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Studia theologica
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2007
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vol. 9
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issue 3
17-30
EN
The world events of the last century again revivified discussion about the objectivity of theological meta-ethical foundation of human morality. The First and Second World War, genocides as the Holocaust or systematic repudiation of the otherness from the side of great majority, societal ethnic cleansing and many other forms of evil in daily life, partly in consequence of destructive activities of man, partly in consequence of natural and biological processes, these all are a part of tragic character of human nature. Despite of these realities, the elementary question about the theological meta-ethical foundation for morality is always the basic necessity in the human life. In this article, we try to show some philosophical as well as theological approaches to this question such as the ethical exegesis, biblical humanism, and the new way of interpretation of both experiences of personal faith and religious tradition. These approaches present some potential solutions, which could be at least a partial answer of this fundamental existential question.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 9
776 – 792
EN
Intuitionism had been one of the most prominent ethical approaches over two hundred years, especially on the British Isles. In the first third of the 20th century it started losing its power; however, in the last few years several philosophers have been trying to renew this approach, which has made it one of the most discussed topics of contemporary meta-ethics. Intuitionism is a foundationalist approach which regards basic moral beliefs, i.e., intuitions, as self-evident. Nonetheless, modern intuitionists have to cope with empirical evidence which shows that intuitions are not as reliable a source of moral knowledge as would be necessary in this case. The aim of the paper is to present and discuss contemporary critique of intuitionism. First, I introduce intuitionism and its basic assumptions, both ontological and epistemological. Second, I focus on the criticism itself, especially on its empirical aspects concerning the role and the reliability of intuitions. As some of the proponents of intuitionism try to react to these objections and create a less flawed version of this approach, in the third part, I describe one of these attempts, i.e., Michael Huemer’s revisionary intuitionism. Finally, I try to explain why intuitionism – despite these efforts – remains a problematic approach and why ethics might be better off without it.
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