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EN
While reading on the cover of the Polish edition of the book Goodbye, Descartes: the End of Logic and the Search for a New Cosmology of the mind, the words written by the well known American mathematician Keith Devlin, we discover that the reflection on language and human perception has played a major role in the history of philosophy and science. Nowadays in times of artificial intelligence research and the development of information technology, the role of psychologists, language philosophers, sociologists and linguists has gained significant weight. The answers to questions like: What is language? What is the human mind? How do we think?, are of key importance to resolving primary IT problems. The birth of a new discipline, cognitive science, which deals with the structure of the mind, thinking and consciousness became a challenge for the philosophical tradition like cartesianism, and at the same time became a pivotal factor of IT and communication techniques development. Devlin settles with tradition, which in his opinion is mainly defined by Descartes himself, however not only by his philosophy but also his methodology. Of course Descartes may be regarded as the symbol of the rationalist heritage albeit it seems that having a major impact on contemporary philosophy, it is not Descartes who should become the main character of the never ending goodbye, but Leibniz. The text is not an attempt at a polemic with Devlin’s opinions, but rather a supplementation of his standpoint. The problems of Leibnizian theory of the mind which were built on the language fundaments shall be elaborated on, as they can visualize Leibniz as the real pioneer of modern cognitive science.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł stanowi zmodyfikowaną część pracy licencjackiej napisanej w 2015 r. pod kierunkiem prof. B. Pazia.
EN
The main aim of this paper is to present and describe the rationalistic principles of Leibniz’s political philosophy. The description of these principles allows one to systematize the theory of the German thinker and to explain its essential character as a rationalist interpretation of political reality. For this purpose various writings of the philosopher, mostly those untranslated into Polish, are exploited. An analysis of these sources in relation to Leibniz’s philosophical system as a whole is the main tool of explication of the discussed issues. The author distinguishes five basic principles of Leibniz’s political theory. The superior one among them is the principle of reason (principium rationis) which is at the core of rationalistic perception of political reality. The articulation of this principle is included in the phrase “the empire of reason” (l’Empire de la raison), which could be considered as representative for the philosopher’s theory and the demand of rational thinking and acting presented in it. From the superior principle of reason stem the other more detailed principles: principle of perfection and order of universum, primacy of natural law, justice as caritas sapientis and the sovereign as imago Dei. All of these principles, as Leibniz’s entire political theory, are considered in the broad context of his philosophical system with particular reference to metaphysics. The close link between politics and metaphysics is in fact, beside firm rooting in philosophical tradition and Roman law, a characteristic feature of Leibniz’s thought and is distinctive on the historical background of the Modern age.
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EN
Philosophical statements are often suppositions. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposes in Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704, a method of the construction of assertive conditionals occurring between any philosophical suppositions. If we can infer a philosophical statement from any suppositions then the implication between these suppositions and the obtained statement is assertive. In the article, some examples of the application of Leibniz’s method are considered.
PL
Artykuł stanowi zmodyfikowaną wersję pracy licencjackiej napisanej przeze mnie w roku 2015, której promotorem był dr hab. Bogusław Paź.
EN
The main aim of this paper is to reconstruct G. W. Leibniz’s view on nature and structure of human identity. For this purpose selected writings of the author and of several other philosophers whose impact on his conclusion was the most noticeable are exploited. Analysis of these sources in relation to Leibniz’s whole monadological system provides us with the explication of human identity in his anthropology. In the first part the author concentrates on the historical background of a reflection on the notion of nature, which in Leibniz’s philosophy constitutes the basis of human identity. The Hanoverian philosopher, as the author claims, continues Aristotle’s thought on this issue. Afterwards a basic individual being – monad – is presented. Through the monad the German philosopher managed to unite two – seemingly opposing – perspectives: substancial (aristotelism) with “consciously-reflective”, which is synonymous with Descartes’ cogito. In the second part the author introduces the concept of the human person, which indicates such features as rationality, substantiality and individuality. From the latter flows such characteristics of personhood as uniqueness, distinctiveness and incommunicability. Even though this classical interpretation of the person was deconstructed by Descartes, the author shows that the monadic subject did not lose the attributes Leibniz’s processors wrote about. In the third part the author presents John Locke’s interpretation of the human identity described in his opus magnum – An essay concerning human understanding, in opposition to which Leibniz developed his own theory. In the fourth part the structure of human identity in the interpretation of the German is presented. The author of this paper particularly focuses on the characteristics of its two dimensions: real identity and moral identity. At the end, in the fifth part, the epistemological foundation of Leibniz’s anthropology: perception, apperception and reflection, its specifics and the relation to two levels of human identity presented in Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain are explored.
