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EN
The author takes Merleau-Ponty's theory to show that the fact that we are living in the world of persistent things with constant features is a result of spontaneous normalization. There are some perceptual norms which decide on creation of typical subjective structures, and due to these structure we experience things as categorised or classified, for example like cats, dogs, trees, people, etc. Therefore Merleau-Ponty's theory can be helpful to explain the origin of the so-called prototype effect, and throw light on relation between the structures of experience and linguistic categories. Experience's orientation on optima, perception's constants, is evidenced in studies on sensory perception and also memory. Attractive, creating a class character of the constants (prototypes) has been emphasised. The prototypes created in the immediate experience create an intentional space, in which each interpretation takes place; they give a measure of all we perceive, see, create, think, etc. Dynamical character of the orientation on prototype makes a basis of the assumption: any actual prototype realisation is only relative, relational, and asymptotic, and linguistic categories (the conceptual structure of our mind) based on prototypes are relative also. The author emphasis that some more detail analyses would question a need of sharp distinction of linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge, because regularities of categorisation processes, manifested in the meanings of terms denoting natural kinds, are the regularities of the perceptual processes and language. In this way the role of language as one and only determinant of the structure of experience may be limited.
Muzyka
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2005
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vol. 50
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issue 1(196)
87-115
EN
The article attempts to analyse the problem of response to music in the context of phenomenological analysis of the act of perception, undertaken by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his 'Phenomenology of Perception'. Such a perspective allows to go beyond the framework of artistic and aesthetic analysis in exploring music perception, by making it possible to examine the situation of response to music ('experience of music') as an act of existential significance. According to Merleau-Ponty, the fundamental feature of perceptual relation is that it is rooted in the perceiving subject's body, and its involvement in the situation. Phenomenology regards the act of perception of music in its situational aspect, defined by, among others, such conditions as: space, movement, events, attitude and mood, and also the cultural context. Analysis of perception then proceeds by examining the problems of subjective 'sense experience' (responsive, experiencing aspect) and 'behaviour' (active, expressive aspect). Perception of music, in the perspective defined by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, turns out to be a complex human experience, which cannot be contained in a one-directional model of response, aimed at constituting a musical work or other aesthetic object. It is an active experience, which involves the subject wholly (bodily, mentally, emotionally) and is integrally conditioned by the situation. In the context of this analysis, the perceptual situation (musical situation) reveals a reciprocal relationship, a relationship of mutual influence of music and percipient. In this manner the existential aspect of musical perception (as understood by Merleau-Ponty) is revealed: music, by releasing the bodily physicality of the subject, which manifests itself in the sense experience and motor gesture, reveals to him/her his own being-in-the-world, a being situationally defined. In the act of response to music the percipient recognises the world as described and defined by music, and recognises him/herself as a participant in that world.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 3
195-206
EN
The paper offers an outline of M. Merleau-Ponty's thought as represented in his earlier works 'The Structure of Behavior' and 'Phenomenology of Perception'. In them Merleau-Ponty, contrary to the conception of the subject as an 'apprehending no-thingness', tries to establish a mutual relationship between person and meaning, person and the other person, a sort of a merging embracement.
EN
This article argues that paintings have a nonconceptual content unlike that of mechanically produced images. The first part of the article outlines an information-theory approach (Lopes, Kulvicki) modelled on the camera and based on the idea that pictures convey information about what they depict. Picture structure is conceived of as contentful by virtue of a supposed causal link with what is depicted and as nonconceptual because it is independent of observers' understanding. The second part introduces an embodied depiction approach based on Merleau-Ponty's view of style and the act of painting. It is argued that (i) because of bodily mediation the nonconceptual content of paintings cannot be assimilated to the information-theory approach; (ii) painted configurations are contentful by virtue of being the product of intelligent activity, but are nonconceptual because they differ from concepts in their representational function.
EN
How might the supernatural be represented in religious paintings that imply continuity between the virtual space of painting and the real space of the beholder? Such an implied continuity might be thought to threaten a necessary distance demanded of religious works. This article examines how a number of Italian paintings employ strategies for representing the supernatural through displacement devices that create a 'gap' within perception - an inviolable space that is implied as being outside normal spatiotemporal relations. The contention is that these distancing devices are dependent on an imagined spatial proximity that is established but then broken. They exploit inherent ambiguities as to where a painting is relative to its beholder, by means of withholding both perspectival distance and positional cues for a discrete section of the work.
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