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Historyzm i uprawomocnienie. Alasdaira MacIntyre’a historystyczna koncepcja uprawomocnienia

100%
Roszyk M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2007
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vol. 2
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issue 2
61-78
EN
In this paper I argue that MacIntyre’s historicism involves a conception concerning the nature of justification, formulated in opposition to ahistorical foundationalism. According to foundationalism justification is a matter of an appeal to certain universal and ahistorical principles, constituting the basis of all claims to knowledge. The merit of MacIntyre’s historicism is that it enables one to answer two difficulties, insuperable to foundationalism. First, it enables to explain why some basic statements are being treated as justified even though there exist, in the same area, contending sets of basic statements: justified basic statements are those which emerge from the history of a given tradition of enquiry as incontestable. Secondly, it allows to explain how we can rationally claim that a certain set of statements is rationally better than others even though they are mutually incommensurable: certain set of statements is better than others, and therefore justified, if and only if it can resolve difficulties insuperable to its rivals and explain both successes and defeats of its rivals.
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FILOZOFICKÝ POHĽAD NA ĽUDSKÉ PRÁVA

80%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 7
527 – 538
EN
The paper deals with a human rights issue in terms of the concept of law and with regard to difference between human, fundamental and civil rights. The author characterizes the formal features of the universality of human rights and the modalities of its justification. In the anthropological justification of the ideas of human rights, despite its limits, she sees a relevant way of justifying human rights without a direct reference to the metaphysical idea of human dignity.
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„SPRAVEDLNOST Z VÍRY“ V KNIZE DEUTERONOMIUM. PŘÍSPĚVEK K STAROZÁKONNÍM KOŘENŮM PAVLOVY NAUKY O OSPRAVEDLNĚNÍ

80%
Braulik G.
Studia theologica
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2011
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vol. 13
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issue 3
1-23
EN
Paul treats justice arising from the Law and from faith in Rom 10. In 10:6–8, he allows justice from faith to quote Deuteronomy as evidence from the Scriptures. First of all, it refers to Deut 8:17 or 9:4, two acute texts on the theology of justification in the Old Testament. These texts prepare an understanding of the three quotations which Paul extracts from Deut 30:12–14 explaining each in a Christological manner. If read in the context of the entire chapter 30, particularly in the perspective of the circumcision of Israel’s heart by God in 30:6, they document that justification through faith corresponds to the witness of the Old Testament.
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JÁNUSOVSKÁ TVÁR ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV: MEDZI ĽUDSKOU DÔSTOJNOSŤOU A PRÁVOM MAŤ PRÁVA. NA MARGO TROCH KNÍH O PROBLEMATIKE ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV

80%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 4
318 – 328
EN
On the background of three related books, the article deals with the concept of humans rights as well as the key conceptual controversies concerning the latter. Three main aspects of human rights are underlined: philosophical, juridical and political ones. The relevance of the concepts of a person, human dignity and an autonomous subject appears clearly in the author's considerations. Further, postulating the universality of human rights unveils the vice of the liberal conception of human rights. Considered is also the tension between the idea of human rights, their institutional background and warranties in international context, where they are often purpose built and power-politically instrumentalized.
5
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Why Aesthetic Value Judgements Cannot Be Justified

80%
Kulka T.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
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2009
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vol. 46
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issue 1
3-28
EN
The article is part of a longer argument, the gist of which stands in direct opposition to the claim implied by the article's title. The ambition of that larger whole is to offer a theory of art evaluation together with a theoretical model showing how aesthetic value judgements can be inter-subjectively tested and justified. Here the author therefore plays devil's advocate by citing, strengthening, and inventing arguments against the very possibility of justification or explanation of aesthetic judgements. The reason is his conviction that such arguments have not been fully met. The article is thus intended as a challenge: any theory of art evaluation which assumes, or tries to establish, that some works of art are better than others or that aesthetic judgements are not just statements expressing personal likes and dislikes, should show how such arguments can be demolished.
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FRUIT OR CANDY? EASE OF JUSTIFICATION AS A MODERATOR OF THE EFFECT OF ASSORTMENT SIZE ON CONSUMER CHOICE

