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Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 2
77-101
PL
Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie syntetycznego uporządkowania zawartej w późnych pismach Kierkegaarda krytyki oficjalnego chrześcijaństwa, czyli tego, co w świecie funkcjonuje pod nazwą „chrześcijaństwo”, a co w rzeczywistości zdaniem Duńczyka nim nie jest. Artykuł otwiera zarys niezbędnej dla zrozumienia tej krytyki pozytywnej koncepcji chrześcijaństwa u Kierkegaarda, w szczególności jego idei naśladowania Chrystusa. Dalej omówione są trzy główne zarzuty, jakie wysuwa Duńczyk: (1) prowadzenie pogańskiego życia pod nazwą chrześcijaństwa, (2) zastąpienie naśladowania Chrystusa rozmaitymi aktywnościami werbalnymi, m.in. uczynienie z chrześcijaństwa doktryny, oraz (3) zastąpienie naśladowania Chrystusa oddawaniem mu czci. Te trzy zarzuty uzupełnione są (4) Kierkegaardowską krytyką stanu duchownego. W końcowej części zostaje postawiona teza, że przedstawiona przez Kierkegaarda krytyka ma charakter uniwersalny, tzn. dotyczy wszystkich głównych wyznań chrześcijańskich.
EN
The paper aims at presenting a synthetic reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s late critique of what he called “official Christianity,” that is that which in the world counts as Christianity but which, according to Kierkegaard, has nothing to do with real Christianity. The paper begins with a short presentation of what according to Kierkegaard the essence of real Christianity is, with special emphasis on his idea of imitating Christ. Then his main reproaches follow: (1) leading a pagan life and calling it Christian, (2) rejection of imitation of Christ and putting some verbal activities instead, and (3) rejection of imitation of Christ and worshiping him instead. Those three points are supplemented by Kierkegaardian (4) critique of clergy. In the final section it is argued that Kierkegaard’s critique is universal in scope, i.e. it concerns all major Christian denominations.
EN
Depression is not a popular philosophical problem, despite the fact that it is one of the most frequent psychopathologies nowadays. The aim of the article is to consider the problem of depression as a philosophical one in terms of Cheshire Calhoun’s analytic work on depression and S.ren Kierkegaard’s philosophy of despair and anxiety. The author shows that the state of depression is connected to the sick man’s failure to be a living being due to the process that Calhoun calls “the defeat of an agency”. Calhoun claims that a man stops to be an active person because his will is disengaged due to his feeling of estrangement from his normative outlook of self-conception, his disbelief in the effectiveness of instrumental reasoning and lack of confidence in one’s security from misfortune and harm. The permanent state of this defeat leads to being disengaged from one’s very roots of being a motivated person. At this point living the being is opened to despair and anxiety, which are the means of creating a state of being as a “defeated agency”. The analysis of Kierkegaard’s work brings a new perspective of depression. A depressed person is one who is possessed by despair and anxiety. The analysis of different forms of despair and anxiety bring new light to the process of becoming depressed. It shows that the depressed person is in a permanent state of being “cut off” from life. This perspective leads to the conclusion that depression could be seen as Kierkegaard’s „Sickness Unto Death”.
EN
The main subject of this paper is the influence of Kierkegaard's philosophy on the concept of Adorno's dialectics. This article is focused on the analysis of Adorno's work published in 1966 titled Negative Dialec-tics. Adomo 's concept of dialectics, which is based on undefined experience, is broadly similar to the "negative" concept of existential philosophy of Kierkegaard. Although Adomo uses the Hegelian dialectics to expose the ways in which Kierkegaard’s thoughts fali into idealism. Finally, Adomo adopts Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegelian identity of thinking. Adomo, in Negative Dialectics refers to Kant, Hegel Heidegger, but seldom to Kierkegaard. A careful analysis shows that a number of themes and concepts of its predecessor have been assimilated to his philosophy.
