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1

ORDINARY EXPRESSIONS HAVE NO EXACT AND SYSTEMATIC LOGIC. SOME REMARKS ON STRAWSON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGICAL THEORY

100%
Dumitru M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 4
542-551
EN
The general slogan in the title of this paper (which is taken from Strawson 1952, 57) gives a general, but nevertheless accurate, expression of Strawson's view concerning the nature of formal logic per se in relation to natural language. What is at stake here is the extent to which the formal methods and the formal semantics of contemporary symbolic logic can render the meanings of natural language expressions. Strawson sets up an agenda for logical theory, which, although rather dated for a logic text, is what one naturally expects from an introduction to elementary formal logic and a systematic analysis of certain crucial meta-logical concepts, most notably entailment. However, the author own reading is that Strawson's approach to logic makes a lasting contribution to understanding the inner workings of natural language through his critical discussion of the limits of the formal renderings of the semantics of natural language expressions via canonical first-order notations. One can recognize in this critical attitude towards the limits of formal methods a consistent generalization of Strawson's own strategy from his critical response to Russell's theory of descriptions. In the paper author focus on certain examples which illustrate the general slogan that characterizes Strawson's views on the nature of logic in connection with ordinary language and talk.
2

WITTGENSTEIN: OD TRAKTÁTU K NESKOREJ FILOZOFII

100%
Ježík P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 9
743-751
EN
The paper is an attempt to shed a light upon the Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development from its early to its late periods. In the author's view the Wittgenstein's philosophy can relatively sharply be divided into two periods with 1930 as a boundary line. He picks out some main events occurring around this line, which can be seen as the milestones on Wittgensteins' road from 'Tractatus' to his new philosophy. This philosophy stands in many points in the opposition to his Tractarian philosophical opinions and principles. Nevertheless, there are many points concerning his view of the role of the philosophy, which these two periods have in common. This enables us to understand Wittgenstein's philosophical conversion much better - the change is more visible against an unchanging background.
3

Stosowalność niektórych rozszerzeń tense logic w logicznej analizie rozumowań prawniczych

100%
Kozanecka-Dymek A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2015
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vol. 43
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issue 2
EN
The paper considers possible applications of some extensions of tense logic in the logical analysis of legal reasoning. At the beginning of the article it is pointed out that the time element plays an important role in the legal sciences. Then conditions are given that must be imposed on temporal systems which can be applied in these sciences. The next parts of the paper contain: a brief characterization of metric tense logic, a characterization of tense logic with the operators Since and Until, and examples of the formalization of sentences of legal language by means of symbols occurring in these logics. The standpoint presented claims that adequate temporal systems, which are extensions of tense logic, can provide a language to formalize sentences of legal language that contain specific time expressions and to model inferences consisting of such sentences conducted in the legal sciences. Appropriate systems would also provide tools to check the formal correctness of these reasonings.
4
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THE LOGICAL STATUS OF ELEMENTARY MUSICAL TERMINOLOGY

100%
Brozek A., Jadacki J.
Muzyka
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2005
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vol. 50
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issue 1(196)
57-86
EN
The article presents a sample of logical analysis performed on the terminology used to describe 'professional' European music in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although we basically confined our analysis to the most elementary part of that terminology, we are convinced that our observations apply to musical terminology as a whole. Using examples from a Polish encyclopaedia of music, we demonstrate the faults characteristic of the whole elementary musical terminology. Firstly, elementary musical terms are often badly defined, using definitions which are inadequate or faulty in other, logically important, respects. Secondly, many musical terms are too imprecise to fulfil the function expected of them. Thirdly, musical terminology is not supported, so far, by a clear conceptual framework. In order to eradicate the faults indicated here, terms which contain them should be explicated, their meaning should be reconstructed, and appropriate regulatory definitions should be formulated. At a future date we intend to perform such a reconstruction on the whole of the elementary musical terminology.
5

TRADITIONALLY, I AM ENTITLED TO A LAST MEAL

88%
Jespersen B.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
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vol. 18
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issue 1
5-13
EN
Nunberg maintains that there are cases like 'I am traditionally entitled to a last meal', as uttered by a condemned prisoner facing the firing squad, which suggest that an indexical like 'I' does double duty as a vehicle of singular and general reference. The author argues against this claim. His position is that the sentence should be factored out into two: 'Traditionally, a condemned prisoner is entitled to a last meal' and 'I am a condemned prisoner'. Nunberg's sentence is generated by means of an illicit substitution of 'I' for 'a condemned prisoner' inside the scope of 'traditionally'. The morale is that sloppy or literally nonsensical speech like Nunberg's sentence is not suitable as a data for logical analysis of natural language. What is the suitable data is the two-premise argument he puts forward.
6

ON THE LOGICAL PART OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF 'INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY AND PROCLUS DIADOCHUS' BY JOANE PETRIZI (Pro lohichnu chastynu pershoho rozdilu 'Rozhliadu Platonovoi filosofii ta Prokla Diadokha' Ioana Petrytsi) Source: Filosofska d

88%
Mchedlishvili L.
Філософська Думка
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2010
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issue 4
27-34
EN
The meaning of the diagram presented in the first chapter of 'Interpretation of the 'Elementatio theologica' of Proclus' by Georgian philosopher Joane Petrizi (XI-XII centuries) is explained in the article (see the picture-diagram at the beginning of the article). The diagram serves there as an illustration for the laws of Aristotle's 'Organon'. It is identified with one of three diagrams (namely, with the diagram for the Figure I) that are presented in Ammonius Hermiae's (V-VI centuries) comment on Aristotle's 'Prior Analytics', and which are based on Aristotle's idea of a linear formulation of schemes of categorical syllogisms and their corresponding division into three figures.
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