Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Leibniz Godfryd Wilhelm
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In the presented analyses we propose a formal complement to a certain version of the semantics of possible worlds inspired by Leibniz’s ideas and provide an adequate logic of it. As the starting point we take the approach of Benson Mates (Leibniz on possible worlds). Mates refers to Leibniz’ philosophy, but also uses tools of contemporary semantics of possible worlds and elaborates on an original conception of predication due to which possible worlds can be identified with collections of certain concepts, and not individuals. We complete a fragmentary description given by Mates in order to analyze if his conception allows for the establishment of this specific idea of a possible world. Our first step is to define a notion of the individual concept and describe possible world semantics in which possible worlds consist of individual concepts of compossible individuals (s-worlds). Our second step is to choose some version of modal free logic with the identity (S5MFLID), which is complete in our reformulation of Mates’ semantics. The connections between standard interpretation of S5MFLID and semantics inspired by Mates show that our logic does not distinguish s-worlds from i-worlds – counterparts of s-worlds that are collections of individuals.
EN
The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s "Monadology". Between those works there are many similarities and analogies, and the key concept for them is the category of the inner and acknowledged importance of consideration based on basic categories of thinking about the world. The Leibnizian prospect allows for a broader look at Wittgenstein’s analysis of relation between propositions and facts, between language and the world. Using the Hanoverian philosopher’s terminology allows for the demonstration of the ambivalence of the concept of logical form in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and also the metaphysical nature of his first book.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą wyjaśnienia kategorii formy logicznej użytej przez Ludwiga Wittgensteina w "Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym" za pomocą pojęć zaczerpniętych z "Monadologii" Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza. Pomiędzy oboma dziełami zachodzą liczne podobieństwa oraz analogie, a kluczowe jest dla nich pojęcie tego, co wewnętrzne, i uznanie ważności rozważań nad podstawowymi kategoriami myślenia o świecie. Perspektywa leibnizjańska pozwala w sposób szerszy spojrzeć na wittgensteinowskie analizy relacji zachodzącej pomiędzy zdaniem a faktem, językiem a światem. Wykorzystanie terminologii hanowerskiego filozofa, pozwoli wykazać ambiwalencję pojęcia formy logicznej w filozofii Wittgensteina oraz metafizyczny charakter jego pierwszej książki.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.