EN
Thesis. The aim of the paper is to interpret Kierkegaard's concept of repetition as a way of creating and experiencing authentic existence in an environment that is set up to repeat this same, inauthentic content of consciousness. Concept. Repetition is associated with determinism and represents social stagnation. Repetition creates the conditions for an inauthentic existence. The article offers an interpretation of Kierkegaard's concept of repetition, which is the repetition of another and produces authentic existence. Results and conclusions. Repetition automatically produces of the same. The repetition of one's choice of oneself is a process of creating spirit and individuality, which is a fundamental principle of authentic existence. Creating an authentic personality is one of the ways to solve the current crisis in society, which is associated with an inauthentic experience of existence, abdication of responsibility and repetition of lies. Cognitive value. The postmodern society associated with the use of the media is not the cause of social disorientation. It is a means that an individual uses to repeat the same. The social environment and magic themselves are not negative, the negative is the inauthentic attitude of a person to them.
EN
Aim. Our main purpose is  to explain the connection between the work and the intimate existence of Søren Kierkegaard, and how freedom operates in both of them.  Concept. The article makes visible new writing ways that open from within Kierkegaard's work. Analytical reading of Kierkegaard's Journals and the comparative interpretation of the rest of Kierkegaard's work in terms of communicative styles and explains the genesis and location and type of communication of the Journals within the framework of the Kierkegaardian Corpus.   Results.  Kierkegaard’s philosophy is present and indicates the extremely personal place in which the author possessed its work.   Conclusions. We conclude the unavoidable importance of the Journals for the interpretation of Kierkegaard's work. The reason why the Journals are for Kierkegaard's „The Book of the Judge” lies in the direct, personal and intimate communication of its writing. Existence as free and self-conscious action constitutes the core of the article. On it rests the personal development of the individual and the incommensurable value of his life and work. 
EN
Aim. In his Kierkegaardian studies Jean Wahl states that there is a fundamental convergence between Plato and Søren Kierkegaard focused on the notions of identity and difference. Wahl suggests a sort of transposition of platonic metaphysics into the sphere of personal subjectivity. This paper intends to explain this passage from the same to the other from Plato to Kierkegaard. Concept. The article explains the passage from the same to the other from Plato to Kierkegaard. In both authors, the categories of being or not being, identity and difference, unity and multiplicity, becoming and rest explain the dynamic nature of the real. Results and conclusion. In both authors, the categories mensioned above explain the dynamic nature of the real. But while Plato applies these categories to the inteligibile word, Kierkegaard applies them to individual freedom, which supports reality as a whole. Cognitive value. Both searches lead to a single speculative answer and culminate in the same metaphysical categorisation, which applies analogously to everything real. Indeed, being and non-being, identity and difference, oneness and otherness, rest and becoming, explain the dialectic, intensive and relational dynamism of entia. At the same time, they essentially determine the power of human existence, infinitely possible and forever depending on the absolute.
EN
This paper presents Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition and attempts to draw an analogy between it and intaglio printmaking, in relation to three well-differentiated moments. The first moment is the location of repetition in the context of individual existence and its relationship with the matrix as a unique thing. The second, its demanding nature, its search for freedom, where the question of printing is understood as the progress and process of transfer. In this stage repetition becomes an instantaneous demand and vindication. Thirdly, the paper analyses the relationship between repetition as a life event and the print as the process of appropriating a story by means of a graphic act. Here the analogy is drawn between the concept of repetition by Kierkegaard and the concept of repetition in the two completely opposing realities that comprise the natural reality of intaglio printmaking; the matrix and the print.
PL
Autor artykułu przedstawia koncepcje powtórzenia Sørena Kierkegaarda, próbując nakreślić analogię między nią a grafiką intaglio (grafiką wklęsłodrukową) w odniesieniu do trzech różniących się od siebie momentów. Pierwszym z nich jest relacja powtórzenia wobec układu odniesienia, jakim jest indywidualna egzystencja i jej związek z matrycą jako bytem wyjątkowym. Po drugie, ponieważ w jego charakterze leży kategoryczny postulat wolności, który porusza kwestie drukowania jako procesu postępu i przekazu. Na tym etapie powtórzenie jest natychmiastowym żądaniem i realizacją. Na koniec analizowany jest związek między powtórzeniem jako wydarzeniem istnienia a drukiem jako procesem zawłaszczenia historii przez istnienie aktu graficznego. W tym kontekście autor zamierza ustanowić analogię między koncepcją powtórzenia Kierkegaarda a koncepcją powtórzenia dwóch całkowicie przeciwnych rzeczywistości, które składają się na naturalną rzeczywistość miedziorytu i systemów drukowania, takich jak matryca i druk.