80%
Radová K.
Studia Psychologica
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2016
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vol. 58
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issue 2
145 – 155
EN
Two studies demonstrate that, because choosing from larger variety is usually more difficult, people are likely to select options that are easier to justify; consequently, choosing from larger assortments often shifts the preference from self-indulgent to virtuous. These effects reverse, resulting in higher relative preference for hedonistic options, when situational factors provide easily accessible reasons to indulge. Subjects made both real-life (Experiment 1 – E1) and hypothetical choices (Experiment 2 – E2). Individuals’ decisions were modified by assortment size and character of options in E1while E2 also added accessible justifications (for choosing vices) created by subjects’ prior altruistic decisions. The results show that variety partially moderates the effect of accessible justifications on option choice. Significant differences were found according to gender and study degree. The fact that none of the subjects was conscious of experimental manipulation suggests that individuals might not always be aware of what truly drives their decisions.
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OPODSTATNENIE PROCESNEJ SPRAVODLIVOSTI

80%
Káčer M.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2021
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vol. 104
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issue 5
333 – 344
EN
The fact of political and moral disagreement confirms that considerations of justice are often influenced by subjective preferences. However, the procedural concept of justice is to some extent immune to this subjectivism. Instead of a speculative question of what is justification and unjustification, proceduralism addresses the constructive question of how to establish legislative and judicial processes to maximize the chances of substantively just outcomes. This approach not only elaborates solid justification of a democratic rule of law; it also suggests a series of practical recommendations on how to improve the functioning of this form of government.
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WHY DID YOU REALLY DO IT? HUMAN REASONING AND REASONS FOR ACTION

80%
Gascón J. Á.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 4
EN
During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.
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STEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

80%
Hemmati M. A. R.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 4
347-352
EN
Epistemic contextualism is a thesis about truth conditions of knowledge ascribed to sentences such as 'S knows that p' and 'S does not know that p'. According to contextualists it is the speaker's context - the one attributing knowledge - that is pertinent to the truth conditions and truth value of knowledge attributions. Thus, in one context a speaker might say 'S knows p' while in another context another he/she might say 'S does not know p' without any contradiction involved. Cohen's version of contextualism takes justification, rather than knowledge, to come in degrees. The author argues that Cohen's contextualist theory of justification suffers from several major problems.
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ANALÝZA POJMU KOROBORÁCIE V POPPEROVEJ TEÓRII VEDY

80%
Katina J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 2
124 – 135
EN
The paper offers an examination of the corroboration in Popper’s theory of science where it is used to describe a theory’s being successfully tested. This, however, does not mean that the theory in question has been also justified. Its corroboration means only that it was not falsified in empirical tests as yet. This view results from Popper’s rejecting the possibility of the justification of scientific theories (or the cognition as such) and from its consequence being a specific negative model of scientific rationality.
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DUMMETT O KRUHOVOSTI PRI ARGUMENTOVANÍ

70%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 6
469 – 480
EN
This paper deals with the distinction between two roles of a deductive argument in the communication: explanatory and suasive. The distinction was hinted out by Michael Dummett, in his Justification of deduction. The paper attempts to show various controversial consequences of the distinction. For example, there is a belief that, regarding the arguments used in the explanatory mode, obvious threat of circularity is not in fact “interesting”. Quite the opposite, it seems to be something natural. The aim of the paper is to critically reconsider the distinction between the roles of a deductive argument as well as its consequences.
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INTERNALISTICKÉ ZNAKY V KONCEPCII INTUITÍVNEHO POZNANIA PODĽA DUNSA SCOTA

70%
Chabada M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 9
721 – 732
EN
The paper deals with internalist features of the conception of intuitive cognition according to Duns Scotus. Its first part is concerned with strong and weak internalism, the latter being compatible with externalism. In its second part attention is paid to Duns Scotus’ theory of intuitive cognition including internal states of the soul, acts of recollection and contingent truth propositions. The goal of the third part is to show the manner in which the internalist features are present in Scotus’ theory of intuition. In conclusion the author suggests that Scotus’ theory of intuition resembles the access internalism in its weak form and as such doesn´t contradict externalism.
13

SPORY O CHARAKTER ZDÔVODNENIA V SÚČASNEJ ANALYTICKEJ EPISTEMOLÓGII

70%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 6
517 – 522
EN
The controversy between internalists and externalists concerning the approach to justification is among central issues in contemporary analytic epistemology. In its first part, the paper briefly surveys the main points of controversy. In its second part, the author defends the view that internalist and externalist approaches are components of two different epistemological projects. If the presented view is true, then the controversy between internalism and externalism is in fact meaningless, because it does not concern the same subject.
14
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On the Seeming Incompatibility Between Poetry and Philosophy

