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Próba ujęcia języka metafizyki w świetle pracy Język i świat realny Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca

100%
Krzos B. M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 2
45-62
PL
Istnieje potrzeba, żeby język był odpowiednim narzędziem do przekazywania całego bogac­twa naszych myśli. Do wyższych aktywności rozumu ludzkiego zalicza się myślenie abstrak­cyjne, które jest użyteczne w dziedzinie metafizyki. Rozważania dotyczące języka jako adek­watnego narzędzia komunikacji metafizyki – doniosłej wiedzy o świecie realnym – stały się przedmiotem pracy Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca Język i świat realny. Po analizie wspomnianej pracy Krąpca można dojść do wniosku, że język naturalny wymaga określonych uściśleń, by być narzędziem komunikacji odpowiadającym metafizyce. W ramach języka naturalnego należałoby wyodrębnić pewien uściślony język. Wyodrębnienie go wymagałoby opisu jego słownika i okreś­lenia reguł poprawnego składania wyrażeń. W świetle przeprowadzonych analiz okazało się, że słownikiem omawianego tu języka byłby zbiór nazw. Reguły składni wspomnianego języka po­winny z kolei być oparte na pewnej relacji określonej na zbiorze nazw. Relacją, która nadawałaby się do sformułowania wspomnianych reguł, jest znana językoznawcom relacja hiponimii.
EN
There is a need of the language to be a proper tool for transferring of all the riches of our thoughts. We consider the abstract thinking as one of the higher activities of human mind. That kind of thinking has its use in the domain of metaphysics. Considerations concerning language as proper for communication in metaphysics became the subject of the work Language and the Real World by Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. After analysing Krąpiec’s work, one can conclude that natural language requires certain clarifications to be a communication tool corresponding with metaphysics. Well, it would be needed to extract a refined language in the context of the natural language. In order to extract it one would require a description of a dictionary and a definition of the rules for constructing well-formed formulae. After the analyses it turned out that the dictio­nary of the language in question would be a set of names. In turn syntax rules of that language should be based on a relation defined in the set of names. A relation that would be suitable to formulate these rules is known to linguists as hyponymy.
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Specyfika relacji transcendentalnych w ujęciu Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca

85%
Stoll P.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2020
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vol. 9
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issue 1
143-165
EN
The paper is aimed at systematizing the thoughts of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec on the subject of relations. The author reconstructs Krąpiec’s justification for the reality of relations, the distinction of necessary relations, and the importance of relations in metaphysical cognition. The analyses are conducted on the basis of the following problems: a) the existence of beings, and especially the subontic relationship between essence and existence that runs through all reality; b) the way in which beings exist and are cognized, where transcendental relations indicate the analogous character of these beings; c) the cognition of the Absolute, which is only possible through the discovery of transcendental relations in contingent beings.
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Filozoficzne korzenie jednostki i osoby. Personalizm i indywidualizm wobec kantyzmu