8
67%
PL
Wielu współczesnych analitycznych filozofów religii próbowało odpowiedzieć na ateistyczny argument z ukrycia, który został przedstawiony przez Johna L. Schellenberga w 1993 r. W niniejszym artykule autor koncentruje się na zarzutach, jakie wysuwał Søren Kierkegaard względem koncepcji wiary, jaką można spotkać m.in. w tekstach Schellenberga. Myśl autora żyjącego 150 lat przed sformułowaniem argumentu z ukrycia pozwala nam wychwycić te jego założenia, które zazwyczaj są przemilczane. Można np. przypuszczać, że Kierkegaard podałby w wątpliwość twierdzenie Schellenberga, że najlepszym świadectwem umożliwiającym rozwój wzajemnej relacji między Bogiem a człowiekiem jest przeżycie akceptującej obecności Boga w ludzkiej świadomości. Kierkegaard argumentował w swych pracach, że wyłącznie ukrycie Boga gwarantuje wolną i bezinteresowną relację między Bogiem a ludźmi. Pokazuje to, stosując język metafor, w których porównuje wiarę do miłości małżeńskiej, życie człowieka do egzaminu oraz relację między Bogiem a człowiekiem do relacji między królem a sługą. Ten sposób rozumowania ujawnia wagę roli obrazów Boga w refleksji filozofów parających się argumentem z ukrycia.
EN
More than a few contemporary analytical philosophers of religion have tried to answer the atheistic argument from hiddenness presented in 1993 by John L. Schellenberg. In the paper the author focuses on the objections raised by Søren Kierkegaard with respect to the concept of faith that is displayed in Schellenberg’s philosophy of religion. The insight from the author living 150 years before the current debate allows us to notice the premises of the hiddenness argument that are commonly overlooked. One can, i.e. suppose that Kierkegaard would cast doubt on Schellenberg’s claim that the best evidence allowing the development of a mutual relationship between God and the human being is an experience of an accepting presence of God in human consciousness. Kierkegaard argues in his works that only the hiddenness of God guarantees a free and a selfless relationship between men and God. He shows this in a colourful language of metaphors in which he compares faith to conjugal love; a human life to an exam and a relationship between God and the human being to a relationship between a king and a female servant. This way of reasoning reveals the importance of the role of the images of God in the reflections of philosophers tackling the hiddenness argument.
EN
This article contains a sketch of the concept of practical faith and a presentation of two important functions that this concept can perform in practical philosophy. The idea of practical faith is a synthesis based on the interpretation of three concepts of faith: moral faith from Kant’s philosophy, religious faith, on which the so-called „third stage” of life in Kierkegaard’s thought is based, and philosophical faith presented in Jaspers’ philosophy. The author presents these functions of practical faith, due to which it transcends the sphere of descriptive knowledge. For practical philosophy these functions are of major importance because they are the source of subject acceptance of the first principles of this philosophy, i.e. the thesis of human freedom and the thesis of the existence of the sphere of value (different than the sphere of facts and objects). If a philosophy of value were logically based on practical faith, it would be free from the charge of the naturalistic error in axiology.
