Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  JUDGEMENT
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
This paper aims to move the debate over the status of the conflict between emotion and judgement forward by refuting three implicit claims: that conflict between emotion and judgement is always to be avoided; that any conflict should always be resolved and, moreover, that it should be resolved immediately; that judgement should usually take priority in any resolution. Refutation of these three claims leads to recognition of the wide variety of different cases of conflict between emotion and judgement; examination of these cases is aided by consideration of the social context in which the conflicts occur.
EN
Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent's intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not to enter into conflict with our judgements.
EN
The article analyses the terms “value” and “explanation” as used in ethical studies, offers a critique of this usage and an alternative, pragmatically oriented semantics of ethical terms, based on the illocutionary act of judging. The term “value” is supposed to describe a super-predicate common to both ethical and aesthetical value judgments. However, the traditional over-reliance on the copulative predication and the idea that language describes reality lead to a one-sided view of ethical terms, and a construction of sentences like “The intentional torturing of little children is morally wrong”, whose pragmatic function, and consequently meaning, is very unclear. If, on the other hand, we take as our paradigm the act of judging (in the literal sense of a judge presiding over a case) we will be able to sketch a new, lighter ethics which, admittedly, falls short of the traditional demands placed on this discipline, but whose semantics is closer to the actual words used in expressing approval and disapproval.
EN
The article shows the positions that philosophers held to the relationship between a priori judgments and those judgments which are valid necessarily. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th and 19th century, who though often in different ways, opposed the concept of metaphysics and scholastic necessity (Hume, Kant, Mill, idealists), play the leading role. At the beginning of the 20th century analytic philosophy was born. Its first leaders inherited from their predecessors an antipathy to metaphysics, and so they had no desire to return again to the traditional concept of necessity (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer). Their logic and the new characterization of the a priori paved the way for the linguistic turn. Some of their followers in the second half of the 20th century realized that the concept needed to be returned to its original meaning (Kripke). This is not a mere repetition of the Aristotelian-scholastic conception, but a new addition that rethinks the relationship between the notions of a priori and necessity.
EN
The private life of well-known people is a topic often covered by the tabloids. Weddings, romances, and divorces of politicians, musicians, and other public figures are of the great interest of these newspapers. It is worthwhile noticing that not every such a relationship is treated in quite the same way. The aim of this article is to introduce the way in which the tabloids deal with the private lives of the famous. It takes as examples the divorce and following relationship of the former prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, and the marriage of actor Cezary Pazura to Edyta Zając. In each case there is a common factor; the man is considerably older than his partner, who is similar in age to his own children. The presentation of Marcinkiewicz and his fiancée in the media is compared with the image of their relationship created by him and his fiancée. The way this relationship was presented by the press is then compared with the media presentation of the marriage of Cezary Pazura. The rhetorical techniques used by the journalists and the effect they created are also shown. Each pair is described in a different way. Writing about the former prime minister, journalists either write negatively or judgmentally, trying to condemn his decision, retreating into irony, employing stereotypes, and describing situation with a mocking tone. The private life of the actor, although it acts as fodder for jokes and various comments, is not, in fact, the subject of such aggressive attack ― the media are rather more positively inclined towards him. This article attempts to clarify reasons of these differences.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.