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EN
In this text the author attempts to sketch one version of the confrontation between post-Husserlian phenomenology and psychoanalytical theory, namely Lacan's reading of Merleau-Ponty's posthumously published work 'The Visible and the Invisible', presented in Seminar XI (Four Basic Concepts of Psychoanalysis). Just as Merleau-Ponty creatively appropriated, certain insights of psychoanalysis and, by their means, reformulated some of the solutions offered by phenomenologically-oriented philosophy, so Lacan exploits the thinking of the late Merleau-Ponty in order to enrich, in a special way, his own version of psychoanalysis - specifically, the development of his theory of the object a which, in the seminar in question, is interpreted as the gaze. In conclusion, some perspectives which this theory of Lacan's opens up in the area of aesthetics are adumbrated.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 9
748 – 758
EN
Reality presents itself in „adumbrations“. It is not due to the subject whose perception is distorted by his/her insufficient abilities; it is due to the real itself, which is unstable and incomplete. The being of things and persons is fundamentally multiplied, dispersed among thousands of “adumbrations”. Yet these various appearances, though not representing a perfectly defined, cohesive whole closed in it, do not produce a sheer chaos. Merleau-Ponty models the reality of a thing/person on a melodic theme. If the theme does occur in the painting, there is also the thing itself in it. Paintings are components of the being of the reality itself. In them the adventures of the reality’s existence continue. The work of art represents the thing as such, nevertheless a different, transformed thing in the form of a noble, fragile, wandering spiritual body.
EN
This paper explores the notion of Affective Pedagogy of Human Rights Education (APHRE) on a theoretical level and suggests a concept of curricular framework. APHRE highlights the significance of affectivity and body in the process of learning, factors usually neglected in the mainstream intellectualistic approach to learning, especially in areas under the Confucian tradition. The paper’s first section explores the thinking of three philosophers - Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Beardsley - who serve as sources for APHRE. The second section explains how their concepts contribute to APHRE’s development. In the third section, a practical curricular framework is presented. Finally, the paper discusses implementing the framework and concludes by recognizing APHRE as a pedagogic approach for crossing borders among nationalities, cultures, and languages.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 5
367 – 375
EN
The paper compares the notion of bodily expression as used in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception with the notion gained from the analysis of The Acting with the Inner Partner. It is a kind of dramatic improvised performance, developed at the Department of Authorial Creativity and Education at the Theatre Faculty of the Performing Arts in Prague. Whereas Merleau-Ponty grasps the experience of non-certainty, so typical for the creative state of mind, by the schema empty intention/fulfilment. The Acting with the Inner Partner is based on the ability of a body’s expression to create its own meaning. Thus the body’s expressivity is liberated from the meaning given in advance, no matter if fulfilled (as it is in the case of imitation) or just empty or intended (as when realizing an idea). The improvisation thus offers a new means how to get to the “very birth” of our experience (Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the proper goal of phenomenology), and to understand the intrinsic creativity of our own body.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 5
376 – 384
EN
The paper gives an outline of a conception of philosophy based on some ideas of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome the traditional thinking (namely its idealistic philosophy /realistic science pattern). He abandons the purely reflexive attitude and turns to the original realm of experience. This turn is crucial for Merleau-Ponty way of philosophizing: issues such as the relationship between the subject and the world (or the Other) are no more explored from the perspective of an impartial spectator, but rather from the perspective of a bodily engaged thinker situated in the world. Therefore, for him the role of philosophy is not reduced to searching for and describing the Truth valid for ever. He rather envisages the philosophy, which should be aware of its being a part of the ambiguous lived world. It also should be nourished by perception, which is a philosopher’s primary sort of cognition. As an example he depicts Socrates and his vivid relationship with the polis.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 4
259 – 270
EN
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty’s lectures L’institution dans l’histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka’s project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts “institution” and “transcendence”, there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
EN
A (Western) school is, among other things, a building with its own spatial formations and boundaries. In educational settings, the place for learning, as well as the human body in the place, is significant. In this paper, we explore the theory of the lived body as it was formulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and argue why we think this theory can be used fruitfully in educational research, and specifically in a study of learning places such as classrooms. We also discuss what a classroom is and can be drawing upon the work of Otto Friedrich Bollnow. As humans, we access the world through our bodies and the knowledge we develop is always embodied. The body and the world are two aspects of reversibility, which Merleau-Ponty terms flesh. He also stresses that the body inhabits the world, and our corporeality can therefore be tied to the room—we are affected by and affect the room in a mutual interplay. In this paper, we develop this further and argue that teachers and students inhabit the classroom. Corporeality is therefore closely connected to spatiality and is understood as a prerequisite for being involved in relationships. We argue for the importance of exploring the notion of embodiment in educational settings with a special focus on the embodied classroom using the phenomenology of the life-world.
EN
First sections of the article present the historical background of the twentieth century philosophy of the human body. Then the author analyzes main elements of Husserlian theory of the constitution of the body: constitution of visual, tactual and kinesthetic body, constitution of the body of the will (Willensleib) and intersubjective constitution of objective body. Husserl's theory of living body is then compared with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body. In the last section the author presents analysis which aims to show how from the dualistic point of view conscious subject (soul) gets its most fundamental embodiment.
EN
In his late works, Maurice Merleau-Ponty attempts to show the direction for the development of a new phenomenology. While analysing the intertwining of the visible and the invisible, he raises a question about the way we participate in Being. For Merleau-Ponty, experiencing a work of art is a representative example of our participation in the flesh (la chair). This article will analyse the broadly understood idea of visibility in art and its ability to transcend its apparent aesthetics into its invisible side, which is the source of all appearance and self-knowledge of existence.
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Fenomenologia cielesnej percepcji

61%
Avant
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2011
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vol. 2
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issue T
25-36
EN
Since this is colloquium on phenomenological and experimental approaches to cognition I’d like to set up te problem I want to address in terms of two of the different strands that we find in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about the phenomenology of the body. One of these strands is profoundly insightful. The other one, however, seems to me to be lacking in plausibility – or rather, to put it less confrontationally and more in keeping with the spirit of the colloquium, the second strand seems to stand in the way of there being a certain type of fruitful interaction between phenomenological and experimental approaches to cognition.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 8
708 – 718
EN
This paper intends to demonstrate that, beginning with his analyses of dream and hallucination in Phenomenology of perception up to his definition of dehiscence as ontological principle in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty holds the audacious assumption that the subject is thrown into a dreamlike and bewitched world and the self is diffracted into many reflections. It is, the author will claim, a fundamental thesis in his philosophy in as much as it enables him to unveil and even radicalize the modern crisis and to pose a crucial ethical problem: if reason is not guaranteed and has to arise perilously from irrational depths, the self is threatened by inauthenticity, illusion and alienation; the existence is a strange dream which may anytime turn into a nightmare. He will also show that Merleau-Ponty reverses this crisis into an asset: a reality which includes a fundamental dimension of imaginary leaves us free to create new metamorphoses.
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