PL
Artykuł zawiera szkic koncepcji wiary praktycznej i prezentację dwóch ważnych funkcji, jakie koncepcja ta może pełnić w filozofii praktycznej. Idea wiary praktycznej jest syntezą opartą na interpretacji trzech koncepcji wiary: wiary moralnej z filozofii Kanta, wiary religijnej, na której oparte jest tzw. „trzecie stadium” życia w myśli Kierkegaarda oraz wiary filozoficznej przedstawionej w filozofii Jaspersa. Autor eksponuje te funkcje wiary praktycznej, dzięki którym transcenduje ona sferę wiedzy deskryptywnej. Dla filozofii praktycznej funkcje te mają ważne znaczenie, gdyż są podmiotowym źródłem akceptacji pierwszych zasad tej filozofii, czyli twierdzenia o wolności człowieka oraz twierdzenia o istnieniu sfery wartości (innej niż sfera faktów i bytów). Jeśli filozofia wartości byłaby logicznie oparta na wierze praktycznej, to byłaby wolna od zarzutu błędu naturalistycznego w aksjologii.
EN
Hoppe identifies his era as a period of profound spiritual crisis that stems from Comte’s positivism, materialism and technical worldview. Man thus understands himself purely as an object, fully renouncing any spiritual dimension. Hoppe argues that science offers nothing but an illusion of knowledge, since true knowledge is of metaphysical nature – to know truly means first of all to know one’s spiritual essence. Hoppe’s philosophical ideas fuse with his religious concepts and, towards the end of his philosophical endeavours, he turns more and more towards Søren Kierkegaard. Hoppe attempts to overcome the unbridgeable abyss between religion and science, object and subject, the knowable and unknowable using Kierkegaard’s leap of faith. Hoppe’s thematisation of man’s abilities and fate results in a turn to Christianity, much inspired by Kierkegaard, with a specific formulation of the utmost goal – godmanhood.
11
60%
Society Register
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2019
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vol. 3
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issue 2
109-121
EN
Two hundred years have passed since the question of subjectivity (re-interpreted through Kierkegaard’s existentialism) became central in modern philosophy. Over these two centuries, multiple theories addressed and questioned the borders between authentic subjectivity and an internalized panopticon of the hegemonic views that dominate the subject. Nevertheless, they still have to be definitively defined. As we may try to point Fake News (FN) is an opponent to subjectivity, and yet it comes from the subject. FN is the intentional spreading through new technologies of false information on a global level by subjects that use social media, a process influencing not only the sense of socio-political reality but also the concept of identity. Identities (personal or collective) are in general the combination of the socially determined understanding of ‘who I am’ and the socially and psychologically influenced ‘mental model’ of ‘what the world - and the self within it - should be’, all expressed and produced under the fundamental influence of our idiosyncratic characteristics. One of the fields that all these factors meet and interact is the new mediated environment where almost everyone can participate and contribute. According to the Sociology of Communication as founded by Giddens, Habermas and Luckmann (Leydesdorff 2000) this makes the public part of our identity the dominant one, creating a ritual in which our narcissistic elements dominate our private ones. The Self, addressing itself into the public like an echo and back to the Self, becomes ritualized. In our paper, we explore the interrelation of this phenomenon with the creation and distribution of Fake News, from the vantage point of Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy.
EN
Szukając samego siebie. Granica między etycznym a religijnym stadium. Niniejszy przyczynek jest poświęcony analizie Kierkegaardowskich kategorii skoku i momentu, które w pewien sposób wyrażają ludzką egzystencji. Ludzkie istnienie, wyjątkowe i niepowtarzalne, jest samo w sobie nieuchwytne i trudne do wyrażenia w języku. Egzystencjalistyczna filozofia Kierkegaarda oferuje metodę komunikacji niebezpośredniej. Kierkegaard sugeruje, że o ile chcemy uchwycić fenomen ludzkiej egzystencji, musimy zadowolić się jedynie pośrednim i partykularnym rozumieniem. Żadna konkretna jednostka nie jest w stanie kiedykolwiek uchwycić własnej egzystencji całościowo. Istnieje jednakże miejsce, otwierające możliwość samorozumienia i samoposiadania człowieka. Tym miejscem jest granica, czy też krawędź etycznego i religijnego stadium egzystencji. Stąd celem artykułu jest poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na pytanie: „Co dzieje się na granicy pomiędzy tym, co etyczne, a tym, co religijne?”
