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EN
This paper deals with the problem of the impact of Kripke’s skeptical paradox on the philosophy of mathematics. By perceiving mathematics as a huge rule-following discipline, one could argue that the Kripkean nonfactualist thesis should be adopted within the philosophy of mathematics en bloc to imply a refutation of objectivity and an enforcement of a particular view on the nature of mathematics. In this paper I will discuss this claim. According to Kripke’s skeptical solution we should reject the notion of fact and adopt the use theory of meaning that could be stated as follows: ’One understands the concepts embodied in a language to the extent that one knows how to use the language correctly.’ [Shapiro 1991, 211] [Kripke 1982]. Focusing on mathematical discourse, we should ask: what are the implications of the use theory of meaning for the philosophy of mathematics? Furthermore, is the answer to the skeptical paradox consistent with selected views in philosophy of mathematics? The supposed answer to the first question is that it demands the view that mathematics should be perceived as a strictly pragmatic discipline and the rules of mathematical discourse are mere conventions. But this is too simplistic a view and the matter at hand is far more complicated.
PL
The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one challenged.
EN
The article discusses the problem of proper names in the approach of S. A. Kripke, which, in terms of analytical philosophy, constitutes an interesting, though not easy, issue. Kripke not only redefines the proper names by identifying them with rigid designators, but also argues against descriptorisms and becomes the creator of a new reference theory of proper names. His concept places great emphasis on the semantic aspect of proper names, which is a breakthrough in analytical research concerning with the semantic aspect of proper names.
PL
Artykuł porusza problematykę nazw własnych w ujęciu S.A. Kripkego, które na gruncie filozofii analitycznej stanowią interesujące, choć niełatwe zagadnienie. Kripke nie tylko redefiniuje nazwy własne, utożsamiając je z desygnatorami sztywnymi, lecz podaje także argumenty przeciw deskrypcjonizmowi oraz stwarza nową teorię referencji nazw własnych. W swojej koncepcji kładzie ogromny nacisk na semantyczny aspekt nazw własnych, co stanowi przełom w badaniach analitycznych podejmujących ich wymiar znaczeniowy.
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EN
The author concentrates on the relation between person and body in phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Both of these traditions are, in their own way, critical towards the cartesian dualism. While phenomenology tries to overcome this dualism through the description of the experience of our corporeality from the first person point of view, analytic philosophy examines the metaphysical problem of the relation person and body from the third person perspective a usually proposes a materialist answer in the sense of an identity of person and body. The central part of the paper is a detailed analysis of Kripke’s challenge of contemporary materialism. The author argues that it is possible to accept Kripke’s modal and temporal arguments in favour of the dualism of person and body without being forced to accept the idea of dualism itself. It is the metaphysics of constitution that represents an alternative: the person is constituted by her body, but she is not identical with it. Surprisingly, it is the idea of the living body that is rediscovered in this solution – the idea which, in a sense, is a part of the phenomenological heritage, even though it is devoid of phenomenological anti-scientism and idealism.
EN
Simulation relations have been discovered in many areas: Computer Science, philosophical and modal logic, and set theory. However, the simulation condition is strictly a first-order logic statement. We extend modal logic with modalities and axioms, the latter’s modeling conditions are the simulation conditions. The modalities are normal, i.e., commute with either conjunctions or disjunctions and preserve either Truth or Falsity (respectively). The simulations are considered arrows in a category where the objects are descriptive, general frames. One can augment the simulation modalities by axioms for requiring the underlying modeling simulations to be bisimulations or to be p-morphisms. The modal systems presented are multi-sorted and both sound and complete with respect to their algebraic and Kripke semantics.
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2015
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vol. 28
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issue 1
94-115
EN
The aim of this paper is to analyse prescriptive interpretations of the thesis that meaning is normative, which was introduced by Saul Kripke and later developed by Paul Boghossian. We are going to show that meaning prescriptivism is counter-intuitive and has implausible consequences. Attempts to save prescriptive interpretations by appealing to prima facie obligations or „normativity of judgment” are unsuccessful.