80%
Ambrożewicz Z.
Diametros
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2015
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issue Diametros 46
1-29
EN
In the paper I argue that Kant’s philosophy underlies both contemporary individualism and personalism. The Kantian categorical imperative may be, in my opinion, interpreted in an anti-egotistical way and in an entirely individualistic one. The first kind of interpretation not only made a contribution to the emergence of numerous and manifold kinds of personalism, but it also inspired many critics of individualism. The second kind of interpretation, together with the Kantian analyses of human self, became essential to the conceptualization of modern individualism. I argue that Kantian tradition in many respects appears to be close to Thomism as far as the conception of person and human individual is concerned. As the dispute between American Thomists, discussed in the paper, reveals, Thomistic personalists found, in Kant’s philosophy (broadly conceived) issues which filled some gaps in the scholastic heritage, especially in anthropology, ethics, and social problems.
PL
W artykule staram się dowieść, że kantyzm, który – jak uważam – stoi u podstaw współczesnego indywidualizmu, stał się też jednym z najważniejszych źródeł (bezpośrednim i pośrednim) personalizmu. Kantowski imperatyw kategoryczny może być, jak pokazuję, interpretowany zarówno w duchu mocno antyegotystycznym, jak też całkowicie indywidualistycznie. Pierwszy rodzaj interpretacji nie tylko przyczynił się do wyłonienia się licznych i zróżnicowanych personalizmów, ale zainspirował również wielu krytyków indywidualizmu. Drugi rodzaj interpretacji wraz z kantowskimi analizami podmiotu stał się istotnym czynnikiem sprzyjającym konceptualizacji nowoczesnego indywidualizmu. Dowodzę, że jeśli chodzi o ujęcie osoby i jednostki ludzkiej, tradycja kantowska okazuje się pod wieloma względami bliska tomizmowi. Jak pokazuje referowany przeze mnie spór amerykańskich tomistów, tomistyczni personaliści odnaleźli w szeroko rozumianym kantyzmie problematykę, która uzupełniła pewne luki w scholastycznej spuściźnie, zwłaszcza w kwestiach antropologicznych, etycznych i społecznych.
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Spór o koncepcję życia. Polemika Mieczysława A. Krąpca z Kazimierzem Kłósakiem

80%
Sakowicz K. K.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2019
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vol. 8
257-274
EN
This paper presents a philosophical dispute on the nature and the origin of life. At the beginning author analyzes the central philosopical concepts of life which appeared in the history of philosophy and examines a main manifestations of life in its action. This inquiry leads to recogniton of a living substance as different from matter. Than author recalls the discussion between K. Kłósak and M. A. Krąpiec on the philosophical explanation of life and its genesis. Kłósak postulated a concept in which God have established such laws of nature, so the matter could yield life on its own. Krąpiec rejected Kłósak's concept of an indirect creation of life and argued that the only rational explanation of life is the special, direct act of God's creation. Krąpiec, relying on St. Thomas Aquinas, argued that God cannot use matter (or any other intermediary tools) in creation of a substance. Author concludes that reductionism in explanation of life bears ethical consequences, because cannot set any barriers to the artificial modifications of living organism.
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Metafizyczny sens osoby i jej relacja do podmiotu. Rekonstrukcja ujęcia Mieczysława A. Krąpca i Karola Wojtyły

80%
Zięba W.
Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne
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2021
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vol. 40
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issue 2
139-159
EN
The origins of the category of the person go back to Christian religion and theology, and only from here does its anthropological meaning and cultural popularity flow. The concept of a person in Christianity served to solve the problem of the Incarnation and the Dogma of the Holy Trinity. The concept of a person is present in many senses today. In the article I analyze its metaphysical, substantial dimension based on the decisions of Krąpiec and Wojtyła. I argue that in both cases the category of the person is close to the scope of the category of the subject. The attributes of a person, according to Krąpiec, are ontic autonomy and subjective on-being completeness, which is the source of inability. In this approach, a person is the highest degree of being autonomous, the highest form of being. The subject, on the other hand, follows from the metaphysical assumption that any act is being dependent on existence. Wojtyła’s starting point will be a human act, that presupposes the existence of a person. Through deeds, man reveals himself as a person with his structure of self-possession and self-domination. The act reveals the agency of a specific man, his subjectivity, i.e. self-aware cause, i.e. self-determination and self-determination.
PL
Źródła kategorii osoby sięgają religii i teologii chrześcijańskiej i zasadniczo stąd wypływa jej sens antropologiczny i współczesna kulturowa ranga. Koncepcja osoby w chrześcijaństwie służyła rozwiązaniu problemu wcielenia oraz dogmatu Trójcy Świętej. Pojęcie osoby współcześnie występuje w rozlicznych sensach. W artykule analizuję jej metafizyczny, substancjalny wymiar w oparciu o rozstrzygnięcia Krąpca i Wojtyły. Twierdzę, że w obydwu przypadkach kategoria osoby jest bliskoznaczna kategorii podmiotu. Atrybuty osoby, według Krąpca, to bytowa autonomia i podmiotowa zupełność bytowa, z czego wypływa nieudzielalność. Osoba w tym ujęciu to najwyższy stopień samoistności bytowej, szczytowa forma bytu. Podmiot zaś jest konsekwencją metafizycznego założenia, że wszelki akt jest bytowo niesamodzielny. U Wojtyły punktem wyjścia będzie czyn ludzki, który presuponuje istnienie osób. Poprzez czyn człowiek objawia się jako osoba wraz z jej strukturą samo-posiadania oraz samo-panowania. Czyn ujawnia sprawczość pewnego konkretnego człowieka, jego podmiotowość, czyli samoświadomą przyczynę, tj. samostanowienie i autodeterminację.
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On the Relation Between Human and Technology