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The Unknown Socrates

48%
EN
The first part of the present paper argues against any attempts to find a set of fixed points of a doctrine that could be ascribed to Socrates. The main thesis of the article has it that Socrates was part of a cultural movement that was marked by a tendency to rather raise questions than merely provide answers and boast about having a number of doctrines or doxai of their own. The second part of the paper concentrates on a number of memorable innovations that eventually constituted Greek culture, e.g., the idea that it is possible and desirable to be in full control of oneself and, consequently, to shoulder responsibility for one’s deeds rather than merely avoid and deny it. Thus, Socrates and ancient Socratic literature are shown here to be a probable source of numerous ideas that the western civilization has built on for centuries, these being, for instance, the idea of the limits of our powers. Hence, the conclusion of the article is that it would be a serious mistake to exclude Socrates from this major cultural development, even though the thinker did produce neither a theory nor a body of theories.
PL
Mentre la prima rivista polacca di filosofia antica inizia le pubblicazioni, è per me unonore e una sfida riprendere, sulle sue pagine, il tema Socrate e fare ancora un tentativoper capire chi realmente egli fu. Quaranta anni di studi sull’argomento mi hanno, invero,fornito molteplici stimoli e strumenti per indagare e cercar di capire qualcosa intornoa un personaggio comunemente ritenuto sfuggente come pochi. In questo contributo,partendo dalle considerazioni proposte in un altro articolo recente1, provo a individuaredue facce del personaggio: da un lato il suo dialogare e il senso che questo suo dialogarepoté avere nell’orizzonte delle invenzioni letterarie del V secolo, dall’altro le potentiinnovazioni di cui Socrate sembra essere stato portatore nel campo dello stile di vita,dell’ottimismo etico e dell’impegno. Il titolo del mio scritto è provocatorio, ma quantomenoaderisce alla convinzione che la sua figura abbia bisogno di essere profondamenteripensata.
IT
The first part of the present paper argues against any attempts to find a set of fixed points of a doctrine that could be ascribed to Socrates. The main thesis of the article has it that Socrates was part of a cultural movement that was marked by a tendency to rather raise questions than merely provide answers and boast about having a number of doctrines or doxai of their own. The second part of the paper concentrates on a number of memorable innovations that eventually constituted Greek culture, e.g., the idea that it is possible and desirable to be in full control of oneself and, consequently, to shoulder responsibility for one’s deeds rather than merely avoid and deny it. Thus, Socrates and ancient Socratic literature are shown here to be a probable source of numerous ideas that the western civilization has built on for centuries, these being, for instance, the idea of the limits of our powers. Hence, the conclusion of the article is that it would be a serious mistake to exclude Socrates from this major cultural development, even though the thinker did produce neither a theory nor a body of theories.
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2013
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vol. 12
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issue 23
37-53
EN
Making good use of the experience of solitude and revealing struggle which great creators faced within the relations with the world and with themselves play an important role in pedagogical practice. The following paper shows this work on one’s own solitude and lack of understanding on the example of the selected fragments of a biography of an eminent Polish scholar Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński. The tool used in this research is an appropriately expressed anthropology of solitude based on the analysis of the selected fragments of the Book of Genesis, J. Kaczmarski’s poem “Pusty raj” (“Empty Paradise”) and the experience of solitude by S. Kierkegaard. Primary and secondary solitude is distinguished and their place in the process of education is shown.
PL
Duże znaczenie w praktyce pedagogicznej ma umiejętne wykorzystanie doświadczenia samotności i pokazanie zmagań, jakie w obszarze relacji ze światem i z samym sobą mieli wielcy twórcy. W artykule tej pokazuję tę pracę nad własną samotnością i niezrozumieniem przez innych na przykładzie wybranych fragmentów biografii wielkiego polskiego uczonego Józefa Marii Hoene-Wrońskiego. Narzędziem stosowanym w tych badaniach jest odpowiednio ujęta antropologia samotności na podstawie analizy wybranych fragmentów z Księgi Rodzaju, wiersza J. Kaczmarskiego Pusty raj oraz doświadczenia samotności S. Kierkegaarda. Wyszczególniam pierwotną i wtórną samotność i pokazuję ich miejsce w procesie wychowania.
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