the construction and jurisprudence of crime described in Article 207 of the Polish Penal Code. In particular, the question of culpability raises many problems when it comes to prosecution. First, we must compare Article 207 with the definition of ‘family violence’ specified inthe Counteracting Family Violence Act and the Istanbul Convention. Then, I will explain how such an understanding and interpretation of Article 207 translates into the dynamics of sentencing and penal decision-making and the virtual ineffectiveness of both penal provisions (the lack of deterrent effect) and the system of counteracting family violence designed by lawmakers.
EN
Condom removal without sexual partner’s knowledge and consent, popularly termed “stealthing”, differs from a typical rape in that the partner consents to the intercourse, although only with protection. Still, in this case, sexual consent does not encompass an intercourse without a condom, as it as an act of a different nature than the protected intercourse. This view is justified as follows: a condom constitutes a physical barrier against intimacy; the partners might be in a different mental state during the intercourse due to the increased risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases; condoms alter the physical sensation; and finally, condom usage is a material prerequisite of an intercourse to a significant proportion of the general public. Stealthing amounts to rape by deception pursuant to Art. 197(1) of the Polish Criminal Code, but only if, at the beginning of the sexual act, the perpetrator already intends to remove the condom later. If he spontaneously decides to remove the condom during the intercourse, then he is merely liable for breach of personal inviolability under Art. 217(1) of the Polish Criminal Code.
PL
Stealthing, czyli potajemne zdjęcie prezerwatywy przez mężczyznę bez zgody partnerki, różni się od typowego przestępstwa zgwałcenia, gdyż pokrzywdzona wyraża zgodę na współżycie, tyle że z zabezpieczeniem. Mimo to współżycie bez prezerwatywy nie jest objęte zakresem zgody na obcowanie płciowe z jej użyciem, gdyż stanowi inny rodzaj czynności seksualnej. Przemawiają za tym fizyczna bariera przed intymnością, inny stan psychiczny w trakcie współżycia wynikający z większego ryzyka ciąży i zarażenia chorobą weneryczną, różnica doznań fizycznych i waga przywiązywana do użycia prezerwatywy przez wiele osób. Stealthing wypełnia znamiona zgwałcenia z użyciem podstępu (art. 197 § 1 k.k.), ale pod warunkiem, że sprawca działał z podjętym z góry zamiarem. W przypadku decyzji podjętej w trakcie współżycia zdjęcie przezerwatywy będzie jedynie naruszeniem nietykalności cielesnej (art. 217 § 1 k.k.).
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest soft power Turcji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jej wymiaru instytucjonalnego. Rozważania koncentrują się na kontynencie europejskim, a ich celem jest ukazanie zasobów tureckiej miękkiej siły i działalności instytucji służących jej realizacji w kontekście europejskim. W pierwszej części tekstu wskazano założenia metodologiczne oraz zdefiniowano pojęcie soft power, następnie przybliżono ewolucję zainteresowania Republiki wykorzystaniem soft power, zasoby tureckiej miękkiej siły, ze wskazaniem, na ile mogą być one efektywne w odniesieniu do państw europejskich oraz scharakteryzowano działalność wybranych instytucji, stanowiących narzędzie owej miękkiej siły w Europie.
EN
The article addresses Turkey's soft power, with an emphasis on its institutional dimension. The discussion focuses on the European continent and aims to show the resources of Turkish soft power and institutions' activities for its implementation in the European context. The first part of the paper is devoted to the methodological assumptions and the notion of soft power. Then, the evolution of the Republic's interest in the use of soft power, the resources of Turkish soft power, indicating to what extent they can be effective to European countries, and the activities of selected institutions that are the tools of soft power in Europe are described.
EN
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence againstwomen and domestic violence (further: CETS210, Istanbul Convention, Anti-violenceConvention) became part of the Polish legal system on 1 August 2015. The IstanbulConvention incorporates a specific legal provision on rape, namely Art. 36 CETS210.It states that the Parties should take the necessary legislative or other measures toensure that the intentional conduct described in Art. 36 CETS210 is criminalised.Article 36.1a CETS210 states that rape takes place when engaging in non-consensualvaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person withany bodily part or object.Rape is respectively regulated in Art. 19 7 of the Polish Criminal Code 1997 (further,k.k.). However, the context of Art. 197 k.k. significantly differs from the wordingof Art. 36 CETS. Whereas Art. 36 CETS protects freedom, autonomy and sexualautonomy of the person, Art. 197 k.k. protects merely sexual freedom combined withprotecting the social customs. In order to establish the presence of rape, one needs toprove the presence of violence, psychological aggression and/or deception. Protectingsocial customs implies an additional burden because it allows evaluating the behaviourof the victim rather than the one of the perpetrator. The Istanbul Convention is orientedon eager elimination of violence against women and domestic violence. Therefore, itestablishes that the Parties should take the necessary measures to promote changesin the social and cultural patterns and behaviour of women and men with a view toeradicating prejudice, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based onthe idea of the inferiority of women or stereotyped roles for women and men (Art.12.1 CETS210). It is within this line that rape regulation should follow.The question that is tackled in this article is as follows: to what extent doesthe difference in the legal description of the act of “rape”, and the difference in protectedvalues by legal provision in Art. 36 CETS210 and in Art. 197 k.k. make an ontologicaland normative difference? Are they not possible to be reconciled? Or, is the meredifference in the words describing what “rape” not an obstacle to achieving the goalsexpected by Art. 36 CETS210?The problem is not an artificial one especially in view of the fact that the Polishlegislators did not amend the text of Art. 197 k.k. upon the ratification of CETS210. It would suggest that the Polish legislator was of the opinion that there is no definitedifference between Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. The text examines what happen eswhen an old term acquires new meaning.Is Art. 197 k.k. despite the lack of amendments filling the value required by Art.36 CETS210? Or, is the sameness expected by the Polish legislator false? By demonstratingvital differences in the protected values and the action required establish ingthe presence of the rape, I call for amendments to fulfill the state legal obligations toobserve the Istanbul Convention.The article deals with the ontological difference in the legal concept behind the textof Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. While Art. 197 k.k. is built on the concept of sexualfreedom, Art. 36 CETS is developed on the concept of sexual autonomy. I elaborateon that.The changes in the protected values incorporated in Art. 36 CETS210 lead toabandoning the concept of sexual freedom established in Art. 197 k.k. and adoptingthe concept of sexual autonomy. While the former concept of sexual freedom, asin Art. 197 k.k., uses violence, psychological aggression and/or deception to establishthe presence of rape, for sexual autonomy as defined in Art. 36 CETS210 the line iscrossed where the consent was not present. While sexual freedom limits freedom to torefusal, sexual autonomy demands the presence of consent. Not violence, aggressionor deception, but the lack of consents matters.The term and concept of sexual autonomy was first explored by the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights in the landmark European Court of Human Right (furtherECHR) judgment M.C. v. Bulgaria (No. 39272/98). The case is thoroughly analysedto further illuminate the difference between the two concepts behind the differentapproaches to defining “rape”.The article, however, starts with an in-depth introduction to the goal of the IstanbulConvention, which is to place the issue of rape in a proper perspective. Apart froma criminological analysis of the concept of rape, the article discusses the values protectedby, respectively, Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. and compares the similarities andactual differences. A similar examination is related to the description of “rape” in Art.36 CETS and Art. 197 k.k. Last but not least, the subject is evaluated, taking the Polishcriminal dogmas into consideration.The conclusion of the examination leaves no room for assuming that Art. 197 k.k.fulfills the requirement stipulated by Art. 36 CETS210. It is, therefore necessary, toamend Art. 197 k.k.
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