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TRACTATUS: POJETÍ PŘÍRODNÍCH ZÁKONŮ

100%
Dolák A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
|
issue 4
301-304
EN
The paper deals with Wittgenstein's conception of the status of scientific laws (in particular the laws of natural sciences), as presented in his 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus'. The author finds Kantian motifs in the conception, namely conceiving scientific laws as an a priori contribution of reason. According to Wittgenstein, however, there could be many of such a priori 'grids', some of them simple, the other more complete, but none of them can be declared to be the definitive and the only accurate one. This is how Wittgenstein argues against another Kant's contribution, in particular against conceiving scientific laws as something universal and apodictically valid.
2

Podstawowe założenia monizmu absolutnego

100%
Żuchowski P.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
|
issue 1
167 - 189
EN
The paper is an attempt to reconstruct the main assumptions of the doctrine of absolute monism. I begin with a consideration of the various meanings of the internal relation that was the core of the controversy between logical atomism and neo-Hegelianism. I try to show that, contrary to Russell's thesis, the presupposition that all relations are internal does not directly result in the doctrine of absolute monism. Whitehead's process metaphysics serves as an illustration here. Whitehead holds that all relations are internal and argues, surprisingly to some extent, that only in this way can we avoid monistic consequences. Hence I show that to embrace absolute monism one needs to have additional assumptions. As result we get the three basic assumptions of the doctrine under consideration: to exist in the most fundamental sense is to be independent of anything whatsoever; all relations are internal; every entity is related to every other entity. Additionally there can be at least two versions of absolute monism: procesualistic and substantialistic, depending on whether we accept another assumption, namely, that the fundamental structure of reality consists in substance with its predicates.
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