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1

MUST EXPRESSION BE INSTRUMENTAL?

100%
Bäckström S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2021
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vol. 28
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issue 2
282 – 302
EN
This article engages critically with the theory of expression proposed by Mitchell Green in his Self-Expression (2007). In this book, Green argues that expressions are signals designed to convey information about mental states. By putting pressure on one of the examples Green uses in his book, I will challenge this thesis. Then I will deepen this challenge by developing a contrast between two philosophical perspectives on expression, which I name the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘descriptive’. I take Green’s theory of expression to be an exemple of the instrumental perspective. Expression, in the instrumental perspective, is a means for transmitting information about mental states from organism to organism. I articulate the descriptive perspective with the help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein. On the descriptive view, expression is (at least a part of) an answer to the question what it is so much as to have mental states and a living body. I suggest at the end of the article that if we remain within the instrumental perspective, we will not be able to use expression to satisfactorily answer this question.
2

THINKING DESCARTES IN CONJUNCTION, WITH MERLEAU-PONTY: THE HUMAN BODY, THE FUTURE, AND HISTORICITY

100%
Griffith J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 2
111 – 125
EN
This article addresses a debate in Descartes scholarship over the mind-dependence or -independence of time by turning to Merleau-Ponty’s Nature and The Visible and the Invisible. In doing so, it shows that both sides of the debate ignore that time for Descartes is a measure of duration in general. The consequences to remembering what time is are that the future is shown to be the invisible of an intertwining of past and future, and that historicity is the invisible of God.
3

CINEMA SURFACE DESIGN (Projekt powierzchni kina)

86%
Lippit A. M.
Kwartalnik Filmowy
|
2009
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issue 65
30-47
EN
The author analyses the matter of the surface: the surface of cinema and of the screen, a space that seems to be flat but at the same time hides and reveals a strange depth, a folded volume. Looking at the first films of the brothers Lumiere and other examples of early cinema, and using Tom Gunning's metaphor of 'absorption' and 'swallowing', the author attempts to describe the strange moment of collision between the spectator and the energy of film, the space of cinema. The gesture of this contact is like a swallowing. What awaits the spectator at the projected point of collision is an imaginary depth that opens from the other side of the screen. He explores the question of the cinema as bilateral reality, where the surface is the border between inside and outside. In his analysis he refers to the concepts and theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, and Sigmund Freud. What we get is a fascinating psychology (or maybe rather psychoanalysis) of cinema, of its movement. The early cinema being the forgotten, but important trace.
4

FRANCOUZSKÁ FENOMENOLOGIE A EXISTENCIÁLNÍ ANALÝZA

86%
Hlavinka P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 1
40-48
EN
The paper is an interdisciplinary study, which describes the results of applying phenomenological analysis in Sartre's analysis of being, as well as the main emphases in Merleau-Ponty's explorations of body/consciousness problem. It also shows the possibilities of applying the phenomenological approach in psychotherapy, in particular in the logotherapy of Victor Frankl. The author's intention is to show the relationship between the intentional consciousness with its possibilities and limits and the conception of phenomena, which differs strongly with the respective thinkers. While for Sartre the phenomenon is a means of self-alienation and for Ponty is a means of embedding the embodied consciousness, for Frankl the phenomenon is a medium of meaning for the intentional consciousness itself.
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