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EN
March 1968 did not leave a distinct imprint on the history of Bialystok. There are no records of significant events, and mention is made only of several hundred distributed leaflets, several inscriptions on walls, and heated discussions held amongst secondary school and university students. The reports emphasize that a prominent impact on the prevailing situation was exerted by the social composition of the local students - the predominance of peasant and working class backgrounds and the absence of students of intelligentsia origin. The politically active role was in many cases assumed by secondary school pupils. Quite possibly, this state of affairs was strongly affected by the lack of humanities faculties, which almost traditionally acted as the 'organisers' of student protest and disturbances. An active 'participant of the March events was the press. 'Gazeta Bialostocka' conducted a propaganda campaign throughout almost the entire period, although compared to the national papers its articles preserved a low profile and, for all practical purposes, reprinted information from the central press and featured accounts of the meetings and mass-scale demonstrations held in assorted workplaces. Neither the local press nor the Civic Militia reports reflect an excessive involvement of the residents of Bialystok in the anti-Semitic campaign, although operation reports contained numerous information about anti-Semitic moods. It is interesting to note that an examination of the Civic Militia Voivodeship Headquarters documents shows a much stronger reaction to events associated with the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Many more 'nonconformist' commentaries, public appearances, meetings and discussions were noted down; the same holds true for the number of detainees.
EN
Information from Warsaw affected the situation in schools of higher learning in Gdansk and Sopot. In order to alleviate the tension, Party and academic authorities hastily consented to a meeting held on 12 March in the hall of the Gdansk Polytechnic. Stanislaw Kociolek, the First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, who was booed out of the hall, later admitted that the Party authorities had not correctly grasped the prevailing mood. The meeting was attended by 3 000 -5 000 students and members of the academic staff. The participants passed a resolution supporting the students of Warsaw and calling for an expansion of democratic liberties. In the afternoon, a demonstration organised next to the Students' Club , where the student activists met with Adam Rapacki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was dispelled by order keeping forces. A meeting at the Gdansk Polytechnic, originally planned for 15 March, was called off a day earlier, but this information did not reach all the academic and secondary school students and other persons interested in attending it. Groups of young people started gathering around the Polytechnic building, and at 3 p.m. the militia, ORMO (Voluntary Workers' Militia) and Polish Army officers dressed in civilian clothes commenced their first assault. The disturbances lasted for several hours, and during the climax they involved, either actively or passively, some 20 000 persons. In March 1968 this was one the largest street clashes in the country, with a considerable number of detained demonstrators and casualties. Characteristically, the majority of the detainees were young workers, showing that contrary to the propaganda meetings held in assorted work places, numerous workers actually supported student demonstrations. Another noteworthy fact is the presence of secondary school students; in May, one of the demonstrators from Gdynia, Bogdan Borusewicz, was arrested and sentenced to one and a half year imprisonment.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2008
|
issue 1
155-165
EN
Heretofore literature contained extremely laconic descriptions of the 'March in Torun'. A fuller study of documents produced by the Security Service made it possible to present the activity of the academic milieu at the Mikolaj Kopernik University in Torun, both in March 1968 and in the preceding period. Particular attention is due to attempted students' protests organised already in December 1967 mainly for economic reasons. On 12 March 1968 the Torun students took an active part in the tide of protests, which already involved more than ten academic centres across the country. The participants conducted leaflet and poster campaigns and held meetings despite the decidedly antagonistic attitude of the academic authorities, headed by Rector Witold Lukaszewicz. The first meeting, on 12 March, was attended by about 200 students, but the second one, held on 14 March, attracted already about 700 persons, i. e. 20% of all of students. Its outcome was a resolution echoing similar acts passed in other academic centres. According to the findings of the Security Service the most active participants totalled 83 students. The third and last meeting, attended by about 600 students, took place on 18 March. Successive attempts, including the largest meeting of 21 March (more than 100 persons), failed. Nonetheless, a leaflet campaign was continued for several weeks. The administrative authorities of the University and the Security organs pursued a policy aimed against the leading participants of the March events. Many students were compelled to conduct disciplinary talks with representatives of the academic authorities, and as many as fifty - with Security Service functionaries; several students were expelled.
EN
The year 1968, universally treated as a 'caesura' in the political life of the People's Republic of Poland, is predominated by two episodes, i. e. the so-called March events together with their consequences, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The impact of assorted occurrences upon Polish foreign policy should be considered within the context of the international situation of the period. The fact that Poland was a satellite country limited its political potential and rendered all other factors secondary. March 1968 did not exert prominent influence upon foreign policy, and the West regarded the transpiring developments predominantly as an inner struggle for power. The significance of March 1968 adversely affected the image not so much of the authorities as that of the country as a whole and its citizens. The author claims that the results of the personnel shifts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not be exaggerated. Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia and active Polish participation in preparing it contributed to a deterioration of the image of Gomulka, who since 1957 had been consistently losing the approval of Western observers. The support expressed by Brezhnev for the Polish First Secretary denoted a stabilisation of power in Poland, and the resolution of certain doubts concerning political leadership affected Poland's political potential. Gomulka remained the only suitable partner. The Brezhnev doctrine clearly expressed the subconsciously held views of the observers and participants of political life, and reminded all those who still harboured doubts that Moscow remained the decisive member of the Soviet bloc. The events of August 1968 influenced the attitude of the West towards détente in West - East relations. Apparently, the Western states had become more willing to conduct direct talks with the Soviet Union and less so as regards the satellite countries, including all negotiations about the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The rank held by Warsaw had, therefore, declined. This holds true also for Polish - German relations.
EN
Despite significant progress of pertinent research, the events of March 1968 continue to a large extent to be the stuff of myths. Regardless of the publication of the extensive and well-documented monograph by J. Eisler, they are still perceived from the central, Warsaw-based perspective, while knowledge about the 'provincial' March remains slight. Although researchers concur in their descriptions (albeit not always assessments) of, e.g., the mechanisms decisive for the so-called anti-Zionist campaign, have relatively well recreated the course of the student protest, and recognised the thesis about the generational character of the protests, there still remain certain domains which call for further in-depth studies of source material and the posing of new questions. They include solidarity campaigns conducted in secondary schools, the consequences of March '68 in schools of higher learning, or the verbalisation of protests in the provinces.
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