EN
The main goal of this article is to outline Barry Stroud’s conception of philosophy. Philosophy, in his opinion, aims at understanding of various kinds of phenomena and our attitude towards them, but this understanding doesn’t manifest in a set of philosophical theses. A philosopher should become aware of a peculiar character of understanding which he wants to reach, and in consequence, admit that a metaphilosophical reflection is integral part of philosophical investigations. An understanding of the nature of philosophical investigations is not possible without pointing to their sources. Thus the task of a philosopher is to diagnose philosophical problems by showing from which earlier questions and theories they have arisen. On the other hand, philosophical reflection must be always confronted with the things which are accepted by all of us, otherwise understanding caused by that reflection wouldn’t refer to phenomena belonging to our world. Stroud thinks that a description of one’s conception of philosophy requires looking at the manner in which that philosopher approaches to a given problem. Acknowledging the rightness of his remark I consider his approach to philosophy using as an example his treatment of the question “what is meaning?”. I point out that Stroud looks into the source of the Wittgensteinian slogan “meaning of the expression is its use”. The main Stroud’s conclusion is that if a description of a use of a certain expression is to explain the meaning of that expression, semantical terms have to appear in that description. This statement could be abandoned, Stroud claims, only if we rejected the things which all of us acknowledge as obvious.
EN
In the paper I discuss the legacy of Donnellan’s famous theory of definite descriptions in which he distinguishes between attributive and referential uses of these expressions. On the one hand I sketch the philosophical context within which Donnellan developed his theory. I put emphasis on the innovatory aspect of the theory by comparing it to a slightly older account proposed by Strawson. On the other hand, I discuss one of the main debates that have their source in Donnellan’s work. Namely, the debate between so called semanticists, who claim that the distinction between two uses of descriptions is of semantic nature, and so called pragmaticists, who believe that two ways of using descriptions is a pragmatic phenomenon while the semantic properties of descriptions have been analysed correctly in Russsell’s theory of descriptions.
EN
The conception of Saul Kripke‘s and Hilary Putnam‘s semantics belongs to new semantic concepts. It formulates three principles which have an essential influence on the contemporary analysis of a law language.Statements which can be inferred from this concept indicate:1. The independence of the language meaning of a law text from a historical legislator‘s intention, attaching significance on the practice of the phrases used in a given communicative community.2. The influence of various ways of a language law use on the procedure of establishing its meaning.3. The evolution in time of the language meaning of a law text.Saul Kripke‘s and Hilary Putnam‘s semantics tries to prove that a law interpretation process, being compliant with the principles of the law positivism, whose characteristic feature is the linguistic character of the law, should consider the changes in time of a law text meaning, the arguments of an unbinding precedent, the views formulated by a doctrine or the comparative arguments. As a result, it is to make them treated as the arguments for establishing the meaning of the law text phrases. This concept pays attention to the context in which language is used and it focuses on the language community which a speaker belongs to.
PL
Koncepcja semantyki Saula Kripkego i Hilary‘ego Putnama, należąca do nowych koncepcji semantycznych formułuje trzy założenia, które w istotny sposób wpływają na współczesną analizę języka prawnego.Twierdzenia, jakie można wyprowadzić z tej koncepcji, wskazują na:1. Uniezależnienie językowego znaczenia tekstu prawnego od intencji historycznego prawodawcy, przenosząc tym samym ciężar na praktykę użytych zwrotów w danej wspólnocie komunikacyjnej.2. Wpływ różnorakich sposobów użycia języka prawnego na procedurę ustalania jego znaczenia.3. Ewolucję językowego znaczenia tekstu prawnego w czasie.  Semantyka Kripkego–Putnama stara się dowieść, że proces interpretacji prawniczej zgodny z założeniami pozytywizmu prawniczego, którego charakterystyczną cechą jest językowy charakter prawa, powinien uwzględniać zmiany znaczenia tekstu prawnego w czasie, argumenty niewiążącego precedensu, poglądy formułowane przez doktrynę, czy też argumenty komparatystyczne. W konsekwencji ma to doprowadzić do traktowania ich jako argumentów służących ustalaniu znaczenia zwrotów tekstu prawnego. Koncepcja ta zwraca uwagę na kontekst, w jakim używa się języka, w szczególności zaś skupia się na wspólnocie językowej, do której mówiący należy.
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