EN
The article investigates the relationship between Leibniz’s and Huygens’ theory of possibility and the principle of conservation of energy. It assumes that their criticisms of Cartesian views concerning those questions as well as their own achievements contributed to the formation of a new metaphysical ground for the modern discussions on the freedom of the will. There are especially two problems whose role is crucial in this context, namely the question of God’s knowledge of the future conditionals (contingentia futura) and the mind-body distinction.
EN
Developed in his polemics with Locke, Leibniz’s conception of the mind based on the so called ‘system commune’ is an example of what the non-reductionist and non-naturalistic view has to offer in the philosophy of the mind. In this paper I discuss the following issues: the status of New essays in Leibniz’s works, the consciousness- mind relation as understood by both philosophers, conception of the innate and innate-acquired relation in the so called ‘system commune’. I have divided this work into four parts. In the first one I present the status of New essays in Leibniz’s works and I explain his conception of the ‘system commune’. In the second one I investigate Locke’s arguments on the nativism and his conception of the innate. Next, I discuss the conception of the innateness, as proposed by Leibniz, and the mind-consciousness relation. Finally, I present the conclusions drawn from the above analyses.
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EN
This study deals with a controversy between Leibniz and Clarke concerning the relativity of space. Although substantivalism, i.e. an approach treating space as a substance, is to be indicated as the main target of Leibniz’s attack, it has usually been replaced by Newtonian absolutism instead, as a proper opposition to Leibniz’s relationalism. However, such absolutism has not been defined ontologically, but dynamically, as if the difference between their conceptions consisted of a different approach to the inertiallity of motion. However, this would mean that while Leibniz intended to reduce all motion to an inertial one, Newton reduced it to a noninertial one instead, or that only one of them acknowledged the existence of noninertial motion at all. Nevertheless, none of them actually denied the existence of noninertial motion, and although all motion indeed seemed noninertial to Newton, Leibniz never responded to such a challenge in the course of their correspondence.
CS
Předmětem této studie je polemika mezi Leibnizem a Clarkem ohledně relativity prostoru. Přestože za cíl Leibnizova útoku by se v kontextu této polemiky patřilo označit v prvé řadě substantivalismus, tj. přístup nakládající s prostorem jako se substancí, obvykle bývá do opozice vůči Leibnizovu relacionalismu kladen spíše newtonovský absolutismus. Vzhledem k tomu, že takto pojatý absolutismus nebývá vymezován ontologicky, nýbrž dynamicky, musel by v takovém případě rozdíl mezi jejich pojetími spočívat v odlišném přístupu k inercialitě pohybu. To by tudíž jinými slovy znamenalo, že zatímco Leibniz veškerý pohyb redukoval na inerciální, Newton jej redukoval naopak na neinerciální, případně, že pouze jeden z nich uznával existenci neinerciálních pohybů. Existenci neinerciálních pohybů však ve skutečnosti nepopíral žádný z nich, a přestože Newtonovi se neinerciálním jevil být vskutku veškerý pohyb vůbec, Leibniz na takovou výzvu v rámci clarkovské korespondence již nereagoval.
