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EN
The paper discusses some problems of the conception of logic in the 'Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné'. Aside to its original edition, the copy edited by Franceso (Fortuné Barthélemy) de Félice is taken into account. The two editions are in accordance with modern preferences, they make the importance of traditional logic relative, i.e. transforming it into a science on method or even an outline of epistemology, nevertheless they tend, in an eclectic manner, to legitimate the elements of logic that had been defined as formal logic since the times of I. Kant, although in a modest form. It is difficult to prove, however, which of the versions of the Encylopaedia is more unanimous in its assessment of logic. Generally speaking, the Encyclopaedia edited by de Félice seems to be more reserved in its modification or even questioning the usefulness of the study of logic. It is not always consequent in this approach, however, and at times it is even better than the original modern edition with respect to its tendency to reduce logic to a method of analysis. If, however, one can find in the Encyclopaedia some entries that support the traditional theory of reasoning, although in a limited form, then following the Logic of Port-Royal the interpretation of these reasonings does not have a purely formal character because - as in Descartes - their value is ultimately conditioned by the obvious character of the first principles subjectively understood, and by the relationship between the elements of the series of implications, defined for instance in the category of deduction. Generally, however, one can see a preference for a critique of traditional logic formulated in the spirit of empiricism with regard to the scope of knowledge and theory of science, especially in the approaches of F. Bacon, J. Locke and É. Condillac. This preference is eclectically in accord with R. Descartes' methodology. This accounts for a willingness to refer to the 'Logic of Port-Royal', or to a certain extent the accomplishments of Ch. Wolff. To sum it up, the solutions assumed by the two editions are closest to J. Le Rond d'Alembert's eclectic approach. The preference for the method of scientific discovery over the method of interpretation makes the rules of traditional logic relative, i.e. formulated to build a systemic structure of science, especially because the rules of traditional logic are replaced by mathematical method. In this case the Encyclopaedia eclectically does not make it absolute either, and postulates its being used either to make the synthetic method legitimate or as a series of proof characteristic of Euclides' geometry, or as methods of algebra linked with analytical method and identified with procedures of scientific discovery.
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USUZOVÁNÍ Z PŘIKÁZÁNÍ

70%
Studia theologica
|
2011
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4
162-169
EN
The concept of the normative system as a partially ordered set of norms is defined in the paper. Certain principles of deduction over norms and claims regarding the consistency of the normative system and the mode of the elimination of a contradiction are formulated. The problems of the consistency of normative systems are demonstrated with the example of the Decalogue, in particular the Fourth Commandment.
EN
V. I. Vernadsky left a unique legacy in the fields of philosophy and methodology of science. The logical structure of science, elaborated by him, is based on the principle of the objective truthfulness of scientific knowledge and its various manifestations in various parts of science, which are unequal in terms of truthfulness (authenticity). The first part is the one being quite authentic and constituting the frame of science, e.g. the core manifestation and content of scientific knowledge, whereas the second part 'clothes' the frame of science and constructs upon its. The notion of the frame of science, introduced by Vernadsky to signify the core structure of the scientific knowledge, seems to be a very accurate reflection of the knowledge system of logics, mathematics and scientific apparatus. Considering Vernadsky's theses on the issue, a series of arguments can be given in favor of treating mathematics, logics and scientific apparatus as the fundament of scientific knowledge. Yet, V. I. Vernadsky treats mathematics as a central component in the notion 'frame of science', introduced by him, as a genetic turn in its creation. Mathematics integrates 'frame of science' through logics, and this determines the exclusive role of mathematics in the science. The Vernadsky's treatment of mathematics is shown in great detail with reference to original works of him.
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