70%
Simecek K.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
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2013
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vol. 50
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issue 1
27-41
EN
Poetry as a mode of philosophizing can reasonably be considered a failure when making the following moves: from the experientially particular to general content (by means of abstract thought); from ordinary pre-reflective thinking (a contingent thought someone happened to have) to philosophically rigorous thought (which is rationally grounded); from domestic conceptions (connections of thought made by individual readers) to public conceptions (why these connections are relevant to our general, collective understanding). These problems arise when trying to meet the three main requirements of philosophical inquiry: generality, rationality, and justification. In order to show that the thinking involved in reading a poem is akin to the thinking involved in philosophical inquiry, poetry must make the right kind of moves in thought and meet these fundamental philosophical demands. In this article, the author offers a defence of the view that poetry can make a significant and valuable contribution to philosophical inquiry when faced with these three problems.
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DEFECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

70%
Frederick D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 4
443 – 459
EN
The author argues that the conception of reflective equilibrium that is generally accepted in contemporary philosophy is defective and should be replaced with a conception of fruitful reflective disequilibrium which prohibits ad hoc manoeuvres, encourages new approaches, and eschews all justification in favour of continuous improvement. He suggests how the conception of fruitful disequilibrium can be applied more effectively to moral enquiry, to encourage genuine progress in moral knowledge, if we make moral theory empirically testable by adopting a meta-ethical postulate which is independently plausible.
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PREČO EXTERIALISTICKÉ KRITÉRIÁ ZDÔVODNENIA PRINCIPIÁLNE ZLYHÁVAJÚ?

70%
Nuhlíček M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 1
37 – 49
EN
The article concerns two basic approaches to the problem of epistemic belief-justification: internalism and externalism. The article aims to showing that internalism as well as externalism, when confronted with the problem of philosophical scepticism, face various kinds of problems, which lead to implausibility of their respective accounts of justification. The author provides a special focus on the externalist approach which was invented as a direct response to the threat of scepticism. The central part of the article contains a brief analysis of main attributes of externalism, and subsequently its criticism which aims to showing that the criteria of justification proposed by externalists do not accomplish the basic function of distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs. The author argues that the discussed deficiencies of externalism result from its elementary rationale, which implies that they are incurable, and therefore the externalist criteria of justification inevitably fail.
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SKEPTICKÉ INTUÍCIE

70%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 9
733 – 745
EN
The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of sceptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on scepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „sceptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. The author considers several possible ways of identifying them and concludes that our intuitive answers to various sceptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, the author proposes a theory of the origin of sceptical intuitions. He argues that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, he shows that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that sceptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of sceptical arguments.
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GETTIEROV PROBLÉM A JEHO VÝZNAM PO PÄŤDESIATICH ROKOCH

70%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 8
679 – 690
EN
Gettier’s problem, which initiated and significantly co-defined the patterns of solving the epistemological problem of justification, is being discussed by the philosophers now for fifty years. In the first part of the paper the point at issue is explained, it’s philosophically most interesting moments being innovatively reconsidered. The second part offers an outline of the most influential answers to Gettier’s problem pointing to their pros and cons. In conclusion the importance of Gettier’s problem after fifty years is scrutinized.
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VYMEDZENIE KOZMOPOLITIZMU V SÚČASNEJ SOCIÁLNEJ A POLITICKEJ FILOZOFII

70%
Šabíková K.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 5
475-480
EN
The paper deals with the idea of cosmopolitanism in contemporary Anglo-American social and political philosophy. The aim of the paper is to introduce cosmopolitan theories as one of the components of the concept of global justice. Its basis is the clarification of the theoretical ground of cosmopolitanism. Attention is paid also to the problems of moral argumentation in the contemporary Anglo-American social and political philosophy.
20

HLUBOKÝ NESOUHLAS A NATURALIZOVANÁ ETIKA

70%
Chudárková P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 10
756 – 769
EN
Disagreement over moral issues is not uncommon and usually is not considered an obstacle in the search for the right solutions. Differences among individuals’ moral beliefs can be explained by the application of different non-moral facts, i.e., by different epistemology. Some ethicists believe that such a problem is not for ethics to solve. This paper aims to show that this conviction is mistaken, as moral and epistemological aspects present two sides of the same coin. Although on the moral level, one might be optimistic and hope for finding an agreement with peers based on relevant argumentation, on the epistemological level, such optimism is impossible. The main reason is deep disagreement, which occurs sooner or later when solving controversial moral dilemmas. The paper tries to explain how certain types of deep disagreement might be normatively solved within the framework of naturalized ethics.
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