Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 11

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Logic
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In this paper two concepts of psychologism in logic are outlined: the one which Frege and Husserl fought against and the new psychologism, or cognitivism, which underlies a cognitive turn in contemporary logic. Four issues such cognitively oriented logic should be interested in are indicated. They concern: new fields opened for logical analysis, new methods and tools needed to address these fields, neural basis of logical reasoning, and an ed- ucational problem: how to teach such logic? Several challenging questions, which arise in the context of these issues, are listed.
EN
We argue that the need for commentary in commonly used linear calculi of natural deduction is connected to the “deletion” of illocutionary expressions that express the role of propositions as reasons, assumptions, or inferred propositions. We first analyze the formalization of an informal proof in some common calculi which do not formalize natural language illocutionary expressions, and show that in these calculi the formalizations of the example proof rely on commentary devices that have no counterpart in the original proof. We then present a linear natural deduction calculus that makes use of formal illocutionary expressions in such a way that unique readability for derivations is guaranteed – thus showing that formalizing illocutionary expressions can eliminate the need for commentary.
6
Content available remote

Finding a Systematic Base for Derrida’s Work

80%
Forum Philosophicum
|
2010
|
vol. 15
|
issue 2
275-300
EN
Derrida became increasingly overt in later years in suggesting that his work displays a rigour, and even a “logic.” Further, it is becoming accepted that deconstruction arose in dialogue with Husserl. In support of these views, this article points out that in 1990 Derrida told us that his first work of 1954 revealsa “law” which guides his career, and that some responses had already arisen there. The work of 1954 is examined, and an interrelated “system” developed by which the responses relate to the law, to help find a common, early and systematic base to apply to Derrida’s oeuvre as it develops. Brief examples will be pointed to in closing to show that this basis subsists, at least in part, in later work.
7
70%
EN
William of Auvergne (1180–1249) was one of the first wave professors of University in Paris to engage with Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he calls the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic – the problem of truth. Based on a doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth's classical definition. In his view, this definition express the essence of logical truth, which is constituted in any relation between human intellect and things, if intellect is adequate to his object. So the logical truth is a basis and property of true judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and – generally – about all the man can think or about everything possible to thinking. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects contingent. William argues that only actually existing things are real existing as caused by God. So only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn't cause things as existing in the past, in the future, but as existing in the present. What is more, He doesn't cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognizes logical truth as the only justification for true adjudication of all what exists and doesn't exist. In Steven P. Marrone's opinion William's theory of truth is a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William's theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is depended on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional terms, he divorced with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, taken in this article studies seem to show that William's theory of truth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of human being. This is not logic in twentieth-century's sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that the logical truth, which realizes in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of truths that exist in contingent beings, William considered as final and the sole basis of every true judgments and statements, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical truth is not able to truly independent existence.
Civitas et Lex
|
2020
|
vol. 26
|
issue 2
85-94
EN
The article aims to clarify the basic laws of logic and show their application in the Gospel. The content of selected fragments of the Gospel proves that it contains fundamental laws of rational thinking in the form of: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, the law of sufficient reason, the law of finality. The statements and teachings of Jesus Christ are not without logical principles, which man already applies in everyday thinking. The source of this kind of laws is real existence. The so-called the first principles that govern the existence of being, in the order of knowledge, become the laws of thinking. For the message of revelation to be understood and accepted by the person to whom it is addressed, the laws of thought must exist in the Gospel.
9
61%
|
|
vol. 14
|
issue 1
87-99
EN
The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus (Toledo) or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo (1564), the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis (1561). As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety.
EN
This study deals with the early theory of truth presented by Walter Burley (ca. 1275–1344) in his so­called middle commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias. The issue of truth is raised in the context of Aristotle’s claim that truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Burley’s dissatisfaction with this purely logical concept of truth leads him to the introduction of a structured definition of truth which allows him to clearly distinguish between truth taken as theological, ontological, epistemological or logical. The first part of this study will present Burley’s understanding of truth in the first three of these meanings of truth. The second part will then focus on truth in the logical sense which is also in the center of Burley’s own focus of interest. There will also be a discussion of what function his propositional semantics and his theory of so­‑called real propositions (propositiones in re) have in this theory of truth.
EN
The aim of this article is present new approach to modeling business process using combined epistemic and deontic logics. Combined deontic-epistemic logic is used during modeling time and combined epistemic-deontic logic during execution time. The sketch of algorithm of detecting inconsistencies in business process model and execution is presented.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.