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue 2
185-204
EN
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present and analyse one of the most intriguing and unique elements of Leibniz’s philosophy of right—the relationship between love (amor, dilectio, caritas) and justice (iustitia)—mainly based on selected excerpts from the Elementa Iuris Natu­ralis (1669–1671) and the preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693). The author presents the characteristics of this close connection (particularly noticeable in definitions of justice as habitus amandi omnes and caritas sapientis) and she tries to answer the question about the reasons for this relationship referring to the metaphysical assumptions and principles of Leibniz’s philosophy. With respect to the latter the author also explains significance of the connection between love and justice in Leibniz’s philosophy of right as a part of his whole philosophical system.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba przedstawienia i analizy jednego z najbar­dziej intrygu­jących i oryginalnych elementów filozofii prawa Leibniza — związku między miłością (amor, dilectio, caritas) i sprawiedliwością (iustitia) — głównie na podstawie wybranych frag­mentów z Elementa Iuris Naturalis (1669–1671) i przedmowy do Codex Iuris Gentium Diplo­maticus (1693). Autorka prrezentuje charakterystykę owej ścisłej realacji (widocznej szcze­gól­nie w defi­ni­­cjach sprawiedliwości jako habitus amandi omnes i caritas sapien­­tis) i stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie o przyczyny tego związku, odwołując się do metafizycz­nych założeń oraz zasad Leibnizjańskiej filozofii. W odniesieniu do tych ostatnich autorka wyjaśnia rów­nież znaczenie związku między miłością a sprawiedliwością w filozofii prawa Leibniza jako częś­ci całego jego systemu filozoficznego.
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue 2
145-165
EN
Leibniz’s claim that we live is the best of all possible worlds is in contradiction with our experience, which is why we tend to maintain that the world would become better if at least some of its properties and characteristics were different. Leibniz criticized such an approach and argued that every attempt at changing the world would make it worse, or even impossible. His claim seems to be in contradiction with the Christian belief that our world is contaminated with sin, but it will be renewed in the end to become the reality of salvation, i.e. the best of all possible realities. This article puts forward two arguments: (1) Leibniz’s claim is not in contradiction with the Christian belief in salvation; (2) Leibniz’s claim is in contradiction with the human ex­pe­rience of the world because it is a result of an intellectual speculation based on the false as­sumption that the structure of the human mind adequately corresponds to the mind of God.
PL
Twierdzenie Leibniza, że świat, w którym żyjemy, jest najlepszym z możliwych, pozostaje w sprzeczności z naszym doświadczeniem i dlatego utrzymujemy, że ten świat stałby się lepszy, gdyby przynajmniej niektóre z jego cech i właściwości były inne. Leibniz protestował przeciwko takiemu stanowisku i argumentował, że każda zmiana tego świata uczyniłaby go gorszym albo wręcz niemożliwym. To jednak zdaje się przeczyć chrześcijańskiemu przekonaniu, że nasz świat jest skażony grzechem, ale u kresu czasu zostanie odnowiony, stając się rzeczywistością zbawie­nia, czyli najdoskonalszą z możliwych. W artykule uzasadnia się dwie tezy: (1) twierdzenie Leib­niza nie pozostaje w sprzeczności z chrześcijańską tezą o zbawieniu, (2) twierdzenie Leibniza jest sprzeczne z ludzkim doświadczeniem świata, ponieważ jest rezultatem intelektualnej spekulacji opartej na fałszywym założeniu o adekwatności struktury umysłu ludzkiego względem umysłu Boga.
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 3
103-111
EN
This article is firstly concerned with the question of whether Kant still holds Newton’s conception of space in his work Concerning the Distinction of the Directions in Space, as his reference to “absolute space” seems to suggest. The author attempts to show that this is not in fact the case since the term “absolute space” should not be interpreted as referring to Newton’s conception of space. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the critique of Leibniz’s conception of space that is the main theme of Kant’s aforesaid work. Leibniz’s conception, in Kant’s view, is shown to be inadequate because it comes into conflict with phenomena by not being able to explain the existence of incongruent counterparts, such as right and left hands.
CS
V příspěvku jde nejprve o otázku, zda Kant ještě ve svém spisku „O rozdílu směrů v prostoru“ z r. 1768 zastává Newtonovo pojetí prostoru, jak se to zdá naznačovat okolnost, že zde Kant mluví o „absolutním prostoru“. Autor se snaží ukázat, že tomu tak není, neboť termín „absolutní prostor“ je třeba interpretovat jinak než jako odkaz k Newtonovu pojetí prostoru. Ve druhé části se příspěvek věnuje hlavnímu tématu zmíněného spisku, jež je tvořeno Kantovou kritikou Leibnizova pojetí prostoru. Leibnizova koncepce se podle Kanta ukazuje jako neudržitelná, neboť se dostává do rozporu s fenomény, když nedokáže vysvětlit existenci inkongruentních protějšků, jakými jsou pravá a levá ruka.