71%
Lizut R. A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 1
95-108
EN
According to the author, we live in the world which requires us to better understand the relationship between humans and technology, and especially technological artifacts. The author claims that this relationship, at least partially, can be explained in the framework of philosophy cultivated by the Lublin School of Philosophy represented by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and his concepts of two intentionalites. However, in order to do justice to the human–artifact relationship two concepts of intentionality as elaborated by Krąpiec seem to be insufficient. The author then proposes to supplement Krąpiec’s concepts of the first intentionality present in the maker’s design and the second intentionality present in the artifact as an embodiment of that design with a concept of the third intentionality which is the inventive contribution of a user.
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The Lublin Philosophical School: Achievements, Identity and Prospects

71%
Krąpiec M. A., Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
423-441
EN
The article is concentrated on the Lublin Philosophical School which came into being in the institutional framework of the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; it describes its achievements, which took place at different stages of the School’s development, as well as the School’s new initiatives and challenges. The development of the School was connected with the involvement of new people and successive generations of new students who joined in the cultivation of realistic philosophy. One can regard the years 1950–1966 as the first stage of the School’s development, in which the School’s program was formulated. The following stages are the years 1967–1980, and 1981–2004, and the years that follow, in which new generations of students who take up inquiries in the spirit of the School’s program arrive. The article also explains the reasons why today the Lublin Philosophical School cannot be identified with the Department of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, but rather with a special style of cultivating philosophy.
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The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics

71%
Krąpiec M. A., Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
405-422
EN
The article is focused on the Lublin Philosophical School; it explains its name, presents its founders, reveals the causes of its rise, and introduce the specific character of the School’s philosophy. It starts with stating the fact that in the proper sense, the term “Lublin Philosophical School” describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by a group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity (achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism.
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Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec in The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy

57%
Chudy W.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2018
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vol. 7
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issue 4
549-566
EN
This article introduces the life and work of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (1921-2008)—a Polish philosopher, theologian, humanist, co-founder of the Lublin Philosophical School, rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, initiator and chairman of the scientific committee of The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Krąpiec created a coherent philosophical system that, by a metaphysical explanation, encompassed the whole of reality that is accessible to human cognition. According to the author, Krąpiec’s philosophy is the greatest achievement in classical philosophy in Poland and in the world in the twentieth century, both with respect to its comprehensive scope and its meritorious importance; for the vision of the world that it reveals shows not only the human person’s unity and harmony with the reality that surrounds him, but also his openness to a connection with the transcendent Absolute.
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Thomistic Personalism as the Key to Understanding Human Altruism

57%
Ezewoko I. C.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 3
547-567
EN
In this paper, the author attempts to explain human altruism within the framework of Thomistic personalism. He claims that (1) Thomistic personalism provides the necessary tools for understanding the human being as person in relation to other persons, and (2) it makes it possible to see the differences between personal and non-personal forms of human dynamism, which, when disregarded, easily lead to confusion. He concludes that, as an extention of love, altruism belongs to the personal, and, consequently, there is an intrinsic connection between personalism and altruism.
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