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1

MODAL LOGIC BEFORE KRIPKE

100%
Cresswell M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 3
323 – 339
EN
100 years ago C.I. Lewis published A Survey of Symbolic Logic, which included an axiom system for a notion of implication which was ‘stricter’ than that found in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica. As far as I can tell little notice was taken of this until 1930 when Oskar Becker provided some additional axioms which led Lewis in Symbolic Logic (written with C.H. Langford, 1932) to revise the system he had produced in 1918, and list five systems which could be obtained using Becker’s suggested formulae. The present paper reviews the development of modal logic both before and after 1932, up to 1959 looking at, among other work, Becker’s 1930 article and Robert Feys’s articles in 1937 and 1950. I will then make some comments on the completeness results for S5 found in Bayart and Kripke in 1959; and I will finally look at how modal logic reached New Zealand in the early 1950s in the work of Arthur Prior.
2

'GRAMMAR RULE' IN LATER WITTGENSTEIN

88%
Cana T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2006
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vol. 13
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issue 3
349-360
EN
The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to the 'rule following activities'. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in an everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the center of a current philosophical controversy known as 'rule following considerations'. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. According to Kripke, the central argument of 'Philosophische Untersuchungen' - the private language argument - leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in the everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term 'following a rule'. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.
3

O SKEPTIKOVI KRIPKENSTEINOVI A JEHO VPLYVE NA DISKUSIU O NEURČITOSTI PRÁVA

75%
Berdisová L.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2012
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vol. 95
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issue 6
534 – 548
EN
The paper deals with a study about rules and private language in Wittgenstein written by Saul Kripke and its influence on argumentation leading to scepticism about possibility of rule-following. Kripkenstein’s sceptical paradox and its solution as to Kripke are formulated in the first part of the paper. Kripkenstein is confronted with Wittgenstein in the second part of the paper. Author’s critical remarks as to Kripkenstein may be summed up in the following way: First of all, the aim of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules was to describe the agreement, not disagreement, as to the use of language (rules). Hence Kripkenstein ignored the aim of remarks. Secondly, „to follow the rule blindly” in Wittgenstein, he points to the end of justification and to the reflexivity of the reaction, not to the arbitrariness of the reaction as Kripkenstein invokes. Thirdly, Kripkenstein fell pray to a craving for generality and he was searching for the fact of meaning as a mental state. However, Wittgenstein warned us of it. The second part involves also the critic of Kripke provided by G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Argumentation of legal scholars that is influenced by Kripke (or even the misunderstanding of Kripke) comprises the third part of the paper. J. Boyle and A. Marmor are shown as the typical examples. The first one, J. Boyle, even misinterprets Kripke as he claims that the Wittgensteinian view on language is relativistic. This part also includes the contra argumentation against sceptical reading of Wittgenstein. Hence, the paper confutes scepticism in modality of rule-following scepticism identified by Kripke.
4

JSOU NUTNÉ SOUDY A PRIORI?

75%
Sousedík P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2012
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vol. 19
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issue 2
180 – 200
EN
The article shows the positions that philosophers held to the relationship between a priori judgments and those judgments which are valid necessarily. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th and 19th century, who though often in different ways, opposed the concept of metaphysics and scholastic necessity (Hume, Kant, Mill, idealists), play the leading role. At the beginning of the 20th century analytic philosophy was born. Its first leaders inherited from their predecessors an antipathy to metaphysics, and so they had no desire to return again to the traditional concept of necessity (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer). Their logic and the new characterization of the a priori paved the way for the linguistic turn. Some of their followers in the second half of the 20th century realized that the concept needed to be returned to its original meaning (Kripke). This is not a mere repetition of the Aristotelian-scholastic conception, but a new addition that rethinks the relationship between the notions of a priori and necessity.
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