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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 10
853-869
EN
The 'Association for Scientific Synthesis' (1937 - 1940, 1945 - 1950) gathered a group of Slovak intellectuals, who tried to introduce the modern scientific attitudes and structural methods into Slovak culture. In their systematic effort for a coordinated and convergent scientific research, for an exact scientific language and the methods they were inspired by logical empiricism of 'Wiener Kreis', Czech Structuralism and Russian 'formal' school. Much of their attention was paid to such problems as the philosophy and methodology of science, concept of empirical knowledge, the questions of logical syntax and semantics, scientific verification, the problems of causality and rational induction as well as to the question of the development of personality. They presented the problems of art and literature from a structuralist point of view. When comparing the poetic language with the scientific language and its function they saw the former as a specific kind of sign. In the post-war period they confronted their non-etical attitudes with philosophical intuitivism and tried to bring together their scientific meta-theory and marxism.
EN
The article presents the history of methodology of econometric sciences and their role in the econometric research. Three methodological approaches to econometric models have been described. The first - logical positivism, where they are used to affirm the theory they represent, to interprete the relation force between economic variables. The second appraoach (instrumentalism) favours observation as a source of information concerning forecasts and simulations that constitute a criterion for the informative value of the knowledge which was used for building a model. On the basis of a data analysis models should be prepared which will be used not for the interpretation of parameters (they usually do not undergo it) but for indicating the forecast. The third approach is referred to as critical rationalism in which an econometric model is to be used for negative verification of the formulated hypothesis.
EN
The author argues that the epistemic significance of the principle of critical realism is far too great to be limited either to a certain phase in the development of logical positivism or to the post-Popperian line of methodology of natural sciences marked by such names as Thomas C. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos or Paul Feyerabend. He emphasizes the importance of the 'anti-positivistic turn' heralded by Popper's double scepticism with respect to the claims that natural sciences can be purged of metaphysics and that induction can somehow be vindicated. Having presented his assessment of Popper's position the author focuses on the 'reflector' theory of knowledge and emphasises the 'Socratic dimension' of the principle of rational criticism, stressing on both occasions that Popper's solutions have not lost their validity.
EN
First part of the text presents a historical excursion searching for the genesis of Popper’s philosophical views in the interwar Vienna. It analyses the actual writing process and circumstances that surrounded Popper’s work on Die beiden Grund-probleme der Erkenntnistheorie. The aim of this section is to evaluate Popper’s reception and intellectual self-development through the denial of logical positivism. The second “internalist” segment of this article further examines the Grundprobleme itself through the analysis of Popper’s specific interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. We will confront Seubert’s claim that through Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie Popper definitely and knowingly accepts Kant’s stance. We show that even though Popper adopted Kant’s transcendental method of questioning, he had later criticized certain aspects of Kant’s transcendental method. As a result, Popper establishes the so called genetic apriorism, which dwells on his own version of the deductive psychology of knowledge.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 8
680 – 695
EN
Moritz Schlick, the founder and leader of the Vienna Circle, occupies a position of importance in the history of modern philosophy. Our article is dedicated to memory of the thinker, who tragically died after a plot on him inside the Vienna University in June 1936. Schlick’s enduring contribution to the world philosophy is the fount of logical positivism. He was well prepared to give a new impetus to the philosophical questing of the future of philosophy. This paper offers a description of the foundations of Schlick’s philosophy.
EN
The article shows the positions that philosophers held to the relationship between a priori judgments and those judgments which are valid necessarily. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th and 19th century, who though often in different ways, opposed the concept of metaphysics and scholastic necessity (Hume, Kant, Mill, idealists), play the leading role. At the beginning of the 20th century analytic philosophy was born. Its first leaders inherited from their predecessors an antipathy to metaphysics, and so they had no desire to return again to the traditional concept of necessity (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer). Their logic and the new characterization of the a priori paved the way for the linguistic turn. Some of their followers in the second half of the 20th century realized that the concept needed to be returned to its original meaning (Kripke). This is not a mere repetition of the Aristotelian-scholastic conception, but a new addition that rethinks the relationship between the notions of a priori and necessity.
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