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Content available remote

Immensum v kontextu Leibnizovy korespondence s Clarkem

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EN
This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space­-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
CLEaR
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2016
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vol. 3
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issue 2
32-39
EN
Voltaire produced his works within the literary-historical period of Classicism and Enlightenment, in which the prevalent role of literature was educational. The period also dictated what genre, theme, style and structure authors should follow. However, more and more changes of literary genres appear, and the process of stratification of literature into high and trivial takes place. The aim of this paper is to describe the polarization of two mutually different processes involved in the literary shaping of Voltaire's philosophical narrative Candide or Optimism. In Voltaire's narrative, the popularization of philosophy, in order to simplify and illuminate the philosophical writings of G. W. Leibniz, results in the changes of style and content that become understandable to the general readership since they work within the scheme of an adventure novel. In this process, trivialization does not affect only the genre, but is also present in other parts of literary analysis and interpretation such as the theme, motifs, structure, characterization, narrative techniques, stylistic features, and so on.
EN
The article concerns prose of Bruno Schulz and a category of a possible world. The aim of the article is an attempt to consider The Cinnamon Shops and The Sanatorium at the Sign of the Hourglass, as a specific possible world. In order to it, the ontology of writing as well as the ontology of fictitious objects is to be analyzed. The tools which are to be used during the analyze are the one of the theory of narration of U. Eco such as possible world, dictionary, encyclopedia, library, open writing, close writing, essential property, vital, dormant, inference trips, text’s topic, interpretation. Eco created a complex methodology which contains proper text’s tools. The Italian semiotics analyst influenced by G.W. Leibniz, made impact on ontologization of conception, where a possible world is a distinct sequence, the world tight ontically.
EN
The article concerns prose of Bruno Schulz and a category of a possible world. The aim of the article is an attempt to consider The Cinnamon Shops and The Sanatorium at the Sign of the Hourglass, as a specific possible world. In order to it, the ontology of writing as well as the ontology of fictitious objects is to be analyzed. The tools which are to be used during the analyze are the one of the theory of narration of U. Eco such as possible world, dictionary, encyclopedia, library, open writing, close writing, essential property, vital, dormant, inference trips, text’s topic, interpretation. Eco created a complex methodology which contains proper text’s tools. The Italian semiotics analyst influenced by G.W. Leibniz, made impact on ontologization of conception, where a possible world is a distinct sequence, the world tight ontically.
EN
This paper is a new translation and interpretation of the essay by Leibniz which has come to be known as “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream.” Leibniz used many different literary styles throughout his career, but “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream” is unique insofar as it combines apparent autobiography with a dreamscape. The content is also somewhat surprising. The essay is reminiscent of Plato, insofar as Leibniz describes a transition from existence in a cave to a more enlightened mode of being outside of it. But, in contrast with the usual identification of Leibniz as a “rationalist,” the mode of being that is valorised involves cognition that is intuitive and supra-rational. The paper begins with the translation followed by an interpretation of the essay. I conclude by considering the ramifications of my interpretation for our conception of Leibniz’s philosophy.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2020
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vol. 48
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issue 4
167-180
EN
The article presents the influence of the Flemish philosopher Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1614-1699) on G.W. Leibniz’s monadological system. It shows the convergence of some of van Helmont’s views expressed in A Cabbalistical Dialogue and Paradoxal Discourses (like, for example, a concept of the monad), and presents also the differences between van Helmont’s monadological system and the later Leibnizian one.
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Content available remote

Idea sztucznej inteligencji

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PL
Sztuczna inteligencja, nadzieja na wielki postęp a zarazem obawa przed niezna-nymi niewyobrażalnym, ma początki w ludzkich marzeniach, których urzeczywist-nianie dokonuje sięprzez racjonalny wysiłek intelektualny. Zarodka intelektualnej idei sztucznej inteligencji dopatrujemy się w pomysłach Lullusa. Rozwój sztuki lullu-sowej, ars combinatoria, był udziałem wielu. Szczególną postacią w tym łańcuchu entuzjastów i badaczy był Athanasius Kircher. Okres kształtowania się idei sztucznej inteligencji kończy Gottfried Leibniz, a zarazem od niego zaczyna się historia sztucz-nej inteligencji jako nauki we współczesnym rozumieniu.
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